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Abstract
The major work of this research is to understand the characteristics and uniqueness of
Taiwan’s democratic development. The weaknesses and problems of this democratic system 
are believed to be influential to its external political economic development especially when
the Cross-Strait economic interaction is getting closer and become the most significant issue
for the island’s further economic development.
In order to prove this argument, the research focuses on two major theories in the fields
of democratic development and international political economy (IPE). The democratic
development theories include the discussion of democratization (modernization, transition
and social structural approach), democratic institutions (institutional choice and its political
consequence), civil society and political culture. The IPE theories include the discussion of
functional work of international economic organizations, type of trade, capital flow, and role
of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). After reviewing the literatures about these two major
theories, the researcher tries to apply these theoretical discussions into the case of Taiwan and
createS a four-level analytical framework (democratic values, institutions choice and design
and civil society) to examine and explain the interrelation between the weakness of Taiwan’s
democratic system and its effects on the Cross-Strait economic interaction.
There are two parts of empirical research in this dissertation to enhance the idea
mentioned above. The first part is the historical discussion in the chapters 5 and 6 which focus
the sixty-one-year process (1949-2008) of the island’s gradualy established democratic 
system under various periods of international political economy environment. The second part
is the investigation on the current political situation of the island after the second party
alternation and reconciliation of cross strait relations with a series of political talks and
economic cooperation after 2008. In Chapter 7, the research focuses on Kuomintang (KMT)
and its mainland policy; In Chapter 8, the discussion changes the focuses on the role of
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its different perspectives on the development of
further Cross-Strait interaction.
The major finding of this research is the fundamental weakness of Taiwan’s democratic
system due to the long-existing Blue-Green Conflicts. The uniqueness had created the
difficulties (dispute over One China Principle) for the nascent democracy to establish an
efficient democratic system which is very influential to make useful economic policies
especially the appropriate trade relations and commercial cooperation with China (including
how to support Taishang). Nevertheless, the research of this dissertation also finds that the
closer cross strait interaction after 2008 did not produce a direct, manifest and complete
influence on the island’s internal social economic development, as well as the change of
the democratic system.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The history of democratic development in Taiwan is short, but in addition to its
outstanding economic performance after 1980, the small and populous island had also
produced another miracle: a democratic system that was established in the late 1990s
and made vigorous progress for twenty years. Since martial law was lifted in 1987,
regular elections for different levels of public officials and representatives have been
held regularly and the high voting rate, especially in the four presidential elections
from 1996, shows very enthusiastic political participation and that democracy has
been well accepted and appreciated by both the elite and the public as a suitable
system of government for Taiwan.
However, the development of democracy in Taiwan is not solely a romantic
story. The process of democratic development is also related to the long-existing
ethnic conflicts between 1949 mainland immigrants (mainlanders) and local
Taiwanese. These conflicts are also combined with the political struggles between
Kuomintang (KMT) and the grass-roots opposition–mainly the Democratic Progress
Party (DPP) which was established in 1986 at almost the same time as martial law
2was lifted. The political struggle is also called the Blue–Green Conflicts.1 The
peoples and political groups consider each other as anti-democratic, but this research
wil provide evidence that each of them actualy did contribute to the island’s 
democratic development, albeit in different ways and with contrary perspectives.
Democracy has merely provided them with a fair set of rules/games to compete with
each other in order to win power and popular support.
The electoral victory of Ma Ying-jeou in the 2008 presidential election suggests
that the problems of ethnic conflicts and the national identity dispute mentioned above
were not serious. A typical KMT mainlander politician, who was known to be
pro-reunification with China, not born in Taiwan and very unfamiliar with speaking
Taiwanese (a variant of Min Nan), Ma still received ,unprecedented prominent
support and led the KMT’s return to ofice after it had lost power eight years 
previously. For Taiwanese democratic development, the KMT’s return to power in 
1 The Pan-Blue Coalition is a political coalition consisting of the Kuomintang (KMT), the People
First Party (PFP), and the smaller New Party (CNP). The name comes from the party colours of the
Kuomintang. This coalition tends to favours a Chinese nationalist identity over a Taiwanese
separatist one and favours a softer policy and greater economic linkage with the People's Republic
of China. It is opposed to the Pan-Green Coalition. The Pan-Green consists of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), and the minor Taiwan Independence Party
(TAIP). The name comes from the colours of the Democratic Progressive Party, which originally
adopted green in part because of its growth its growth from grass-root level. In contrast to the
Pan-Blue Coalition, the Pan-Green Coalition favours Taiwan independence over Chinese
reunification
3some aspects explains that “party alternation” has become a normal condition in 
Taiwan, which is in fact one of the major characteristics of a mature democratic
system. Meanwhile, it is also good to see that the process was very smooth, peaceful
and without any violence–even when the outbreak of a series of corruption scandals
regarding former president Chen Shui-bian at the end of 2006 shamed the reputation
of the island’s democratic performance and stimulated a large street demonstration in 
which thousands of people wanted Chen to step down (a potentially violent
confrontation). The Taiwanese people finally used their vote to achieve their goal,
demonstrating that the general public of Taiwan are democratic citizen with excellent
civic virtues, and that not only is a modern democratic citizen capable of questioning
authority and evaluating the performance of those in office, but also has the
willingness to listen to different opinions and is capable of participating in public
affairs with a rational–critical discourse and action. Those qualities will be discussed
more in Chapter 3 (Democratic theories and uniqueness of Taiwan democracy).
Nevertheless, the island’s democracy is stil considered as a nascent and in need 
of further consolidation owing to several problematic institutions, including: the
semi-presidential system (executive level); the single-member district dual ballot
system for legislators (legislative level); and the public referendum which had
separately caused various difficulties in view of establishing an efficient government,
4fair elections and a non-controversial public policy. As the first democratic system in
the Chinese community, the design, test, work and future development of these
institutions are undoubtedly very significant issues in order to allow those concerned
with Taiwan’s democratic development to understand and investigate whether this 
system can survive and be maintained in the future. In fact, the major political groups
between both sides including the KMT, DPP, even the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) all have their own understanding and interpretation on the meaning of
democracy. These political values undoubtedly influence the nature and direction of
this democratic system.
In addition to demonstrating the potential democratic development of the
Taiwan democratic system, the economic relationship with China (or the Cross-Strait
Relations–this term will be adopted as the major description of the relations between
Taiwan and China in this dissertation) is undoubtedly the most important external
factor to the island’s further possible change and development. In the meantime, the 
characteristics, uniqueness, even weaknesses or problems of this nascent democratic
system are also believed to be influential to the island’s international political and 
economic development, especialy when the island’s economy has been gradualy 
influenced and transformed by the growing economic power of mainland China
(China provided very attractive and advantageous incentives for Taiwan companies
5including low taxes, cheaper labour and a fast growing potentially huge domestic
market) after 1990 . The dispute whether Taiwan should be more integrated with
mainland China or keep a certain degree of political and economic autonomy has been
combined with the problems of national identify cleavages and has become the major
issue for the political competition and public policy making. The dispute also reflects
three major problems and weaknesses of this democratic system that affect the normal
work of cross-strait political dialogues, trade and commercial cooperation. First, the
so called Blue–Green Conflicts have diversified the direction and priority of the
island’s external political and economic development. Thestructural cleavage in
national identity (reunification or independence), social class (mercantilism or fair
social wealth distribution), and regional development (north or south) have caused a
cycle of “self contradiction”, instability and incoherence if party alternation becomes 
a rule which is good for the normal work of a democratic institution but may be
disadvantageous for an efficient and stable mainland, and foreign and social economic
policy making. Second, the shortcomings of incomplete democratic institutions,
especially the high possibility of minority or divided government, will also reduce the
island’s momentum to concentrate its limited energy and resource to develop its 
export-led economy, upgrade the recently developed high-tech industry, and maintain
international competition. Third, the island’s gradualy emerging “M-Shaped Society”, 
6the widening poverty gap between rich and poor, also make it possible that the
psychology of the island’s general public may become more isolated and marginalised 
when this social economic inequality is expanding. In fact, the reconciliation of the
cross-strait and the later series of political talks and economic cooperation after 2008
coincidentally provide another dimension to test this issue. Whether deeper economic
integration with China may worsen the social economic inequality mentioned above
and further cause any political consequences, such as an extreme or serious political
confrontation with China, is an interesting and significant topic for a further research.
1.2 Aim of this research
The aim of this research is to understand the characteristics and uniqueness of
Taiwan’s democratic development. The weaknesses and problems of this democratic 
system are believed to be influential to its external political economic development,
especially the closer Cross-Strait economic interaction after 2008. The major work of
this research is divided into three parts: first, the literature review and conceptual
framework building; second, historical discussion; and third, the empirical studies of
democratic development and cross-strait relations after 2008. Each part consists of
two chapters of discussion.
71.3 The plan of this dissertation
The first part of research focuses on two major theories in the fields of
democratic development and international political economy (IPE), and the researcher
will try to apply these theories to clarify the characteristics and uniqueness of Taiwan
democratic development after 1949 and the dynamic change of Cross-Strait relations
after 1990. The second part is the historical discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 which
focus on the sixty-one-year history (1949–2008) of the island’s gradualy established 
democratic system under various periods of external political and economic situations.
The third part is the examination of democratic development and its impact on
Cross-Strait relations after 2008. The researcher will try to clarify whether the nascent
democratic system can work well, can be sustained, and even cause an effect on
Taiwan’s external political economic development, especialy the rapprochement of 
cross-Strait relations after 2008. The details of each chapter are illustrated as follows.
In Chapter 3 (Theories of democracy, critics and Taiwan uniqueness), the
researcher will examine the reason and type of democratic transition according to the
three major theoretical approaches (modernization, transition and social structural
approach). Next, various constitutional choices (forms of government and electoral
formula) in the early democratic countries and their political consequence (strengths
8and shortcomings) will be fully discussed in Chapter 3.2. Chapter 3.3 explores
theories about civil society, and Chapter 3.4 examines the debate regarding whether
the culture of a Confucian society like Taiwan is compatible with the logic and
concept of a modern democratic system. Finally, in Chapter 3.4, the researcher tries to
apply the theories mentioned above to create a theoretical framework in order to
examine the case of Taiwan. Several critics on the nascent democratic system
including Blue–Green Cleavage (diversified democratic values, problems of minority
president and divided government) imbalanced North–South regional development
are found and tentatively concluded as unique to, and characteristic of, Taiwan’s 
democratic development. Moreover, the theoretical findings required more historical
evidence to support these discussions and arguments.
In Chapter 4 (IPE Theories and Cross-Strait relations), the researcher directly
applies four international political economic theories (international organization, trade
and currency policy, the work and characteristics of MNCs) to explain the nature and
characters of rapid Cross-Strait economic and commercial exchange after 1990. The
discussion includes Taiwan and China’s confrontation in international economic
organizations (Chapter 4.1), types of cross-strait trade relations, the effects of the
RMB exchange rate (Chapter 4.2), and the role of Taishang in Cross-Strait relations
(Chapter 4.3).
9The research of this chapter concludes that the“space” of Taiwan’s international
economic activities is being gradually limited, even marginalized, since China makes
use of its regional hegemonic power with bilateral cooperation to block Taiwan’s 
international political economic development. Moreover, the island’s internal
Blue–Green Cleavage had made very diverse perspectives on the cross-strait
economic interaction, and produced completely opposing mainland trade policy
orientation (open-door policy or protectionism). This is a hugely disadvantageous for
the island’s internal cooperation (there is an existing problem of national identity
cleavage) and external efficient political economic development. Meanwhile, a
comprehensive number of Taiwanese businesses are moving out of the island (the
movements of Taishang 2 in this research are defined as normal actions of
multinational corporations) and therefore worsening the internal problems of
gradually expanding social economic inequality.
Chapter 5 discusses the political and economic development during the 40-year
Two Chiang authoritarian control period (pre-democracy of Taiwan: Chiang Kai-shek,
1949–1975; Chiang Ching-kuo, 1975–1988). As narrated above and concluded at the
end of Chapter 3, more historical evidence of Taiwan’s democratic development’s 
2 Taishang is Pingying transcription of Taiwan businessmen. It is a widely used term which refers to
those Taiwanese businesspeople who are doing business and investment in mainland China
especially after 1980s.
10
uniqueness and characteristics was required. After the discussions of this chapter, the
origins and characteristics of the Blue–Green conflicts and the major uniqueness of
Taiwan’s democratic development are found in this chapter. The hasty and 
embarrassing immigration of the KMT regime from mainland China to Taiwan in
1949 had made the ethnic conflicts between minority mainlanders and native
Taiwanese unavoidable, to make matters worse, Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship and 
KMT’s authoritarian control in the name of mainland recovery had actually awoken a
potential and widespread sense of dissatisfaction, even anger, among the general
populace. However, when Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father’s political power 
and stepped into office in 1988, a series of political reforms –especially the
Taiwanization policy–limited local elections, and tolerance on growth of opposition
were actually considered as a contribution to the later peaceful and smooth democratic
transitions. The measurements were also useful for the KMT to consolidate its
legitimacy and reduce its tension with local Taiwanese.
Chapter 6 follows the previous historical discussion and focuses on the series of
political reforms when two Taiwanese presidents, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian,
went into power during 1988–2008 (democratic transition under two Taiwanese
presidents, Lee Teng-hui, 1989–1988; Chen Shui-bian, 2000–2008). Two most
significant changes for the island during these twenty years were the rapid and
11
complete democratization after a series of constitutional reforms and growing
cross-Strait economic and commercial exchanges. Taiwan’s five stages of
constitutional reform had helped the nascent democratic system become more mature
and workable since all the redundant and cumbersome institutions and organizations,
including senior parliamentarians (members of National Assembly, Legislative Yuan
and Control Yuan are elected by constituencies on mainland China), provincial
government and council were all abolished or renewed after the series of political
reforms. Meanwhile, the direct elections for the highest political positions including
the presidents, the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were successfully held from 1994.
However, the series of reforms were also suspicions as a political manipulation and
abuse of anti-China sentiment. Chapter 6.2 provides examples that the holding of the
“defensive referendum” during Chen’s second presidential election was later 
considered as a useful tool to successfully mobilize DPP core supporters; and
reducing the size of the legislature (half the number of legislators) was also believed
to be a strategy to bypass Pan-Blue Coalition obstructionism in the Legislative Yuan.
Nevertheless, while the Taiwanese were confused at these democratic institutions, the
growing cross-Strait economic interaction had made Taiwan gradually lose economic
power in order to maintain its political autonomy and cause greater problems for the
island’s internal cooperation. The rapid exodus of Taiwanese business (Taishang) 
12
from Taiwan to China can be considered as a natural tendency to maintain the
Taishang’s international competition and global market share, but the large amount of 
capital and talent outflow had actualy holowed out the island’s economy, destroyed 
the original labour division, and therefore worsened the social economic inequality.
The dilemma situation reflects the two presidents’ (Lee Teng-hui: “Go Slow, Be 
Patient”; Chen Shui-bian: “Four Nos, One Have-Not”) conservative, passive, even a 
self-contradictory and inconsistent Mainland policy.
The last two chapters (Chapter 7: the democratic development and Cross-Strait
relations after the KMT returned to power in 2008; and Chapter 8: the development of
the DPP after it lost power in 2008) are the application of the theoretical framework
and historical findings described in Chapters 3–6 for the happenings of the last two
years, after Ma and his KMT administration went to the office after 2008. In Chapter
7, the researcher wil examine whether Ma’s KMT administration can make use of its
unprecedented landslide electoral victory to overcome the disturbance from
Blue–Green conflicts and comprehensively promote its open-door policy to the
mainland in order to reconstruct the island’s economy. In addition, whether the 
existing institutional problems of the established democratic system will cause any
effect on the normal work of the Cross-Strait political dialogue (Chiang–Chen Talks),
and economic interaction will be the other focus of this chapter (and needed to be
13
further investigated). The initial findings of this research shows that first, the
weakness (Blue–Green Cleavage) and problems (risk of minority president and
divided government) of the nascent democratic system have actually caused
difficulties for the normal work of Cross-Strait economic interaction the strategy of
Ma’s administration is defining the agreement of cross-Strait talks at the “executive 
and domestic” level, rather than at a “beyond the border” level. Thus, decision making 
can be easily done through the intra party mechanism. The methods of negotiation
have obviously violated the basic democratic norms and principles in terms of
transparency and efficient consensus building with the opposition. Meanwhile, the
work of Cross-Strait negotiations might not so smooth and efficient in the future if
there is another minority president and a divided government, such as the state of
affairs during the Chen Shui–bian tenure between 2000–2008. If a divided
government happens again, (comparable with the circumstances of the 2000–2008
DPP tenure), it will be seen that an inefficient and inconsistent mainland policy will
influence the normal and regular work of Cross-Strait political dialogue and economic
cooperation going forward. Second, the closer Cross-Strait interaction after 2008 has
not produced a direct, manifest and complete influence on the islands internal social
economic development. The effects of the series of KMT open door policies to China
are indirect and marginal, such that most people on the island do not have strong
14
feelings about these major changes in their daily life, excepting those Taiwanese
Businessmen (Taishang) who have cause to move between the mainland and Taiwan
frequently.
In the final chapter (Chapter 8), the researcher clarified four fundamental
problems (social confrontation, erosion of social base, factionalism, and corruption)
of the DPP administration’s eight years in central power and why it lost the 
presidential election in 2008. The discussion of this chapter is designed to understand
the relationship between the island’s democratic system and its efects on the curent 
Cross-Strait economic interaction from the perspectives of the opposition. The result
of the studies show that after 2008, the DPP also changed its focus of supervision
from the domestic affairs to the rapprochement of Cross-Strait relations (a good
example of this can be seen in the choice of newly elected DPP chairman, Tsai Ing
-wen–the former vice premier and chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council during
the Chen Shui-bian administration). The DPP strongly criticize the non-transparency
of Cross-Strait dialogues and the problems of the KMT’s open door policies –
especially the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Economic
Cooperation Framework (ECFA). However, the major argument of this chapter
reveals that the popular dissatisfaction with the island’s long term economic 
difficulties (expanding social economic inequality) and existing unbalanced
15
North–South regional development are still better opportunities rather than the
Cross-Strait economic issues for the DPP to reclaim central power in the future. This
argument is proved as true since 2009 the DPP have started to win and get more seats
in the local level elections for country magistrates, city majors, and by-elections for
legislators.
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Chapter 2 Research Methods and Methodology
Introduction
The initial stage of this research consists of four major tasks which are all about
how to determine a useful strategy and the methods which are essential to the practice
and success of this research. These tasks are: Step 1, deciding on the topic of the
research project; Step 2, specifying the scope of research; Step3, developing
hypotheses to explain its operationalization; and Step 4, developing a conceptual
framework showing the relationships between the different hypotheses and variables
to be investigated. The details of each task are described as follows:
2.1 The central theme of this research
The title of the research is: “The weakness of a democratic system and its
interplay with external political economic development: in case study of Taiwan after
1949”. The weakness of a democratic system here refers to the existing and potential
contradictory political values which actually cause the problems to the design and
work of a democratic institution. The interplay with international political economic
(IPE) development refers to that country’s power and work in any international 
political economic negotiations, capital flow, efficient trade policy making, and
17
movement of multi-national corporations. The basic logic of this research is that the
author of this dissertation believes the fundamental weakness of Taiwan’s democratic 
system is the long-existing Blue–Green Conflicts. This major political, economic and
social cleavage had actually brought about the hasty design and improper transplant of
democratic institutions inside the island, and the democratization in Taiwan is
suspicious as a process of abandoning the One China principle and the direction of
Taiwan’s independence. These weaknesses and characteristics wil become a 
boundary for the external political and economic development, especially the
direction of the island’s economic development which was gradualy becoming 
associated with mainland China after 1990. Meanwhile, on the contrary, the closer
Cross-Strait economic interaction wil influence the island’s economic and social 
structure, which is also linked to the island’s further political development.  
2.2 The scope of this research
The research scope includes democracy and IPE theories, with a range of time and
focus.
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2.2.1 Academic theories
The research focuses on two major theories in the fields of democratic
development and international political economy (IPE). The democratic development
theories include the arguments of democratization (modernization, transition and
social structural approach), democratic institutions (institutional choice and its
political consequence), civil society and political culture. After reviewing the general
arguments of these theories, the researcher will attempt to develop a framework to
explain the case of Taiwan and the other more specific and detailed theoretical
arguments, including: national identity issues, constitutional forms of government,
electoral formula. Types of government–opposition interaction will be also discussed
and applied to examine the uniqueness of Taiwan’s democracy. The IPE theories
include the discussion of the functional work of international economic organizations,
trade, capital flow, and role of multinational corporations (MNCs). The researcher
will directly apply these theoretical discussions to the case of rapid cross-Strait
economic and commercial exchange after 1990 and endeavour to determine the
possible effects on the development of the island’s democratic system, especialy the 
change of democratic values of the island’s political elite and populace.     
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2.2.2 Range of time and focus
In addition to the theoretical discussion mentioned above, there are two pieces of
empirical research in this essay. The first is the historical discussion in Chapters 5 and
6 which focuses on the sixty-one-year process (1949–2008) of the island’s gradualy 
established democratic system during various phases of Taiwan’s external political
economic environment. The historical research is also divided into two areas of
discussion: the 40 years of the Chiang family’s authoritarian control(Chapter 4: Pre-
democracy of Taiwan: under Two Chiang’s Control; Chiang Kai-shek, 1949–1975;
Chiang Ching-kuo, 1975–1988); and the 20 years of democratic transition under two
native Taiwanese presidents (Chapter 6: Democratic transition under two Taiwanese
presidents, Lee Teng-hui, 1989–1988; Chen Shui-bian, 2000–2008) .
In the final two chapters (Chapter 7: the democratic development and
cross-Strait relations after the KMT returned to power in 2008; and Chapter 8: the
development of the DPP after it lost power in 2008), the researcher will endeavour to
clarify the situation as to whether the reconciliation and rapprochement of
Cross-Strait political talk and economic interaction after 2000 will cause any change
to the Blue–Green Conflicts – a major characteristic of Taiwan’s democratic 
development. The major focus will be the analysis of whether the closer economic
cross-Strait relations wil reinforce, restrain, or change the psychology of the island’s 
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populace and major political leader’s ideas and determination to support and 
consolidate the island’s established democratic systems.      
2.3 Conceptual framework
The basic hypothesis of this research is a nascent democracy with an export-led
economy that were the initial choice of the political elites (not the public), and the
elites’ political ideas or concepts (including democratic values) aredeeply influenced
by dynamic changes in the external political economic environment. In the case of
Taiwan, this situation has become more obvious since the closer Cross-Strait
economic interaction in the late 1990s. Under this hypothesis, in order to understand
the nature of Taiwan’s “nascent” democratic system and cross-Strait economic
relations, after reviewing literatures on democracy and IPE in Chapters 3 and 4,
respectively, the researcher has created and developed a four-level analytical
framework which resembles a pyramid (Figure 2.1) and has been set up by the
researcher as a useful, systematic and multi-dimension conceptual framework to
examine the case of Taiwan democratic development (Figure 3.1)–especially in
relation to the analysis on the relations between political values and institution
building (from level 1 to level 2).
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H3
Figure 2.1: The four-level analytical framework on Taiwan democratic development with
external political economic factors
The external IPE factors
H 1
Int’l Organizations
Democratic Values 1
MNCs
Institutional Choice 2 H2
Capital Flow
Trade Civil Society 3
Traffic Political Culture 4
Source: Author’s own compilation
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In addition to the four-level analytical dimensions (democratic values,
institutional choice, civil society, political culture), the framework also combines the
discussion of various external political economic factors, including Taiwan and
China’s confrontation in international organizations, growing commercial exchange, 
and trade and capital flow. Moreover, the work and movements of Taishang (in
section 4.3, the researcher has defined Taishang as a kind of MNC) is a significant and
special phenomenon while discussing Cross-Strait economic interaction. These
external political economic factors actualy have influence on the island’s democratic 
development, especially the change of the public mindset, the political ideas of the
ruling elite, even reshaping the social economic structure. Three major hypotheses are
developed that will be tested for correctness in this research, these hypotheses are
described as follows.
2.4 Hypotheses
As mentioned above, the basic hypothesis of this research is a nascent democratic
system with an export-led economy that were initially decided upon by the political
elites (not by the public), and the political elites’ ideas or concepts (including 
democratic values) are deeply influenced by dynamic changes of the external political
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economic environment. The three detailed hypotheses necessitate a significant
undertaking for this researcher to supply answers. The first hypothesis (H1) relates to
the nature and evolution of the political ideas or concepts of Taiwan’s political leaders 
after 1949, the second hypothesis (H2) relates to the problems of a nascent democratic
institutions, and the third hypothesis (H3) tests the external political economic effects
on the development of this democratic system.
H1: The function of democracy for Taiwan is to provide a differentiation from
CCP China and to reject further political integration with mainland.
The researcher would like to prove that the function of democracy in Taiwan
evolved from differentiating between democratic ROC and Communist CCP and
became a justification for Taiwan’s independence. In other words, the democratic 
development can be interpreted as the process of abandoning the “One China” 
principle. In the period controlled by two Chiang presidents (Chiang Kai-shek and
Chiang Ching-kuo) their governance is generally considered to have been
authoritarian and anti-democratic; however, this researcher still aims to prove there
were still democratic ideas in their minds and that these ideas were actually put into
practice; that the limited local elections held in the early times were also helpful for
the regime to prove the ROC was still the only legitimate government of China; and
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to internally ease the tension between the minority ruling mainlanders and majority
local Taiwanese. Later, when the two native Taiwanese presidents (Lee Teng-hui and
Chen Shui-bian) stepped onto the political platform, and Taiwan had gradually
become more isolated in international politics while successfully integrating into the
global economy, the established democratic institutions became a very useful tool for
the island to win international sympathy and support, causing however, a growing
conflict with China as the democratization strengthened the island’s resolve to secede 
from China and build its own country.
H2: Institutionalisation of Taiwan’s democratization is established, but not fuly 
developed and working well. The function of democracy described in
Hypothesis 1 is the major reason which causes a blind or inappropriate
transplant from other leading or near democratic countries (i.e. US and
Japan).
Various basic democratic institutions including the semi-presidential system
(executive level), the single-member district dual ballot system for legislators
(legislative level), and public referendum had already been designed and established
within the past twenty years. However, as described in the previous chapter
(Introduction) these institutions had separately caused various difficulties including an
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unclear division and unclear responsibilities between president and premier, unfair
elections (regarding dis-proportionality between votes and seats), and more
controversial public policy debate (i.e. the defensive public referendum in 2004 and
possible ECFA referendum in 2009). This situation in some aspects explains that the
work of institution building might be an outcome of the short-term political struggle
rather than the product of long-term rational calculation or good political tradition.
The testing of this hypothesis will be proved true after the historical discussion in
Chapters 4 and 5 and the empirical studies of Chapters 6 and 7.
H3: As there is deeper integration with the global economic market, the island’s 
international economic competition grows rapidly and hence also the
autonomy of the established democratic systems. However, in the meantime,
the condition also worsens the island’s economic inequality, especialy after 
the rapid Cross-Strait economic interaction since 1990, and has even
produced extremist politics.
In Chapter 3 (Theories of democracy) and Chapter 4 (IPE theories and
cross-Strait relations), the researcher will argue that the existing unbalanced
North–South regional development is the result of the island’s economic globalization 
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and major social economic factors which worsen the Blue–Green Conflicts. The
researcher assumes that the situation will be more serious after the rapidly growing
cross-Strait economic interaction began in 1990. This truth of this hypothesis will be
examined in Chapter 7 (the democratic development and Cross-Strait relations) and
Chapter 8 (the development of DPP after it lost power in 2008). The worry of the
island’s economic marginalization and growing anti-China resentment will be the
major focus whilst discussing the relation of social economic inequality and the
further development of Taiwan’s democratic transition.
2.5 Research Methods
The following three methods are specified and considered by the researcher as
appropriate for answering the research questions, testing the hypotheses, and
investigating the accuracy of the model. However, there are also limitations in these
methods and different expectation with the planning after execution.
2.5.1 Documentation
Documentation research is adopted as the major method in the process of
theoretical discussion (Chapter 3) which includes retrieving the previous research on
general theories in the field of democracy and international political economy,
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drawing a general picture of Taiwan’s democratic development as wel as cross-Strait
relations, and building a theoretical framework to answer the research questions and
test hypotheses.
The procedure of documentation research is composed of two major steps: First,
collecting related materials from diversified resources including books, journals,
magazines, newspapers, websites, TV and videos –typically, most materials of this
type can be accessed through libraries (for example the main library in Durham
University and the ROC National Library); in some cases however, the researcher will
utilise online search engines or need to trace references in other articles to obtain a
selected readings. Second, a combination of extensive and intensive reading on
selected materials that includes accumulating materials by note taking, filtering useful
and important information, integrating different arguments systematically, and finally
developing new ideas about the theories and realities in a creative and practical way.
In the entirety of the reading process, this research has followed the principle that the
ideas or arguments which are analytical and critical are preferred for the purposes of
summarization, evaluation and collection. The collection and analysis of these
“secondary data” is a very cost-effective way of discovering what research has
already been undertaken on the topic and what evidence is available, also highlighting
any areas where new research needs to be done.
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2.5.2 Event analysis
In the empirical work of this research (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8), the technique of
content analysis is widely adopted. The objective, systematic, and qualitative
description of manifest event of communications recorded on a wide range of material
from newspaper reports, TV programmes, radio broadcasts, and internet websites are
essential research techniques for the researcher to understand the research questions
and test the thesis hypotheses. As the material is public, there are no problems of
access or informed consent. Typically, when using event analysis, 3 the researcher
will analyse the content of different materials according to the following six steps:
1. Select a topic and develop research hypotheses
2. Choose the appropriate communications sources (e.g. newspapers, television
programmes, party manifestos
3. Decide on the basis of sampling the materials
4. Define the categories for analysis
5. Develop the procedure for coding the material
6. Choose the quantitative measure for analysing the data
3 According to Koopmans and Rucht, there are two methods of analyzing social communications:
Content analysis, which attempts to be precise, scientific and quantitative; discourse analysis, which
is a qualitative technique and sheds light on the importance of language especially political language
Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenberg (2002) (ed.), Methods of Social Movements Research
(University of Minnesota Press), pp. 221–242.
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For example, in chapter 7 (the democratic development and cross-Strait
relations after the KMT return to power in 2008), the major focus and issue
orientation (Step 1: research hypotheses) is around the Ma administration’s open door 
policy, which defined cross-Strait relations as a kind of cooperation status, without
hostility to each other. Therefore, the re-rapprochement of Taiwan and China
especially in the series of economic interactions after five rounds of Chang–Chen
Talks (CC Talks) during 2008–2009 make it foreseeable that any recent information
about government new measurements and cross-Strait interactions in the period
2008-2009 from reports and articles on newspapers and magazines (i.e. five CC
Talks), TV programmes (i.e. discussion on the Ma administration’s performance),
government public statistics (i.e. estimated effects of ECFA) will be the major source
of data collection in the work of this chapter (Step 2: appropriate communications
sources). Meanwhile, the researcher has collected 71 news reports, 6 magazine
articles, 9 government official statistic and reports, 1 TV programme video (Step 3:
the basis of sampling the materials) and classified the data into 5 major and 8 sub
categories (Step 4: the categories for analysis). Among these research materials,
international news reports (i.e. Reuters, the Washington Post, New York Times), the
local newspaper written in English (i.e. Taipei Times, China Post ) and the articles
which focus more on economic issues (i.e. Commonwealth Magazine, Wealth Invest
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Weekly) are preferentially adopted since the series of cross-Strait economic
cooperation and reopened negotiations in 2008–2009 had actually drawn attention
from the international community and mostly concerns the international economic
effects of this new development and tendency (Step 5: the procedure for coding the
material). The quantity of work can be illustrated in Table 2.1: The categories for
analysis and source of materials in Chapter7 (Step 6: quantitative measure for
analysing the data).
In Chapter 8 (The DPP after it lost power in 2008), the researcher basically
follows similar principles of event analysis skills to collect data and examine the
hypotheses. The major focus of this chapter (step 1: research hypotheses) is the role of
the DPP in the current transformation of cross-Strait relations and the DPP’s response 
to the island’s worsening social economic inequality. In order to understand this topic, 
the updated and latest information in the period 2008/2009 from reports and articles in
newspapers and magazines (i.e. discussion on the reasons of DPP failure in 2008), TV
programmes (i.e. the debate of ECFA between Ma Ing-jeou and Tsia Ing-wen), and
government public statistics (i.e. the statistic of poverty gap) are also considered as an
appropriate data resource (Step 2: appropriate communications sources) for the
research. There were 50 news reports, 4 magazine articles, 1 government official
statistic and report, and 1 TV programme collected in the work of this chapter.(Step 3:
31
the basis of sampling the materials). The collected data are classified into 4 major and
9 sub categories. (Step 4: the categories for analysis). Among these research materials,
the editorial comments of major newspaper (i.e. China News, United Daily News, and
Liberty Times)4 and the books which focus on the previous and current developments
of the DPP are preferentially adopted since the general public still expect there to be a
strong opposition power to supervise the KMT. The question of whether the DPP
could emerge from the shadow of former president Chen Shui- bian’s coruption 
scandal, rebuild the party image and strength its function had actually become a major
focus for Taiwan’s further political development and a symbol of democratic 
consolidation. Meanwhile, the articles about Taiwan’s social economic inequality are 
also part of the major work in the data collection, as the DPP has traditionally defined
itself as disadvantaged social groups. They are more sensitive to the worsening social
economical inequality especially after deeper economic integration with Mainland
China after the KMT went to office (Step 5: the procedure for coding the material).
The quantity of work is illustrated in Table 2.2: The categories for analysis and source
of materials in Chapter 8. (Step 6: quantitative measure for analyzing the data)
4 In fact, the China Times and United Daily News are generally considered as pro-Pan Blue news
media; On the contrary, the Liberty Times is even considered DPP official propaganda.
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Table 2.1: The categories for analysis and source of materials in Chapter 7
Source: Author’s own compilation
Source
Categories
Newspapers Magazines Government
Official Report
Public Statistics
TV
Programmes
Interviews
Ideas 4The ideas and
performance of
Ma Ying-jeou’s 
administration
Performance 6 1 1 2
Cross-strait negotiations 4
Direct Link 9 1 3
MOU 9 2 1
Cross-Strait
Economic
Exchange
Proposal
ECFA 8 2 3 1
Participation
of
International
Organizations
5 2Outside
Negotiation
Tables
Armed Sales 10 1
Global Financial Crisis 16 2
Amount 71 6 9 1 6
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Table 2.2: The categories for analysis and source of materials in Chapter 8
Source: Author’s own compilation
Source
Categories
Newspapers Magazines Government
Official Report
Public Statistics
TV
Programmes
Interviews
Social
Confrontation
3
Erosion of
social support
Factionalism 2 1 1
The reasons
for DPP
failure in
2008
Corruption 1
First DPP
Female
Chairman
5Development
of the DPP
after Tsai
elected as
part
chairman
Role of
supervision on
cross-Strait
negotiations
5
Poverty Gap 2 1 2New Social
issues for
opposition
The effects of
ECFA
5 1
North–South Cleavage 17 3
Future 2
Amount 40 4 1 1 5
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2.5.3 In-depth interviews
A series of in-depth interviews is designed as the other useful and supplementary
method to make this research more comprehensive and elaborate especially in the
historical (Chapters 5 and 6) and empirical discussion chapters (Chapters 7 and 8 ). As
the in-depth interview is a conversation with an individual conducted by someone
who usually collects more specific information or has been a key leader or member in
the community for a long time, this type of research method is considered to be
uncomplicated (just speak to one person and keep her or his attention, rather than
having to address a group), detailed (the researcher may even have a chance to
follow-up on questions), and suitable for a researcher to understand the relative
questions. For example, in Chapter 7 (the democratic development and Cross strait
relations after the KMT return to power in 2008), the researcher conducted 25
interviews and selected 6 of them (Table 2.1) to supply explanations and analyses of
the cross-Strait interaction after the KMT returned to power in 2008, Owing to the
interviewees’ backgrounds –experienced staff from a variety of organizations such as
travel agency, transportation company (airline, marine), small and medium sized
entrepreneur; and two famous KMT politician –the information gained from these
interviews was actually very helpful for the researcher to understand more details
regarding, and specific effects of, direct link, ECFA and the problems of Ma’s 
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leadership and KMT cooperation. In Chapter 8 (The DPP after it lost power in 2008),
the researcher conducted 24 interviews and also selected five of them to supply
explanations and analyses of the development and rebuilding work of the DPP after it
lost power in 2008. The interviewees here are experienced staff in a house service
agency, the Revenue Service department of the government, and famous DPP
politicians, and so the information gained from these interviews were also actually
very helpful for the researcher to understand in greater detail some specific situations
of the island’s worsening social economic inequality and the strategy and works of the 
DPP reforms. In Chapter 4 (Pre-democracy of Taiwan under Two Chiang’s 
authoritarian control) and Chapter 5 (The process of democratic transition after two
native Taiwanese presidents, Lee and Chen), the researcher conducted 20 interviews
and selected one of them to supply explanations and analyses of the special historical
events mentioned in these two chapters. The ideas from interviewees who had
actually experienced the historical event –such as the 228 incident (1940s), KMT
Taiwanization policy (1970–1980), constitutional reforms (1990), and first party
alternation (2000). In other words, the interviews are not only reliable sources of
valuable information, but also “one part of Taiwan’s democratization history”.
Conclusion
According to the discussion above, in order to understand the motivations and
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limitations of Taiwan’s democratic development, three stages of work are required to
complete this research and testify the hypotheses. The first stage of work (Chapters 3
and 4) contains the literature review about democracy, IPE theories, and various
explanations and discussions about the case of Taiwan’s democratic development and 
Cross-Strait relations. As highlighted above, a four-level analytical model and three
hypotheses have been created and an analytical framework will be applied as the basic
conceptual lens to understand the history (stage 2: Chapters 5 and 6), current situation
and further tendency of Taiwan’s democratic development (stage 3: Chapters 7 and 8). 
The result of this work will undoubtedly determine the success or failure of testing the
truth of the hypotheses. In addition, three research methods (documentation research,
content analysis, and discourse analysis) are skilfully and flexibly applied in this
research especially in the later four chapters which are defined by the researcher as
the empirical field of this research.
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Chapter 3 Theories of Democracy, Critics and Taiwan’s Uniqueness
Introduction
While examining the democratic performance in any country which is in the
process of democratic transition and consolidation, it is clearly essential before
starting the research to define and clarify of the meaning of the different terms used
when talking about democracy. Generally speaking, such terms might refer to political
values (i.e. government accountability, tolerance on minority and dissident opinions),
institution building (i.e. constitutional government, regular elections, and competitive
party systems), the emergence of civil society (i.e. voluntary organizations; trust
reciprocal network), and political culture (i.e. rational critical discourse; respect to
individual and minority rights), all of which are advantageous for long-term
democratic development. Figure 3.1 illustrates a four-level analytical framework
created by the researcher to aid in understanding the preconditions, processes and
shaped social structure of any case of democratic development, this framework offers
a systematic concept lens and may be considered as necessary before examining
major theories about democracy.
As Figure 3.1 shows, in the first and second levels of discussion, when the elite
in power or people in the public start to believe that democracy is the most legitimate
form of government, support market structures and a civil society are spontaneously
created and gradually separate from state control, further democratization is possible
but may occur in different ways.5 Contemporary democratic theorists, especially
social economic theorists, typically discuss different causes of democratization in this
5 Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture”,Journal of Democracy, Vol.6, No.1 (January 1995). pp.
7–14.
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Figure 3.1 Levels of Democratic Development
Definition of Democracy Analytical approach
Pre-democracy Values
Social Economic Approach
Institutions
Electoral democracy
Civil Society Institution Approach
Liberal Democracy
Culture
Social Cultural Approach
Source: Author’s own compilation
level. They argue that the emergence and prevalence of democratic values is the result
of economic well-being (modernization theory) and change of social structure
(structural theory) despite facing criticism from “transition” theorists who believe 
democratization is the result of the political elite’s decision to change and their 
calculation to retain legitimacy, not a “precondition” of social and economic factors. 
In the second level of analysis, institutionalism theorists focus on various
constitutional choices and institutional designs including different forms of
government, election systems, party systems, and the like. Democracy at this level
transforms from abstract ideas to real “procedures” or “methods” to produce an 
“elected” and “representative” government.  However, “painstaking design did not 
ensure good performance”6. As an interesting saying goes, “it is easier to build a road 
6 R. Putnam (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press), p.10.
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than to build an organization to maintain the road”.7 Many researches on this level
have shown that institutions in a nascent democracy are the product of politics and
power struggles, not the result of rational calculations about the establishment of an
efficient government and fair rules of game. Moreover, institutions can often be
manipulated by public policy made by incumbent in order to keep their inherent
advantages. The discussion in the third and fourth level emphasizes socio-cultural
factors in explaining the performance of democratic institutions. More recently, social
scientists have looked to political culture in their explanation of cross-national
variations in the political system. They study civic culture and seek to explain
differences in democratic governance in various countries through an examination of
political attitudes and orientations grouped under the rubric of civic culture.
In this chapter, the researcher will try to review and scrutinise the arguments of
major democracy theories according to the four-level analytical framework illustrated
above. In the first section, three approaches to the reasons and processes of
democratization will be discussed: modernization theorists consider democratization
is the result of certain degree of economic development; transition theorists consider
democracy to be produced by the initiatives of human beings –especially political
elites including incumbent and opposition leaders; and structure theorists combine
both of the previous perspectives and argue that democratization is the result of
interaction between social structure and political actors. In the second section, the
origin and characters of various democratic institutions will be discussed. The
researcher will compare three major Western democracies (the Presidential,
Westminster and Consensus models) and their problems (i.e. executive–legislative
deadlock, electoral dis-proportionality) of actual performance. The discussion in this
7 Arturo Israel (1987), Institutional Development: Incentives to Performance (Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1987).
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section will remind people that the constitutional choices of democratic institutions
are sometimes the result of dynamic political struggles, not the sophisticated
consideration of electoral justice or an efficient form of government. In the third
section of this chapter, the researcher will endeavour to clarify the nature and
elements of a civil society (generally believed to be the most important foundation of
a liberal democracy). A vigorous and active social group or association, reciprocal
social network and citizens with “good” qualities and pro-democratic attitudes (i.e.
rational-critical discourse; tolerance of minorities) are key elements of the modern
democratic society and very influential for further democratic development. In the
fourth section, the discussion considers whether the traditional Chinese social culture,
especially the Confucian way of thinking is an obstacles to modern democratic
development. The discussion will reveal that the family unit is the most significant
character of Chinese society which provides a reciprocal network not unlike civil
society and even a bulwark against the power of state; however, some theorists view
this negatively and consider strong families which emphasize the virtues of harmony
and concession are actually incompatible with core ideas of modern democracy:
institutions are built upon the clear competition and participation of strong individuals.
In the final section, the researcher will try to apply the arguments discussed in the
previous four sections to the case of Taiwan and describe the uniqueness of Taiwan’s 
democratic development process. The researcher will then attempt to arrange new
theoretical findings from the case of Taiwan and establish a theoretical model
according to the four-level analytical framework in order to have a clear and
systematic historical explanation (Chapters 5 and 6) and tendency prediction (Chapter
7 and 8). The final chapter will be the conclusion and the major task of this theoretical
chapter.
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3.1 Three approaches to the analysis of democratization
Three theories of thinking on regime change –known as the modernization,
transition and structural approach –are useful to understand how democratization
occurs. The modernization approach emphasizes a number of social and economic
requisites, either associated with existing liberal democracies, or necessary for
successful democratization. The transition approach emphasizes political process and
elite initiatives and choices that account for moves from authoritarian rule to liberal
democracy. The structural approach emphasizes changing structures of power
favourable to democratization.8 Some scholars classify the three approaches into the
functionalist and the genetic school, or respectively macro and micro-oriented
dimensions analysis .The functionalist school, which includes the modernization and
structural approaches, gives paramount attention to structural or
environmental-notably (the structural approach), economic and social determinants of
political system change; and views regime change as preconditioned by particular
conditions like economic development or cultural patterns (bottom -up). The genetic
school, similar with transition theories, usually gives priority to conjectural and
volitional variables and especially political determinants of regime change, and
therefore emphasizes the importance of political choice and strategy by actors during
the transition process (top-down).9
Modernization and democratization are related to four factors: industrialization,
urbanization, increased income, and education. Industrialization develops the market
8 D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M., Kiloh, and P. Lewis, (1997) (ed.), Democratization. (Cambridge: Polity
Press), p. 10.
9 Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (1994) (ed.), Democratization in Eastern Europe, Domestic
and International Perspective, London and New York, p.16.
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and media. This is the complex of skills and resources, which characterize the diverse,
complex and interrelated economy (market) which requires greater interpersonal trust,
life competence and plural sources of information. Increased income makes the
various social strata from upper class to working class more receptive to democratic
political tolerance norms in order to keep the wealth and help people to have more
power to negotiate and so be able to have greater political participation (no
representation, no taxation).10 Urbanization changes the shape of the stratification
structure so that it shifts from an “elongated pyramid” with a large lower-class base
(homogeneous and isolated community) to a “diamond”with a growing middle class
(cosmopolitan) which has a mitigating role in moderating conflict and is able to
reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups.11 Education
enables people to broaden their outlook, helps them to understand the need for norms
of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremists and monolithic doctrines,
increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices and to participate in
voluntary groups. Seymour Martin Lipset, the guru of modernization theories, had
provided a famous saying to explain the relationship between economic development
and democratic stability: “The more wel-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it
wil sustain democracy.”12
Modernization analysis is plausible on the basis of quantitative evidence. For
example, Using GNP as an explanatory variable is a useful method to understand the
economics condition in different levels of democratic development. The data of the
1976 GNP provide persuasive evidence that there was obviously a “political transition 
10 Anna Clark, and Sarah Richardson (1999), History of Suffrage 1760-1867 (ed.), 6 Vols. (London:
Pickering & Chatto Publishers).
11 Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), ‘Some Social Requisitesof Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March, 1959), p.96.
12 Seymour Martin Lipset (1960), Political Man, (London, Heinemann, 1976), p.31.
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zone”: 27 out of 31 countries which liberalized or democratized from 1974–1989
were in the middle income range, per capita GNPs between $1,000 and $3000; neither
poor and nor wealthy.13 Another empirical research conducted from 1950 to 1990 of
135 countries also showed the economic development and performance to have a very
strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive. The probability of
democratic demise is lower and expected life is longer in the countries with higher
annual per-capita income. Where there is an annual per-capita income above $6,000,
democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever; Inflation also
threatens democratic stability. A democratic regime has a 2.3 per cent chance of dying
and a life expectancy of 44 years when the annual inflation rate is under 6 percent; a
1.4 per cent chance of dying and a life expectancy of 71 years when the annual
inflation rate is between 6 and 30 percent; and a 6.4 per cent chance of dying and a
life expectancy of 16 years when the annual inflation rate is above 30 percent. The
moderate of inflation promotes democratic stability.14
Modernization theories face two major criticism: First, despite that the
quantitative index makes the modernization theories more plausible while explaining
the relation between democracy and economic development, the proposition, such as
“no telephone, no democracy” or” more telephone, more democracy” seems only to 
point out the “universal” and “liner” corelations, not the “actual causal 
mechanisms”15 between modernization and democratization. The economic and
social factors have significant impact on democratization but they are not
determinative. Over the long term, economic development creates the basis for
13 Samuel Huntington (1991), The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), p.59.
14 Adam Przeworski (1996) (ed.), “What Makes Democracies Endure?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7,
No.1 (January 1996), pp. 40–41.
15 Ibid, Potter, D., Goldblatt, D., Kiloh, M. and Lewis, P. (1997)), p.12.
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democratic regimes (such as in Western Europe), however, in the short term, the rapid
economic growth and economic crisis may undermine authoritarian regimes and not
necessarily lead them to introduce democracy16 (e.g. China’s GNP has an annual 
growth of 10 per cent; in the period 1960-1975, Brazil’s GNP grew by 8 per cent and 
Iran’s GNP grew by 8 per cent). Modernization also fails explain the case of the oil 
producing countries –Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait were undemocratic, although in
1976 they had per capita GNPS over $4,000, ranking well among the wealthy
countries. The implication is that broad-based economic development involving
significant industrialization may contribute to democratization but wealth resulting
from the sale of oil and other natural source does not.17
Second, the modernization approach receives criticism from transition theorists.
The transition theorists say that modernization theories simplify the evolution of the
historical political process of democratization. Historically what has driven these
processes is the agency of political elites in conflict and their eventual conciliation.18
Democracy is produced by the initiatives of human beings, not “inexorable 
movement” on the “comparatively bland terain of timeless social requisites”.19
Determinism is the major problem of functional analysis, and historical evidence
shows that important political changes do not happen according to certain stages (i.e.
Lenin and Mao initiated their communist revolution and never thought the proletariat
were too small or that capitalism had not reached an advanced enough stage for a
16 Ibid, Samuel Huntington, (1991), p.72.
17 Ibid., p. 65.
18 Rustow remarked that “a people who are not in conflict about some rather fundamental maters 
would have little need to devise democracy’s elaborate rules for conflicts resolution”; Danwart 
Rustow, (1970), “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, Comparative Politics Vol.2
(April 1970), pp.337-363.
19 J. Higley, and M.G.Burton (1989), “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transition and Breakdowns”, 
American Social Science Review 54, No.1 (1989), p. 21.
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revolution in Russian and China).20 Lipset later also acknowledged that the theorist is
only able to point out the probability, not the certainty of democratization.21
Transition theorists understand that democratization is a historical process of
social conflicts. Rustow defines the route to democracy as having four main phases in
all countries: national unity phase, preparatory phase, decision phase (first transition),
and habituation phase (second transition). Democratization occurs when the vast
majority start to share a political identity (the first phase), inconclusive political
struggle eases, compromise is achieved, democratic rules are adapted, and political
parties gain some share in the polity (the second–third phase). Democracy is firmly
established after a new generation of elites become habituated to democratic rules and
believe them (the fourth phase).22 The idea of the decision phase of transition has
developed into the concept of “political pacts”, which are the means whereby diferent 
camps of political elites negotiate with each other and achieve a compromise of
consensus on the rule of the game.23 Huntington points out there are three types of
government–opposition interaction provide three various paths to democratization.24
20 Myron Weiner (1987), “Empirical Democratic Theory and the Transition from Authoritarianism to 
Democracy”, Political Science, Vol. 20, No.4 (Autumn, 1987), p. 862.
21 Seymour Martin Lipset, Seong and Torres (1993), “A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites 
of Democracy”, International Social Science Journal, No. 136 (1993), p. 158.
22 Ibid, Rustow, D. (1970), p. 362.
23 G. O'Donnell, and P. Schmitter (1986), Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 37.
24 Shain and Linz formulate there are four ideal types of interim government: incumbent- led caretaker,
opposition–led provisional, power sharing interim, and international interim; The concept of
incumbent-led is equal to “transformation”, opposition–led is equal to “replacement”, and power 
sharing interim is equivalent of the meaning to “transplacement”. Transformation, replacement, and
transplacement are three major types of government–opposition interaction in Huntington’s 
description; Y. Shain and J.J. Linz, (1995) (ed.), Between States: Interim Governments and
Democratic Transitions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Ibid, Huntington, Samuel (1991),
pp. 121–124.
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“Transformation” (incumbent-led caretaker government) occurs when the elites in
power take the lead in bringing about democracy (opposition government): opposition
groups take the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regimes
colapse or are overthrown. What might be termed “Transplacement” (power sharing 
interim government; opposition and government have equal power) occurs when
democratization has resulted largely from joint action by government and opposition
groups. Furthermore, each path is the result of deeper interactions between reformers
(or soft liners) and standpatters (or hardliners) in the governing coalition, and between
moderates and extremists in the opposition. The “transformation” occurs when 
reformers are stronger than the extremists in the opposition. Opposition moderates are
often co-opted into the governing coalition while standpatter groups opposing
democratization defect from it. In “replacement”, (opposition-led provisional
government) the opposition eventually have to be stronger than the government and
the democratic moderates have to be weaker than radical extremists. A succession of
defection of groups often leads to the downfall of the regime and inauguration of
democratic system. In “Transplacement”, the central interaction is between reformers 
in the governing coalition and moderates in the opposition, whose power is roughly
equal, with each being able to dominate the antidemocratic groups on its side of line
between the government and the opposition. In some transplacement, government and
former opposition agree to at least a temporary sharing of power. Figure 3.2 explains
that the legitimacy erosion of an authoritative incumbent is also an important impetus
for democratization. Historically, religion, the divine right of kings, one-party
ideology (nationalism or communism), temporary military vanguards, and personal
charisma have provided the basis of legitimacy for non democratic rule. However,
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Figure 3.2: The reasons for political elites to promote democratization
Empire Lose war
Military Crisis of legitimacy Economic Depression & Social Instability
Ruling One party Minority Rule
Dictator
More Political Contestation
Elites
Opposition <Ruler (Transformation)
Opposiiton Fighting with rulers Opposition >Ruler (Replacement)
Opposition = Ruler (Transplacement)
Source: Author’s own compilation
with the growth of industrialization and challenges from Western power, the major
difficulties for these non democratic regimes, no matter be they continental emperor,
military regimes, one-party systems or personal dictatorships, are their out-of-fashion
political systems and inefficient self-renewal mechanisms for solving the crises of
legitimacy such as losing wars, depression, social failure or minority rule.
Authoritarian leaders choose to adapt the election, but it is also probably a risk for
them because it is likely they may never come back to power. The holding of an
election is considered as a milestone or watershed in the transition from
authoritarianism to democratization.25
The major criticism to the transition approach comes from the structural
approach. The basic premise of the structural approach to democratization is that
particular inter-relationships of certain structures of power, economics, society and
opportunities drive political elities and others along a historical trajectory leading
25 Ibid, Samuel Huntington (1991), p. 48.
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toward liberal democracy.26 The structural theorists argue that although it is easy to
say that democratization is brought about by the decisions of political elites, it is
difficult to prove that such decisions are made without any calculation or concern for
the environment and structure. There are many structures of power that constrain the
behaviour and shape the thinking of individuals and elites in society. Structural
influence always exists even if the actors are not aware of it.27 Besides, the transition
theorists had ignored the details and complexity of the behaviour and motives of
political actors. So much of the decision making relevant to democratization takes
place behind closed doors and it is very difficult for a researcher to ascertain if the
decision of individual actors is the outcome of a rational calculation or just a feeling
or passion. 28 In most cases, democracy is preferable to the opposition, the
authoritarian regime generally do not like the coming of democracy. An authoritarian
breakdown will not happen just because of a lack of legitimacy. What matters for the
stability of any regime is not its legitimacy, but rather the presence or absence of
preferable alternatives.29
The structuralist perspective is useful in both analysing the interpaly between the
condition and the choice made by political elites. The logic, which connects the
various factors, is capable of interpreting the interactions between structures and
actors to explain the dynamics of democratization.30 It accounts for the general
26 Ibid, D. Potter, D. Goldblatt , M. Kiloh, and Lewis, P. (1997), p. 18.
27 Ibid, J. Higley, and M. G. Burton, (1989), p. 28.
28 Nancy Bermeo (1990), “Rethinking Regime Change”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3 (April,
1990), p. 368.
29 Przeworski Adam (1986), “Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy” in O’Donnel, G., 
Schmitter P.C. and Whitehead, L.(1986) (ed.) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 51–52.
30 Karl Terry Lynn and Philippe C. Schmitter (1991),“Modes of Transition in Latin American, 
Southern and Eastern Europe”, International Social Science Journal, No.128 (1991), pp.269–284.
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“cause” (condition) and the “timing” of regime transition or breakdown (actor) and 
assumes that even though actors may have their own interests and motives, their
choices can only represent calculations depending upon given structural constraints.31
A modified structural approach, in Karl and Schmiter’s term, a “path-independent
approach”, is introduced having developed the logic ofanalysing.The structural
approach compares the historical transformation not in terms of pattern variables
(modernization approach or elite intiatives –transition approach), but in terms of
changed inter-relationships between changing structures of power. Barrington Moore
mentions that changing relationships are between four structures: state, lord, urban
bourgeoisie and peasants, and later in Dietrich Rueschemeyer’s analysis, there are five 
classes singled out: large landlords, urban working class, urban bourgeoisie, salaried
and professional middle class, and peasant. Both Moore and Rueschemeyer consider
democratization to be a process of class struggle between the dominant and
subordinate classes to put democracy on the historical agenda and decide its
prospects.32After examining the historical transformation between the seventeenth and
twentieth centuries when agrarian societies were changing to modern industiral ones,
England, France and the United States moved towards the political form of liberal
democracy, Japan and Gemany moved toward fascism, Russia and China moved
towards communist revolution, Moore concludes that liberal democracy happens
when there is a development of a balance to avoid a strong state, a weakening of the
landed aristocracy, a vigorous bourgeoisie with its own economic base emerging in
opposition to the state–eventually becoming the dominant class in society. Moreover,
31 Kitschelt Herbert(1993), “Comparative Historical Research and Rational Choice Theory: The Case 
of Transitions to Democracy”, Theory and Society, No. 22 , p. 424.
32 Barrington Moore (1996)., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the
Making of Modern World, (Boston: Beacon Press); D. Rueschemeyer, E. H. Stephens and J.D.
Stephens, (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy (University of Chicago Press).
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the landed upper class turned increasingly towards commercial agriculture while
setting the peasants free and the peasantry were gradually transformed by the
commercialization of agriculture and enventually eliminated as a political factor of
consequence. Communist revolution (Russia and China) occurred in conditions where
the urban bourgeoisie was weak and dominated by the state, the link between the
landlord and the peasantry was weak, the landords failed to commercialize agriculture,
so the peasantry were cohesive and found allies with organization skills.
Rueschemeyer argues similarly with Moore that democratization has more chance of
success in the middle ground between not enough and too much state power, when
landlords are weak (landlords as a class have historically been the most
anti-democratic force and perceicved democracy as incompatible with their interests
because it makes their labour more expensive). Rueschemeyer considers that the
urban working class has historically been an important force for pushing for extension
of suffrage, union rights and other aspects of democratic advances. Capitalist
industrialization can strengthen the working class and weaken the landed class, such
developments being structuraly favourable to the development of democracy.
Rueschemeyer found the bourgeoisie to have a different role. They have not been as
anti-democratic as large landlords, but neither have they been known to press for
liberal democracy. Indeed, there are plenty of cases where the bourgeoisie have
supported the crushing of democracy.Their role has varied a lot depending on the
alignment of other classes, the position and power of the state, and transnational
forces.
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3.2 Constitutional choice and its political consequence
A viable representative government depends on the proper arrangement of its
formal parts, structures and reasonable institutional affairs. Schumpeter defines the
democratic political system as a “method” of “institutional arangement for ariving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote”.33 Democracy is a procedure consisting of
two dimensions –contestation and participation –which provides a number of
benchmarks – grouped largely along Dahl’s lines – as critical to Schumpeter’s 
realistic democracy to Polyarchy. Huntington argues that the popular election of the
top decision makers is the essence of democracy.34 The critical point in the process of
democratization is the replacement of a government that is selected in a free, open,
and fair election.35 Political elites who wish to establish electoral rules to achieve
their objectives may be constrained by the historical development of their
geographical region. Figure 3.3 explains the historical and geographical contributions
to institutional choices. There is a historical and geographical dividing line between
those countries using the parliamentary or presidential plurality system and those
using the proportional system. Historically, countries that had monarchies but
experienced no revolution transferred governmental responsibility from crown to
parliament, ending up with parliamentary systems. Countries in which monarchy was
abolished (France in 1848 and again in 1875, Germany in 1919) and colonies that
rebelled against monarchical powers (the United States and Latin America in the late
33 Joseph Schumpeter (1975) , Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper).
34 Robert A. Dahl, (1971), Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press).
35 Ibid, Samuel Huntington (1991), p. 9.
52
Figure 3.3: Historical and geographical contributions to constitutional choice
Non-Abolished (UK, Japan)
Monarch Parliamentary
Abolished (France 1845, 1878)
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Colonial Dominant Power Transfer (India)
The choice of
Institutions Rebellion (US, LA) Presidential
Geographical British Plurality
Continental Proportional
Source: Author’s own compilation
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) replaced monarchs with presidents.
Countries that emerged from colonial domination after the Second World War
typically inherited parliamentarism from the colonizers. Characteristically, however,
these same countries instituted presidential systems if and when the initial democracy
fell. Democratizing dictatorships tended to retain presidentialism.36 Geographically,
for it is only in countries, which have come under British political influence –
Commonwealth countries, the United States and British herself–, the plurality system
is still used for election of legislature. Every continental democracy except France
used a proportional system.37 Golder points out that there is a tendency shown that
absolute majority rule has replaced plurality rule as the predominant electoral system
for presidential election in the 1990s and proportional systems have become more
36 Adam Przeworski, (1996), “What Makes Democracies Endure?” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7,
No.1 (January 1996), p. 46.
37 Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler (1983) (ed.) Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and
their Political Consequence (New York: Cambridge University Press), p.7.
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complex due to an increasing use of multiple tiers and mixed electroal formulas. A
total of 60.5 per cent of presidential elections in 1990s used the absolute majority
system compared to just 6.1 per cent in the 1950s. The adoption of absolute majority
rule by most new democracies in Eastern Europe helps to explain this dramatic
change, and most countries in Africa have also adopted the absolute majority rule
following the reemergence of multi-party elections in the 1990s. The desire to avoid
electing presidents who lack a strong popular endorsement may explain the
worldwide preference for majority requirements but does not help us understand why
they suddenly became so popular in the 1990s.38
There are four possible combinations of democracy types (as can be seen from
Figure 3.3) if we take into account parliamentary, presidential, plurality and
proportional representative (PR) factor. The purest examples of the combination of
presidentialism and plurality are the United States and democracies heavily influenced
by the United States (especially some East Asian democracies, including South Korea,
Taiwan and Philippines). Latin American countries have overwhelmingly opted for
presidential–PR systems. Parliamentary–Plurality systems exists in the United
Kingdom and many former British colonies (India, Malaysia) and the countries of the
so called Old Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).
Parliamentary–PR systems are concentrated in Western Europe. Arend Lijphart
clarifies the two parliamentary systems and defines them separately as “Westminster” 
and “Consensus” models.39 Presidential, Westminster and Consensus models are
three major types of Western democracies. While examining their electoral
38 M.Golder, (2005), “Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2000”, Electoral Studies,
Vol. 24, No. 1, pp.103–121.
39 Arend Lijphart (1984), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six
Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
54
consequences, executive efficiency, executive–legislative relations, and party politics,
each system has different democratic performance (fair participation, professionalism,
flexibility, accountability and stability). In Table 3.1, from a perspective of electoral
consequences, the majority or plurality method in the presidential and Westminster
models cause a two-party system 40 offering the voters a clear choice between two
alternative sets of public choice, and has a moderating influence because the two main
parties have to compete for the swing voters in the centre of the political spectrum and
hence have to advocate moderate centralist policies.41 The Consensus model tends to
create a multiparty system because of PR effects, which is not good for moderate
centralist politics if political parties are polarized, but advantageous to more political
participation and fair representation (Evaluation 1: P = M < C). Moreover, the need for
parties to find allies to organize a coalition encourages power fragmentation and an
unstable government, especially when no majority coalition can be formed
(Evaluation 2: P = M < C). Presidential and majoritarian models share problems of
disproportionality more serious than those of the Consensus model: the winner is
almost certain to benefit (the winner gains an absolute majority with fewer seats; i.e.
winner gain 38.3 per cent of the vote, but win 53.2 per cent of the seats) since those
votes supporting losing candidates are effectively wasted. Douglas W. Rae
emphasizes that all electoral systems tend to over-represent the larger parties and
under-represent the smaller ones because all electoral systems tend to yield
disproportionality, reducing the effective number of parliamentary parties compared
with the effective number of electoral parties, and manufacturing a parliamentary
40 Maurice Duverger, (1954), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State,
Translated by Barbara and Robert (North London, Methuen), p. 217.
41 Ibid, Arend Lijphart (1984), p. 63.
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Table 3.1: Democratic Performance of Presidential, Westminster and Consensus Models
Presidential
model
(US)
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model
(UK)
Consensus
model
(Switzerland )
Democratic
performance
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P: Presidential model
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C: Consensus model
Electoral
consequence
First past the post
(Plurality)
PR Fair
Participation
(1) P =W< C
Party
politics
One party dominance &
Two party alternation
Coalition and
multi-party
System
Stability (2) P = W > C
Professional (3) P > W = CExecutive
Effectiveness Flexibility (4) P < W = C
Cabinet
incompatibility
(separation of
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compatibility
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Executive
legislative
relations
Fixed terms Non-fixed terms
Accountability (5) P < W = C
Source: Author’s own compilation
majority for parties that have not received a majority from the voters42 .Duverger
explains the efects in terms of “mechanical” and “psychological” factors. The 
mechanical effect of the plurality rule is that all but the two strongest parties are
severely under-represented because these parties tend to lose in each district; the
42 Rae, Douglas W. (1967), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale
University Press), pp.67-129.
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British Liberals, continually the disadvantaged third party in the post-war era, are a
good example. The psychological factor reinforces the mechanical one, “the 
electorates soon realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the
third party”. Whence comes their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil 
of its two adversaries. In addition, the psychological factor operates at the level of the
politician, whose natural tendency is not to waste his/her energy by running as third
party candidates but is instead to join one of the large parties.43
On the other hand, in view of government capability and executive–legislative
relations, the presidential model is more professional (Evaluation 3: P > M= C), but not
as flexible (Evaluation 4: P < M= C) or accountable (Evaluation 5: P < M= C) than the
other two models. In the Presidential system, the constitutional principle of executive
and legislative relations is a separation of powers and incompatibility of cabinet
membership. The president invites professionals (other than senators or
representatives) to organize the cabinet, and those who are invited always perform
more professionally than members of parliament who are more reliant on civil
servants’ support. 
However, the executive–legislative paralysis happens easily in the Presidential
system when the president’s party does not hold a majority of seats in both chambers 
of congress, and the legislature is controlled by a majority that is hostile to the
president but not large enough to override presidential vetoes routinely. Moreover, the
executive, by virtue of the fixed term of office, can survive alongside hostile
legislatures, leading to stalemates between the executive and the legislative branch.44
These regimes lack a constitutional principle that can be invoked to resolve conflicts
between executives and legislatures, such as the vote of no confidence of
43 Ibid, Maurice Duverger, (1954), p.226
44 J.J.Linz (1978), “The Perils of Presidentalism” , Journal of Democracy (Winter 1990), pp.51–69.
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parliamentary regimes. Minority presidents and deadlock provide incentives for actors
to search for extra-constitutional means of resolving their differences, thus making a
presidential regime prone to instability and eventual death.
Nevertheless, some observation shows that the traditional worry about the
institutional problems (unfair participation in a plurality or majority electoral system,
executive–legislative paralysis in the presidential system, and instability in a
multiparty system) caused by shortness of different constitutional principles might
sometimes be intuitive and thus oversimplify the operation of real politics without
looking for the rational action of political actors45 and other institutional factors. For
example, in the case of the United States, Cheibub argues that the probability of a
minority government is intertwined with the number of legislatures and the electoral
cycle: the probability (close to 60 per cent) is higher than that in a unicameral system
(36.46 per cent), and almost half of the years in a unicameral system were years of
minority presidents; the timing of presidential and congressional election also affects
the likelihood of a minority government in presidential regimes. The likelihood of a
minority government will be higher than when presidential and congressional
elections do not coincide.46 What may sometimes matter for the functioning of a
presidential regime is whether the president does or does not have enough seats to
impose his or her own policy agenda. Mayhew’s systematic analysis of “significant 
laws” passed in the post war era finds no evidence that a divided government is any
less productive than a unified government. He presents evidence that partisan control
of a government does not have a significant negative effect on the formation of
“innovative policy” and this innovative policy is more directly linked to the “timing 
45 Strom Kaare (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule (UK: Cambridge University Press).
46 Jose Antonio Cheibub, (2002), “Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of 
Presidential Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No.3 (April 2002), pp. 294–296.
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of legislation” (enacted in the first two years of a presidential term), the “public 
mood” (innovative policy is more likely to emerge when there is a public demand for 
a activist government) and budget (innovative policies will be easier to pass when the
budgetary pie is larger). “Unified versus divided control has probably not made a 
notable difference during the post-war era” in the United States.47 Cameron, Howell,
Adler, and Riemann find that a divided government reduces the enactment of
“landmark” legislation, but increases the enactment of less significant legislation.48
Krehbiel, Bradly and Volden argue that in the American case, super-majoritarian
models focusing on the senate filibuster and the veto are more appropriate to the study
of gridlock than the majoritarian model.49 In the senate, a minority of members can
prevent final action on a bill by filibustering (or credibly threatening to do so), and
thereby prevent enactment. Ending a filibuster requires the support of three-fifths of
the senate, or 60 out of 100 votes. In Congress, bills preferred by opposition are
passed, the president vetoes these bills, but the opposition should have 75 per cent of
the votes to override the presidential veto, otherwise, there is stalemate. Therefore, a
unified government in which the president has the less than three-fifths support from
the senate, and opposition has less than three-quarters support, could be just as prone
to gridlock as a divided government. The traditional view is that party discipline is
supposed to lower in a presidential system where there are more incentives for a
47 David R. Mayhew (1991), Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigation,
1946-1990 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 179; Sean, Q.Kely, (1973), “Divided 
We Govern? A Reassessment.” Polity 25 (Spring 1993), p.476.
48 Charles Cameron, Willam Howell, Scott Adler, and Charles Riemann (2000), “Divided Government 
and the Legislative Productivity of Congress, 1945–1994” Legislative Studies Quarterly,
Vol.25,No.2, pp. 285–312.
49 Keith Krehbiel, (1998), Pivotal Politics (Chicago :University of Chicago Press, 1998); David Brady,
and Volden Craig (1998), Revolving Gridlock: Politics and Policy from Cater to Clinton (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press).
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candidate to cultivate the “personal vote” because the mechanisms that supposedly 
produce highly disciplined parties in a parliamentary system are, by definition, absent
in a presidential regime: party discipline is higher in a parliamentary system because
individual members of parliament have strong incentives to comply with their parties
to avoid bringing the government down and the threat of an early election is sufficient
to induce party discipline.50 However, these characteristics on the contrary reduce the
possibility of confrontation between Republicans and Democrats, which is useful to
dissolve executive–legislative stalemates. In the United States, party preference can in
some cases be highly polarized, and in other cases have a considerable degree of
overlap. When party polarization is low, Democrats are not uniformly opposed to
Republican proposals, and Republicans are not uniformly opposed to Democratic
proposals. Higher party polarization increases gridlock, but the magnitude of the
increase diminishes to the extent that a party is close to having enough seats to thwart
filibusters and vetoes. In other words, a unified government is just as prone to
gridlock as a divided government when parties are highly polarized and neither party
has a majority. Conversely, a divided government is just as productive as a unified
government when party polarization is low or when one party has a veto-proof,
filibuster-proof majority.51
50 J. J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Diference?” in J. J. Linz and
Arturo Valenzuela (ed.), The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Cause of Latin American
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 3–87.
51 David R.Jones (2001),”Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock”, Political Research Quarterly,
Vol. 54, No. 1, pp.127–128.
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3.3 Civil Society
In Chapter 3.1, the argument is discussed that democratization can be considered
to be the result of a changed inter-relationship between different levels of social
structures. In Western democratic development experience, it is widely believed the
occurrence of democratization is related to the emergence of a civil society and
culture: a spontaneously created social structure separate from the state and consisting
of a lifestyle full of active social activities, a trust reciprocal network (social capital)
and good qualities and pro-democracy attitudes of its citizen. As Fukuyama describes,
“civil society takes shape even more slowly than political institutions. They are less
able to be manipulated by public policy, and indeed often bear an inverse relationship
to state power, growing stronger as the state recedes and vice versa.”52
Historically, the problem of political despotism and how to break its grip or
prevent its growth played a decisive part in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century intellectual unrest which resulted in the overthrow and modernization of the
classical concept of civil society.53 For example, according to Paine’s argument, the 
power of the state must be restricted in favour of civil society because within all
individuals there is a “self-regulating society” existing before the formation of the 
state, this natural sociability predisposes individuals to establish peaceful and happy
relations of competition and solidarity based only on reciprocal self-interest and a
shared sense of mutual aid. The state in the pre-modern and uncivilized world is
over-governed, patriarchal, excessively taxed, bellicose, and dependent on the whims
52 Francis Fukuyama (1995), “Confucianism and Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 6, No. 2, p.
20.
53 J. Keane, (1988), “Despotism and Democracy.” In J. Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State
(London: Verso), p. 65.
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and fancies of political despots and their appointers. Paine emphasizes that the power
of states is only ever delegated by actively consenting individuals who can
legitimately retrieve this power at any time by withdrawing their consent. Civilized
governments are constitutional governments empowered by the active consent of
naturally free and equal citizens. This kind of government has no rights, but only
duties before their citizens. Individuals are permanently sovereign. Any reversal of
this natural order and every attempt to preclude actively represented consent as the
basis of law, is despotism. A confident, self-regulating society requires only a
minimum of political mechanism to ensure the natural interaction of the various parts
of civil society upon each other. In contrast to the labyrinthine, spendthrift, secretive
and bellicose operations of despotic states, the limited constitutional state would be
qualitatively more simple and efficient, cheaper, and more open and peaceful.54
A healthy and mature civil society is considered as advantageous to the
maintenance of democracy when there are a group of voluntary organizations,
abundant social capital, rational civic virtue, and the protection of minority rights.
Traditional civil society theorists believe that when citizens start to interact often and
join groups, organizations expand citizens’ access to information and political ideas, 
which increases government accountability. 55 Following a study of American
government and society, Tocqueville argued that a new type of state despotism is
popularly elected in the name of the sovereignty of people. Political checks upon this
new despotism must be reinforced by the growth and development of a civil
association which lies beyond the control of state institution. There is an independent
54 Thomas Paine (1984), Rights of Man, with an introduction by Eric Foner, notes by Henry Collins,
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).
55 Pamela Paxton (2002), “Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship.”American
Sociological Review, Vol. 67, No. 2, p. 254.
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eye of society: an eye comprising a plurality of interacting, self organized and
constantly vigilant civil association which is necessary for consolidating the
democratic revolution. “Nothing would be hidden from the eyes of civil society”. A 
state power without these social obstacles is always hazardous and undesirable, a
licence for despotism.56 In fact, in some of the recent social research, theorists found
that voluntary associations provide a training ground for the new political leader; help
members to practice compromise and learn tolerance; and stimulate individual
participation in politics. Moreover, associations help disseminate information about
protest activities and aid in the growth of opposition social movements.57 Finifter
finds that friendship groups provide a protective space in the workplace for dissident
political opinions.58 Morris argues that trusting associations can both form early
opposition movements and support.59 Current research finds that the formation of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will help foster and maintain stable
democracies. The proportion of total aid from government to NGOs becomes an
important reference to understand the development of voluntary groups in certain
countries.
After measuring the government performance in Italy, Putnam finds that
voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock
of social capital in the form of norms of reciprocity and civic engagement. Social
capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks
56 Alexis Tocquevill (1946), Democracy in America (London: Oxford University Press).
57 Ibid, Pamela Paxton (2002), p. 257.
58 Ada,W. Finifter (1974), “The Friendship Group as a Protective Environment for Political Deviants”, 
American Political Science Review 68, pp.607–625.
59 Morris Aldon D.(1981), “Black Southern Student Sit-In Movement: An Analysis of International
Organization”, American Sociological Review 46, pp. 744–767.
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that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.60
Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civil engagement encourage social
trust and cooperation because they reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and
provide models for future cooperation. 61 The argument is similar to Paine’s 
assumption: natural society is self-regulating such that individuals are naturally
disposed to co-operative forms of social life–individuals’ natural wants exceed their 
individual powers. This means that they are incapable of activating their powers and
satisfying their diverse wants without the labours and assistance of others.
Consequently, they are driven to establish forms of commercial exchange based on
reciprocal interest and the division of labour.62 That these “vertical ”networks are
less helpful than horizontal networks in solving dilemmas of collective action may be
one reason why, in the eighteenth century, capitalism turned out to be more efficient
than feudalism, and why democracy has proven more effective than autocracy in the
twentieth century. 63 Patron–client relations, for example, involve interpersonal
exchange and reciprocal obligations, but the exchange is vertical and the obligations
asymmetric. In the vertical patron–client relationship, characterised by dependence
instead of mutuality, opportunism is more likely on the part of both patron
(exploitation) and client (shirk).64 Douglass North provided a good example to
explain this point by tracing the post-colonial experience of North and South America
to their respective colonial legacies. After independence, both the United States and
the Latin Republics shared constitutional forms, abundant resources, and similar
60 R. Putnam (1993), Making Democracy Work: Civic Tradition in Modern Italy. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press), p. 167.
61 Ibid, p. 177.
62 Ibid, J. Keane, (1988), p.48.
63 Ibid, R. Putnam (1993), p.175.
64 Ibid., p. 178.
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international opportunities; but North Americans benefited from their decentralised,
parliamentary English patrimony, whereas the Latin Americans were cursed with
centralised authoritarianism, familism, and clientelism inherited from late medieval
Spain. The North Americans inherited civic traditions, whereas the Latin Americans
were bequeathed traditions of vertical dependence and exploitation .The point is not
that the preference or predilections of individual North and South Americans differed,
but that historically derived social contexts presented them with a different set of
opportunities and incentives.65
Civic virtues or what is caled “public spiritedness” is considered an important 
standard to evaluate the quality of democratic life. Public spiritedness includes the
ability to question authority, evaluate the performance of those in office, and the
willingness to engage in public discourse. 66 A rational–critical discourse or
conversation provides a space for the creation of criticism of the present regime and
the dissemination of a potential source of opinions that may differ from prevailing
state ideology.67 Public spiritedness also includes the willingness to listen seriously to
a range of views which, given the diversity of liberal societies, some listeners are
bound to find strange and even obnoxious.68 Liberal citizens must give reasons for
their political demands, not just state preference or make threats.69 This are the most
distinctive aspects of citizenship in a liberal democracy, since they are precisely what
65 Douglass C. North (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York:
Cambridge University Press), p.58.
66 Will Kymlicka (2001), Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.296.
67 Ibid, Pamela Paxton (2002), p.257.
68 William Gaston (1991), Liberal Purpose: Goods, Virtues, and Duties in the Liberal State
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
69 Mecedo Stephen (1990), Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue and Community (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge).
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distinguish “citizens” within democracy from “subjects” of an authoritarian regime.70
One’s position on minority rights is dependent on one’s assumption on the 
liberal–communitarian debate: if one is a liberal who cherishes individual autonomy,
then one will oppose minority rights as an unnecessary and dangerous departure from
the proper emphasis on the individual; communitarians, by contrast, view minority
rights as an appropriate way of protecting communities from the eroding effects of
individual autonomy, and of affirming the value of community.71 Ethno-cultural
minorities in particular are worth of such protection. Civic nations, in contrast with
illiberal ethnic nations, are neutral with respect to the ethno-cultural identities of their
citizens, and define national membership purely in terms of adherence to certain
principles of justice.72 However, when considering actual policies that occur through
democratization, the norm of ethno-cultural neutrality is manifestly not the fact but is
replaced by deliberate policies which are designed for the purpose of national building.
National building is a process of promoting a common language and a sense of
common membership in, and equal access to, the social institutions based on that
language. Decisions regarding official language, core curriculum in education, and the
requirement for acquiring citizenship, have all become the intention of diffusing a
particular culture throughout society, and of promoting a particular national identity
based on participation in the societal culture.73 For example, even in the United States,
many policies are made to ensure that “anglophones” would be a majority within each 
of the 50 states of the American federation: it is a legal requirement for children to
70 Gabriel A. Almond, and Sidney Verba (1989), The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy
in Five Nations (Newbury Park: Sage Publications).
71 Ibid, Will Kymlicka (2001), Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and
Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 19.
72 Ibid., p. 24.
73 Ibid., p. 24–27.
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learn the English language in schools, for immigrants to learn English to acquire
American citizenship; for employment (in government or elsewhere) those applicants
must speak English.74 National building is in obvious conflict with the respect and
protection of minority rights but very popular in the nascent democratic countries and
very confusing in the name of democratic development.
3.4 Is Confucian society anti-democratic?
The theoretical criticism by S.P Huntington and political support from some
Asian authoritarian regimes, especially Singapore previous Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew, raise the debate whether Confucianism is incompatible with Western style
democracy. While discussing those countries (i.e. Japan, Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan) historically and geographically influenced by China, Huntington argues that
Confucian societies lack a tradition of rights against the state and provide no
legitimacy for autonomous social institutions at the national level. The maintenance of
order and respect for hierarchy are central values and the conflict of ideas, groups, and
parties is viewed as dangerous and illegitimate.75 Lee had said that Western-style
democracy would have deleterious effects and encourage permissiveness, social
instability, and economically driven decision making.76 The similar theory of new
authoritarianism, based on the experiences of Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea, adapted
by the Chinese government, claims that a country at China’s stage of economic 
development needs an authoritarian regime for fast and stable economic growth and to
74 Will Kymlicka (1997), States, Nations and Cultures: Spinoza Lectures, Van Gorcum Publishers,
(Amsterdam, 1997), p.50.
75 Ibid, Samuel Huntington (1991), p. 24.
76 “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew” in Fareed Zakaria (1994)(ed.), Meeting
the Minister, Foreign Affairs 73 (March/April1994) No.6, pp.189-194.
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contain the unsettling consequences of development. 77 General criticism of
Confucianism points out that Confucianism views the human society and morality as
contextual individuals and role-based and thus goes against the concept of people
having rights to be free, autonomous and independent of culture and society.
Confucianism emphasizes that a genuine community is not composed of mutually
disinterested agonistic individuals but is rather a microcosm of a big family. The
Confucian conception of person-to-person relations advocates hierarchy and
submission (i.e. a son is expected to follow every instruction of his father, however
unreasonable it may be) and is thus often criticized as being too paternalistic and not
giving enough recognition to individual autonomy. Confucianism rejects the appeal to
personal rights would turn social relationships from harmonious to conflicting or
litigious. The Confucian ideal of a social harmony emphasizes the virtues of
concession and yielding rather than competition and self-assertion, which is hugely
incompatible with the two core ideas in democracy–contestation and participation.78
On the other hand, the debates for Confucianism provide some examples to
support the idea that this traditional philosophy is not anti-democratic. The regular
examination system to implement government bureaucrats, the emphasis on education,
and the high tolerance of various religions and ethics are traditional mechanism, but
do actually contain some modern democratic values. The examination system
provides a gateway into higher political systems and significant paths to upward
mobility that reinforces the relatively egalitarian income distribution. Education
promotes literacy and is more concerned with non-economic issues. Confucian
77 Yongnian Zheng (1994), “Development and Democracy: Are They Compatible in China?” Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp.235–236.
78 Joseph Chan (1999), “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights to Contemporary China “in 
Joanne R Bauer and Daniel A Bell (1999) (ed.), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights,
(Cambridge University Press), pp. 216–227.
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societies are relatively more tolerant and have coexisted with other religions better
than the societies of either Islam or Christianity have managed.79 Chinese authority
was also not absolute in Chinese Confucianism; even for an emperor, it could be
undermined altogether if his own immorality caused him to lose the “mandate of 
heaven”. Competition between families frequently makes Chinese society appear 
more individualistic, and even in political affiliations; loyalties to family, lineage, and
region frequently take precedence over the mere fact of being Chinese.80 The nature
of the traditional Chinese family is the bulwark against the power of the state and a
defence mechanism serving to protect its members against an arbitrary and capricious
state.81 This is why Dr. Sun Yet-sen, the national father of the Republic of China,
when describing this situation said the Chinese are like “a tray of sand”. The extreme 
familism and the weak Chinese deference to authority are maybe the real reason why
there is a need to form an authoritative political system in Chinese societies.
The belief that the idea of Western style democracy is not suitable for a modern
Confucian society is a typical eror of extreme “Ultra-Orientalism” (Rudyard Kipling 
Fallacy: East is East, West is West)82 and a failure to understand the philosophy of
“political Confucianism” or “state policy”, which legitimates a hierarchical political 
system tied to the imperial system and supporting the bureaucracy of
gentleman-scholars, but was actually abolished with the overthrow of the Qing
dynasty in 1911.83 In some empirical research, the results shows that Asian countries
are not significantly more communitarian and Western countries are not significantly
79 Ibid, Francis Fukuyama (1995), p. 24.
80 Ibid., p. 27.
81 Ibid., p. 29.
82 Donald K Emmerson (1995), “Singapore and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate”, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 99.
83 Ibid, Francis Fukuyama (1995), p. 26.
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more individualistic. While whether “maximum freedom and opportunity for 
individuals” would improve the quality of their life; or “if individuals continuously 
take care of their fellow citizens, even if it obstructs their individual freedom and
development” would improve the quality of their life, individual freedom and
opportunity were valued more highly in India than in France, were equally popular in
Japan and West Germany, and were less highly valued in Switzerland than in Hong
Kong.84 Another research in China also indicates that general values are becoming
more individualistic especially in the younger generation. Most individuals prefer to
choose a riskier job, higher consumption, and tend to pay more attention to their own
interests while competing in promotion, even with their close friends.85
The final debate about Confucianism is the role of state. The state plays a
dominant role in those Confucian countries–not because of reasons of tradition. The
strong state is characteristic of a developing country–political stability must be given
high authority. In China’s case, the state simultaneously seeks diferent goals such as 
economic growth, equitable distribution, political stability, and national unification.
These goals often conflict with each other and make it difficult for the state to stand
above society, like a “rational agent” in a democratic country.86
3.5 Critics and Taiwan’s Uniqueness  
In the final section of Chapter three, the researcher tries to apply the theoretical
discussion to the explanation of democratic development in Taiwan in the 20-year
period 1987–2008. There are different theoretical findings in the four levels of
84 Ibid, Donald K, Emmerson (1995), p. 100.
85 Ibid, Yongnian Zheng (1994), pp. 241–243.
86 Ibid., p. 258.
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analysis (democratic values, institutional choice, civic society and political culture ).
In the first level of analysis (democratization), three approaches of thinking
(modernization, transformation, and structural approaches) on the reasons of regime
change are al plausible to the occurrence of Taiwan democratization: Taiwan’s GNP
grew from $1,159 (1976) to $11,859 (2006), which is typical in Huntington’s 
“transition zone” of the third wave of democratic development –nondemocratic
countries with GNPs between $1,000 and $3000 in the mid-1970s democratized or
liberalized significantly in 1989. The Taiwanese case is also explainable in
Preworski’s analysis that Taiwan’s democratic regime is theoreticaly “impregnable” 
and “expected to live forever” because the 1993’s GDP is above $6,000 ($6,094) and 
the inflation rate has always been moderate.87 Chu Yun-han argues that unlike most
of Latin America and Eastern Europe, Taiwan’s political opening was neither 
triggered by any major socioeconomic crisis or external market shock, nor was it
accompanied by popular demands for major socioeconomic reforms. Support for the
old regime’s development was much more broadly based than is the case in many
Latin American countries with comparable levels of industrialization. The
achievement of robust economic development gives the incumbent elite a fairly free
87 Inflation in Taiwan has been moderate. For example, between 1953 and 1980, the consumer price
index rose at an annual rate of 7.95 per cent, whereas the wholesale price index averaged an annual
increase of only 7.14 per cent. If the four years of energy crisis are excluded, the consumer price
index rose only 5.39 per cent annually, and the wholesale price index increased by a mere 4.3 per
cent per year. From 1980 to 1995, the inflation rate in Taiwan was even lower. In fact, it could be
termed a period of mild inflation. During this period, the consumer price index averaged an annual
increase of 3.35 per cent, and the wholesale price index averaged an annual increase of a mere 0.24
per cent. On average, from 1952 through 1995, the consumer price index went up annually by 6.34
per cent and the wholesale price index by 4.79 per cent. See the Government Information Office,
“The Story of Taiwan- Economy”, http://www.taiwan.com.au/Polieco/History/ROC/report04.html.
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hand in limiting the scope and speed of democratic reform and crafting new political
institutions.88
In view of the transition approach, the Taiwanese case can be categorized as a
“transformation” type –the elites in power took the lead in bringing about democracy
(or an incumbent-led caretaker government) when the opposition power was weaker
than authoritarian incumbent.89 The occurrence of democratization is attributed to
KMT President Chiang Ching-kuo’s wise but perhaps the “reluctant” decision90: to
democratize the political system in order to solve the “legitimacy crisis” of the KMT 
authoritative regime. Democratization is useful for the KMT to win the favour of
Americans externally and support from Taiwanese internally (the KMT was a 15 per
cent minor mainlanders’ dominant ruling class confronted with 85 per cent major
native Taiwanese population). A series of political reforms by president Chiang in the
middle of 1980, especially the Taiwanisation of the KMT leadership, can be proved as
advantageous to its constant dominant control on politics. The Pan–Blue coalition has
never received votes less than 50 per cent support in the past 20 years, which
demonstrated that at least 40 per cent of native Taiwanese have become supporters of
the KMT.91 The victory of KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 also
indicates that most Taiwanese voters do not think the presidential candidate needs to
88 Yun-han Chu (1996), “Taiwan’s Unique Chalenges”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp.
69–82.
89 Ibid, Samuel Huntington (1991), p. 122.
90 Lin Chia-lung (1998), Paths to Democracy: Taiwan in Comparative perspectives (PhD diss., Yale
University, 1998), pp. 235–238.
91 There are about 80 per cent native Taiwanese voters. The remaining 20 per cent minority, including
Hakka and aboriginals, is considered the major support to KMT. If we broadly define that five out of
ten people support the KMT, there must be three out of eight native Taiwanese. The details of
different level elections in the past 20 years will be discussed in Chapter 5.
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be a native Taiwanese.92 After the investigation of 11 post-communist nascent
democracies in Europe, Wu Yu-shan argues that the constitutional reforms in Taiwan
can be classified into a type of “gradual amendment”: the series of constitutional 
reform between 1994–1998 is “endogenous” (initiated by state organization, not 
popular sovereignty) and “incremental” (with gradual steps, not in one stroke)  
“moderate amendment” (amended, not rewriten). The process also demonstrates that 
the KMT enjoyed higher legitimacy according to the folowing argument: “support for 
the old regime is inversely related to the radicalism of the constitutional reform”.93
Some scholars remind people that the KMT is also a winner in the process of
economic liberalization and privatization. The KMT transformed itself from an
authoritative Leninist party to a legal state-enterprise owner. 94 The KMT is one of
the richest political parties in the world, which makes the Taiwanese democratic
transition a very special case, but is perhaps a useful model to predict the CCP’s 
possible future transformation. Nevertheless, Steven Tsang argues that whether
Taiwan democracy model can be transferred to other countries is questionable since
the democratic transition process of each country are fundamentally affected by its
political culture, history , timing and local conditions . However, Taiwan‘scase at
least provide five lessons which are meaningful and inspire other democratic
development including the political reform in China. Despite the democratic
development had actually caused a destructive forces that the people are divided by
92 Ma is generaly considered as a typical “KMT’s mainlander politician” as he was born in Hong 
Kong and his parents both came from China when the KMT regime fled to Taiwan in 1949.
93 Yu-shan Wu (2005), “Taiwan Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations”, China Journal,
(Canberra, 2005), pp.35-60.
94 Tun-jen Cheng and Yun-han Chu (2002). “State Business Relation in South Korea and Taiwan”, in 
Laurence Whitehead (ed.), Emerging Market Democracies: East Asia and Latin America (Johns
Hopkins University Press).
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ethnic, communal and national cleavage (2nd lesson), the KMT’s ruling elite behave as
an “inhibited political centre” (1st lesson) along with a credible and responsible
opposition (3rd lesson) and high public expectation of the democratic development (4th
lesson), there is no causal relationship between Confucian tradition and
democratization.95
The structural analysis also shows that the KMT enjoys considerable social
support in the process of democratic transition. David Yang offers a
counter-conventional account of Taiwan’s democratization: “The beter-educated
middle class may display great enthusiasm for democratic principles in abstract, as the
primarily beneficiaries of the state, they were also among the most politically
conservative sectors in society.”96
Nevertheless, democratisation in Taiwan obviously caused a Blue–Green conflict:
a structural cleavage in national identity, social class, and regional development. Shau
argues that the Taiwanese national consciousness started to rise up in 1980 under the
pressure of US protectionism and the related domestic anti-neo-mercantilism.
Externally, in order to reduce dependence on the US market, Taiwan started to trade
with different countries, but failed to either establish official diplomatic relations or to
join various international organizations. The difficulty of international isolation was
gradualy atributed to the government’s unrealistic and out-dated “One China 
policy”.97 Inside the island, anti-KMT neo-mercantilism had also caused a
95 Steven Tsang (2007), “Democratizationin a Chinese community- Lessons from Taiwan”,in Robert
Ash and J. Megan Greene (ed.), Taiwan in the 21st Century: aspects and limitations of a
development model (First published by Routledge), pp.177-193.
96 David Yang (2007), “Class, Ethnicity, and the Mass Politics of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition”, 
World Politics 59 (July 2007), pp.517–520.
97 Chyuan-jenq Shiau (2004), Economic Development and Taiwan’s Democratization, Taiwan
Democracy Quarterly, Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 1–26.
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considerable social discontent, such as poor labour welfare, environmental protection,
and unbalanced regional development (north–south). Compared with supporters of the
KMT, the traditional supporters of the DPP are “the minor urban and rural working 
classes”98 mostly located in south Taiwan. Those people were at same time the most
“deeply atached to a nativist Taiwanese identity” and “responsive to ethnic 
mobilization”.99 Shu Keng and Lu-huei Chen argue that different types of regional
economy also influence people’s perspective on cross-Strait relations. Most people in
northern Taiwan are entrepreneurs, or professionals in technology and financial
service departments benefiting from Cross-Strait economic interactions, and as a
result favour the KMT’s policy orientation –especially deregulating trade with and
investment in China. People in southern Taiwan turn to DPP because they are
traditional working class and become victims when manufacturers were forced to
move out to the mainland for lower labour costs.100 As can be seen from Figure 3.4,
there are four possible types of national identity if people have different perspectives
of political and ethnic relations between China and Taiwan.101 Possibility A–Those
who think that mainland China and Taiwan are the same nation and should be
reunified in the future must agree a policy of one country (PRC, People’s Republic of 
China), two systems. Possibility B –Those who think that mainland China and
Taiwan are different nations but that Taiwan will lose the independence war when
China invades the island. Possibility C –Those who think people in mainland China
and Taiwan are same nation but two different countries: Taiwan is democratic but
98 David Yang (2007), “Class, Ethnicity, and the Mass Politics of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition”, 
World Politics, 59 (July 2007), pp. 503–538.
99 Ibid. David Yang (2007), p. 507.
100 Shu Keng and Lu-hui Chen (2003), “Taiwan’s Regional Blocks”, Issue and Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6
(2003), pp. 1–27.
101 Cheng-feng, Shih (2000), Taiwanese National Identity (Taipei, 2000).
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China is not. Possibility D –Those who think people in mainland China and Taiwan
are diferent nations and two diferent countries and wil support Taiwan’s
independence. Obviously, the CCP prefers options A and B (for CCP hardliners), the
KMT prefers option C, and the DPP’s choice is option D. Phil Deans interesting
article about the images of postage stamps issued by the government of Republic of
China explain there were actually various identities in different stages and the elites
aspirations and political objectives were reflected by the public propaganda. During
the KMT authoritarian control, stamps were designed to show the virtuous leadership
of Chiang Kai-shek , the importance of the ROC in international affairs , and success
of KMT in delivering economic growth and development. However, the Taiwanese
identities have become increasingly significant on postage stamps since 2000 when
the DPP went into the central power.102
Figure 3.4: Four types of national identity between Taiwan and China
One Country Two Countries
One
Nation
Two
Nations
Source: Author’s own compilation
In the level of institutional analysis, after seven constitutional amendments from
1991 to 2005, a semi-presidential system (executive level), a single-member district
102 Phil Deans(2005),“Isolation, Identity and Taiwanese Stamps as Vehicles for Regime Legitimation”,
East Asia (Summer 2005) , Vol.22,No.2,pp.8-30.
A: PRC
(One Country, Two systems)
C: ROC
(Statu Quo)
B: PRC
(China me (China merges Taiwan)
D: ROT
(Taiwan Independence)
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dual ballot system (legislative level), and a public referendum were introduced in
Taiwan, but actually caused a lot of institutional difficulties in view of establishing an
efficient government and fair election. Inappropriate institutional transplantation from
and imitation of the French Fifth Republic semi-presidential system is a typical
product of the KMT- dominated scenario that the DPP rejected for its failure to match
the expansion of presidential power with a corresponding check-and-balance
mechanism. The DPP called for the creation of a US-style presidential system and
demanded the elimination of premiership, the abolition of the National Assembly, and
the streamlining of the five-branch government. The DPP’s proposal is corect but 
was rejected by the major KMT in the National Assembly. The problematic system
eventually caused a typical executive–legislative deadlock when the DPP went to
power in 2000 in that the majority party in parliament was still the KMT, and
confrontation with the DPP president began. Compared with the general presidential
system, the president in this system does not have veto power to break a deadlock but
enjoys extensive powers of premier nomination and pre-eminence in the areas of
foreign policy, defence, and relations with the mainland without the legislative’s 
check and consent. Compared with the parliamentary system, the highest executive is
the premier who is not certain to be the major party leader in parliament and the
members of cabinet are not definitely legislators (incompatibility). Therefore, it does
make sense that the premier has the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan, and the
Legislative Yuan can unseat a cabinet through a vote of no-confidence because the
government is a form of presidential cabinet, not an alternative parliament with clear
colective responsibility. Huwang’s empirical investigation on the interaction between 
the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan after the DPP came to power (2000–2008)
provided evidence of “minority government” dificulties caused by this problematic 
constitutional arangement. She discovered that “government bils” passed with more 
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difficultly, took a longer time and even lost more than 60 per cent in the roll-call votes.
Despite the percentage of the executive budget cut by legislatures not increasing in
the era of divided government, the number and complexity of resolutions
accompanying the budget review obviously did increase because the opposition party
took advantage of their legislative majority to pass resolutions to bind and restrict the
behaviour or the policy of the executive Yuan. To matters worse, the preference
between the KMT and the DPP is highly polarized during this stage such that the
increasing party cohesion significantly enhances the percentage of the Blue–Green
confrontation (78.79 per cent).103
The change from the Japanese SNTV (Single Non Transferable Voting) system to
the single-member district, dual ballot mixed system (first vote for candidate
according to plurality formula, second vote for party according to PR) for use in the
legislative elections is another story of political struggle without sophisticated
thinking of how to build up fair electoral and efficient policy making mechanisms.
The KMT introduced the Japanese SNTV (Single Non Transferable Voting) system in
the early local elections for the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. Like the LDP in Japan,
the KMT do quite well under this system and had been enjoying the majority in the
legislatures for a long time. Unlike the traditional view of SNTV, the system is
super-proportional and tends to make more difficulties for small parties and produce
larger seat bonuses for large parties because they face easier nomination and vote
division problems,104 Cox found that the SNTV privileges the governing parties in
103 Shiow-duan Huwang (2003), “The Predicament of Minority Government in the Legislative Yuan”, 
Taiwan Political Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2003), pp. 33–38.
104 Edwin A.Winckler (1984), “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: Form Hard to Soft
Authoritarianism?”, China Quarterly, No. 99, pp. 481–499; Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg
Shugart (1989), Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determination of Electoral System (New Heaven:
Yale University Press).
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Japan (LDP) and Taiwan (KMT) by giving them superior access to particularistic
policy benefits, which is useful in stabilizing both nomination and vote divisions
within party. 105  The KMT makes fewer “over-nomination” erors than the 
fractionalised opposition and enjoys “mechanical advantage” from relatively low 
district magnitudes. 106 Nevertheless, the SNTV caused two major problems:
“factionalism” and “money politics”. Under the SNTV system, there is typicaly more 
than single candidate competition in each district and each candidate can be elected
with fewer votes. Vote buying thus become easier and candidates have more
incentives to cultivate the “personal vote” which strengthen the intra-party conflicts
and weakens the party discipline. After the DPP came to power in 2000, the KMT
started to face pressure from its “black gold” images and gradualy came to be 
considered as the major cause of political deadlock between executives and
legislatures. In August of 2004, the KMT dominant Legislative Yuan passed the
constitutional amendment that the legislative election in 2008 would follow Japanese
new form in 1996, changing to a single-member district, dual ballot system, but the
number of legislators would be reduced by half. The result of the 2008 election shows
that the new system had caused such serious disproportionality problems that the
KMT benefitted from an incredible seat bonus: 53.8 per cent vote support, but 77 per
cent seats (61 of 79) in the single-seat constituency voting.107 The new system was
still advantageous to the development of factions because candidates had changed
105 Gary W. Cox (1996), “Is the Single Non-Transferable Vote Super-proportional? Evidence from
Japan and Taiwan", American Journal of Political Science 40, p. 752.
106 Gary W.Cox and Emerson Niou (1994), “Seat Bonuses Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote
System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan”, Comparative Politics 26, p.28.
107 In 2006, the Legislative Yuan decide to reform its electoral system from SNTV to the new mixed
system: 79 seats are decided by single-seat constituency voting and 34 by proportional
representation from a party candidate list.
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their support from their personal networks to a local basis. Some scholars suggest
Taiwan should change from the present “independent” mixed system where the two 
electoral formulas are implemented independently (imitated from the Japanese new
system) to a “dependent” one (Germany style) where proportional representation is 
applied in the higher tier so as to correct the distortions in proportionality caused by
the plurality formula at the district level,108 however, it is highly improbable that the
KMT will accept this idea in order to keep its own inherent advantage from the new
system. Meanwhile, the Taiwan’s leading parties had also reached a highpoint of
inner-party democracy with the institutionalization of the member primary, survey
system and direct primaries for party leaders. However, Dafydd Fell argues that the
directions of these democratic procedures are also influenced by the election results
and inner- party factional balance of power. Fortunately, the KMT has completely
kissed its authoritarian nomination practice goodbye and its counterpart DPP have
taken a more consensual approach to nomination reform and very anxious to avoid the
image of political corruption and factions struggle.109
In the thirdlevel analysis, civil society is undoubtedly the “protective space and 
source” of opposition power and movement. According to Hsiao’s analysis, the aim of 
the rising social movements in 1980 can be classified within three categories: labour
and peasant benefits, welfare of social minority (disability, women and aboriginals),
and environmental protection issues.110 These movements are considered the result of
KMT mercantilism, later combined with DPP opposition to KMT authoritarian
108 Mat Golder (2005), “Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2000”, Electoral
Studies 24, p. 112.
109 Dafydd Fell ,“Democratization of Candidate Selection in Taiwanese Political Parties”,
, Journal of Electoral Studies (November 2006),Vol.13,No.2 ,pp.167-168.
110 Michael Hsin–huang Hsiao (2004), “Non-Governmental Organization, Democratic Transformation
and Democratic Governance in Taiwan”, Taiwan Democracy Quarterly (2004), Vol. 1, No.1.
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dominance.111 However, the vigorous opposition does mean there is a good social
basis for democratic development in Taiwan. According to Lin’s investigation, 70 per 
cent of people do not join an official group (political, social service, or religious) and
60 per cent of people do not trust their “neighbours” or strangers on the street.112
According to the theory of social capitalism, this low civic engagement and social
trust are not good for political participation (political knowledge, training, and
efficiency) and support for democratic values (tolerance, respect and compromise).
Although various reality TV/talk show programmes about politics are popular and
influential to people‘s daily life,113 this modern technological trend is considered as
privatizing or individualizing people’s use of leisure time and thus disrupting many
opportunities for social capital formation.114 Moreover, Lin and Yang observe that
compared with older native Taiwanese males, mainlanders, women, and young people
have low political efficiency and support for democracy.115 The older generation of
native Taiwanese have deeper memories about the KMT’s authoritative control and 
thus cherish the coming of democracy. As Taiwanese society became freer 116 and
111 Arthur Jen-fang Ting (2007), “The Mutual Constitution of Civil Society and Democracy: A 
Comparison of Recent Developments in Organized Civil Society in Japan and Taiwan”, Taiwan
Democracy Quarterly, Vol. 4, No.2, pp. 1–31.
112 Tsong-Jyi Lin, (2007), “Social Capital and Democracy: Case Studies in Taiwan”, conference papers 
published in the Annual Conference of Chinese Association of Political Science (Sep. 29–30th
September ,2007, I-Shou University, Kaohsiung).
113 Every evening, from 7:00 pm to 12:00 pm, there are at least eight political talk shows presented on
the major channels of Sky TV.
114 R.Putnam, (1995), “Bowling Alone: American’s Declining Social Capital”, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 6, No. 1 , p. 74.
115 Ibid, Tsong-Jyi Lin (2007).
116 According to the 2008 Country Report in the Freedom House Survey:, Taiwan continued to be
listed as a “Free” country, and received the highest evaluation with a score of 1 in the area of civil 
liberties and political rights.
Website: www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7069
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the DPP came to power in 2000, democracy was not of use for opposition to
overthrow the KMT authority but evolved into the idea of self-determination for
expressing an anti- China disposition. According to Shih, the idea of a limited
government lacks appreciation in Taiwan’s cultural background. Taiwan’s 
postcolonial condition is such that political leaders suffer deprivation and inferiority
and can only feel satisfied by democratic self-empowerment.117
Conclusion
Following the literature review and systematic discussion about the major
democracy theories and uniqueness of Taiwan’s democratic development, two 
suggestions for the further research of this essay are considered as helpful, illustrated
as follows.
First, the detailed discussion about the four levels of democratic development in
the former four sections of this chapter and the four-level analytical framework
created by the researcher were proved as workable and applicable to the case of
Taiwan’s democratic development –especially the interrelation between democratic
values (level 1) and its effects (level 2) on institution building. However, although the
island’s democratic system is initialy defined by the researcher as a “nascent” 
democracy, the 62-year democratic development history folowing the KMT’s flight 
to Taiwan after 1949 is a necessary historical evidence to make this framework more
comprehensive and predictable. Therefore, the researcher will start to investigate the
political and economic history in the first two chapters of empirical studies (Chapter 5:
Pre-democracy of Taiwan: Under Two Chiang’s Control; Chapter 6 Democratic
Transitions under Two Taiwanese Presidents –Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian),
117 Chih-yu Shih (2003),“the Global Constitution of“Taiwan democracy”: Opening up the image of a
successful sate after 9/11”, East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 20, No.3, p.97.
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especially the democratic values of the highest political leaders, their decision making,
relative measurements and the political consequences
Second, as argued in Chapter 1.2, the other aim of this research is to understand
how Taiwan survives between two international superpowers, the United States and
China. As a small island with a considerable export economy globally, the work and
future development of this nascent democratic system is definitely relative to external
changes in the international political environment, especially the Cross-Strait
relations between Taiwan and China. Initially, the diplomatic setback, trade relations,
and movement overseas of influential Taiwan companies are considered by the
researcher as possible external international political economic factors influential to
the island’s political values, popular mentality, institution building and even the shape 
of the social economic structure. These efects also undoubtedly relate to the island’s 
future democratic development. The researcher will try to find answers in the
following chapters.
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Chapter 4 IPE Theories and Cross-Strait Relations
Introduction
Since the IPE theories focus on the global distribution of wealth and economic
activities and their effects on national autonomy, the characteristic of cross-strait
interaction –a politically confrontational power relationship with economically
intimate commercial ties –is typical of the inevitable clash between the logic of
market and the logic of state, both of which are central to the study of international
political economy.118 The logic of the market system is to expand geographically, to
incorporate more and more aspects of a society within the price mechanism, and to
locate economic activities wherever they will be most efficient and profitable. In
contrast, the logic of state is to capture and control the process of economic growth,
capital accumulation, relative gains of trade, and territorial distribution of industry in
order to increase the power and economic welfare of the nation.
In this chapter, I am trying to create a systematic analytical framework (Table
4.1), inspired by Susan Strange’s pioneering structural analysis of international 
political economy, to review the current research about Cross-Strait relations.
According to Susan Strange’s description, the work of a world political economy 
system is shaped and determined by “structural power”, far more than “relational 
power”, including the preservation of people from violence (security), goods and 
services for survival (production), supply and distribution of credit (finance) and
“know-how” of technology (knowledge), which are controlled and operated by
powerful and influential states, political institutions, enterprises (majorly
118 Robert Gilpin (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton
University), p.81.
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multinational corporations, MNCs), and professionals.119 Between China and Taiwan,
the confrontation in international organizations; the diversified DPP and KMT trade
policy (protectionism or open-door); China’s RMB policy; and Taishang’s activities 
(Taiwanese business in the mainland), are defined by the researcher as the four major
international political economic phenomena which are influential to the dynamic
change of cross-Strait relations and the evolution of the island’s democratic 
development. The relative IPE theories and research articles will be discussed in the
following sections.
Table 4.1: Four IPE phenomena of Cross-Strait Relations
Market–
Authority
Nexus
Security Production Finance Knowledge
State 1 Confrontation
in international
organization
Political
institutions
2 Protectionism or
open door
3.RMB
MNCs 4.Taishang’s 
activities
Source: Author’s own compilation
119 Susan Strange (1994), State and Market (2nd Edition London, Pinter Publishers), p.24.
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4.1 Confrontation in international organizations
The interaction between China and Taiwan in international organization provides
researchers with another dimension to analyse the changing nature of Cross-Strait
relations. Rather than focusing on the increasing numbers of countries with official
diplomatic relations, the KMT and DPP both realise that successful participation in
international organization is both a more practical and more efficient method by
which to expand Taiwan’s international space without stimulating Beijing to interfere
and potentially block such expansion. According to neo-liberalism theories,
international organization is an intermediate agent which provides a more neutral
framework, issue linkage, and transparency for greater multi-cooperation rather than
bilateral interaction. 120 Nevertheless, the realist-institutionalism theorists have
different perspectives about the work of international organization. They think
international organization not only promotes interstate cooperation, but sometimes
results in additional conflicts and competition among different nations. Various
interstate interactions also depend more on different types of individual relations
before they join.121 Sometimes, the inequalities created by the major powers in
international organization are greater than the problems they solved.122
Taipei considers the rapid East Asia regional integration to be a naturaly “market 
driven” rather than a “policy driven” process.123 The economic factors are relatively
120 Robert O. Keohane, (1982), "The Demand for International Regimes", International Organization,
Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 325–355.
121 Ronald R. Krebs (1999), "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict,"
International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 343–377.
122 Andrew Schotter (1981), The Economic Theory of Social Institutions (New York: Cambridge
University Press).
123 Albert Fishlow and Stephan Haggard (1992), The United States and the Regionalization of the
World Economy, Development Centre Documents (Paris: OECD).
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more important than any political consideration in the process of Taiwan’s foreign 
economic policy making. Taipei views that the increasing East Asian regional
economic integration is built up from “regionalization” to “regionalism”; Christopher 
M. Dent gives a clear explanation about these two processes. Regionalization refers to
the growth of intra-regional economic linkages (trade, investment, finance) at
business or market level, whereby regional concentration of internationally linked
private-sector activities help develop transnational economic spaces within a region
and also regional economic interdependence generally.
Regionalism, on the other hand, “arises from public policy initiatives, such as 
an FTA or other state-led projects of regional economic co-operation and integration
that originate from inter-governmental dialogues and treaties.” “Regionalization and 
regionalism are mutualy reinforcing.”124 “Taipei is aware of how non participation in 
the new bilateral trade agreement (FTA) and the ASEAN plus Three (APT) process
has the potential to marginalize Taiwan both ‘geo-economicaly’ and 
‘geopoliticaly’.”125 However, Beijing considers Taiwan is making use of the
legitimate participation126 of international regime as a means of agenda setting and
linkage in political bargaining127 for greater international recognition of its political
status. Taiwan’s foreign economic policy is interpreted by China as “policy driven” by 
political motives to de facto independence rather than “market driven” by regional 
economic integration, no matter if the KMT or the DPP are in the office. As Gordon
Cheung commented, this series of “Taiwan salient movement toward 
124 Christopher M. Dent (2005), “Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia”,the
China Quarterly, No.182 (June 2005), p. 388.
125 Ibid., p. 401.
126 Parris H. Chang (1994), “No Security without Taiwan”, Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 July1994, 6.
127 Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph Nye (1989), Power and Interdependence, 2nd edition (New York:
Harper Collins Publishers).
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internationalization” had created an impression of Taiwan seeking independence so 
far as China was concerned.128
In fact, China’s opposition to Taiwan is another kind of policy driven by its
“one country, two systems” principle. This basic logic makes the Chinese government 
very sensitive to Taiwan’s membership and agenda seting in any international 
organization.129 For fear that Taiwan will get equal membership, China constantly
opposes Taiwanese representatives who are also high ranking government officials
and any initiatives proposed in the name of financial contribution to regional
economic development.130 Another of China’s worries is the US factor. Despite much
research showing that the economic power and political leadership of the United
States has been relatively declining and the US itself is no longer capable of providing
“international colective goods” such as foreign aid131 due to increasing international
industrial rivalry from the rise of new economic power,132 federal budget and
trade/payments deficit,133 and slowing of American productivity growth;134 it is
believed that the US is still influential in international organizations and that the US
encourage the use of economic regimes binding forces to coordinate country relations.
128 Gordon C.K. Cheung (1997), “APEC as a Regime for Taiwan’s Interdependence with the United
States and Mainland China”, Issues and Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, p. 25.
129 Wen-heng Chao (2002), “Cross-Strait Interaction: from APEC to WTO”, Issues and Studies, 16: 3
(Sept. 2002), pp. 1–13.
130 A typical example is China’s opposition to the Asian Monetary Fund ( AMF) and Taiwan’s 
involvement in the Asian Bond Fund.
131 Mancur Olsen (1996), in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (1996) (ed.), New Dimensions in
Regional Integration, (New York: Cambridge University Press), p.125.
132 Robert O. Keohane (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Disorder in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
133 Susan Strange (1998), Mad Money (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press).
134 Steven Weber (1997), “Institutions and Change” in Michael Doyle and John Ikenbery(ed.), New
Thinking in International Relations (Boulder, CO: West view Press).
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For example, Taiwan and China’s applications for WTO membership have thus 
harmonized the US comprehensive engagement policy toward China and continuous
commercial and friendly relations with Taiwan.135
Table 4.2 shows a clear example of Cross-Strait confrontation from APEC to
WTO in three perspectives (regulation, power relations, and issues setting ) and
explains China gradually receiving advantages in international organizations owing to
its superiority in the legal arena, the role of a world hegemonic power and superior
agenda setting power. Taiwan only owns advantages in compliance with international
principles, norms and rules.
Table 4.2: Cross-Strait confrontation in international organizations from APEC to WTO
APEC WTO Compare Advantage
Membership China =TaiwanRegulation Forum International
organization
Legal arena China >Taiwan
Power
relations
Regional
interaction
Global
competition
1.Hegemonic power
2. Global North–South
conflicts
China > Taiwan
World production system China > TaiwanIssues
setting
Various issue Trade issue
International norms and
rules
Taiwan > China
Source: Author’s own compilation
135 Ibid, Gordon C.K. Cheung (1997), p.37.
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First, in terms of regulation, unlike APEC, the WTO does not hold an annual
forum, it is not necessary to be a sovereign state in order to be a member, neither must
the representatives be a head of state –APEC holds an annual forum and its
representatives must be a national leader, president or prime minister. This more
flexible regulation thus provides Taiwan a good opportunity to obtain both
membership and relative international recognition in the name of “regional economy” 
without question or challenge from Chinese opposition. However, unlike APEC’s 
unoficial annual forum in which the conclusion is decided by consensus, the WTO’s 
forum is relatively more official and it is compulsory that its members obey its legal
resolution by vote. Under this circumstance, China has more power to mobilize the
veto any of Taiwanese proposals, including an arbitration application because Taiwan
has suffered poor international recognition with only 23 states having full diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. Second, in power perspectives, the WTO is more complex due
to the global competition among major economic power and global north–south
conflicts.136 Thus, for China, the WTO is advantageous in terms of gaining more
agenda setting power because China is considered as the rising hegemonic power and
gaining influence over developing countries in Africa and Latin American. Moreover,
the WTO discussion focuses more on trade issues and because China has already
played an important role in world production system more emphasis is placed on the
Chinese factor. However, the whole situation is not completely pessimistic to Taiwan.
Owing to its earlier liberalization and integration into the world economy, Taiwan
enjoys higher compliance with international principles, norms and rules, for example,
respect of copyright and environmental protection. On these issues, Taiwan can
receive greater support from advanced countries; enhancing Taipei’s ability to work 
136 Ibid, Chao Wen-heng (2002), p.12.
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with other governments, and somewhat eroding Beijing’s atempts to isolate Taiwan 
internationally.
After 1990, when financial crisis-induced tensions threatened to destabilize
regional trade diplomacy, the WTO was perceived to be inefficient and bilateral FTA
projects became popular and were viewed as a better mechanism for trade
liberalization and regional economic interdependence management.137 The trend of
increasing bilateral negotiations and economic regionalism, the proliferation of
bilateral FTA projects, and enhanced economic diplomacy interaction in East Asia has:
introduced a series of significant international economic agreements between the
region states; stimulated regionalization processes through reducing barriers to
intra-regional trade and investment; built a sub-structural basis for regionalism and
regional economic community building; and even brought regional distribution of
power and hegemonic aspirations of Japan and China.138 In this trend, Taiwan faces a
dilemma between marginalization or further integration with China. Under pressure
from China and its threat to its major trade partners, Taiwan’s FTA options are 
currently rather narrow –the 26 relatively small states that Taiwan enjoys full
diplomatic relations with account for only 4 per cent of its total trade.139 By a similar
token, if Taiwan accepts Beijing’s proposal of an FTA between Taiwan and China,
discounting any dificulties relating to resistance to the “one country, two systems” 
formula, it wil be always a hard lesson for Taiwan’s government to find a balance 
137 Barry Eichengreen,“Discussionon Multinational and Bilateral trade policies”in Jaime De Melo
and Arvind Panagariya (1996) (ed.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration (New York:
Cambridge University Press), pp.120–121.
138 Ibid, Christopher M. Dent (2005), p.394.
139 ROC Trade Partners Ranking List, ROC Bureau of Foreign Trade Information .Website:
http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSC3/FSC3040R.ASP?rptName=FSC3040R&typ=A&BYEAR=200801&EY
EAR=200806&USER_ID=&intType=1.
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between cross-strait liberalization and erosion of national autonomy and security.
4.2 Cross-Strait trade relations and RMB exchange rate
Macroeconomic policy consists of two basic tools for managing a national
economy: fiscal and monetary policies. The principal instruments of fiscal policy are
taxation and government expenditures; monetary policy works through its
determination of the size and velocity of a nation’s money supply.140 Free capital
outflow accompanying the relocation of Taishang (Taiwan business in mainland) for
lower cost and integrating financial markets across the Taiwan strait had reduced the
autonomy of the Taiwanese government’s fiscal policy and its ability (especialy the 
erosion of revenue basis to control their own economies). According to a ROC
Investment Commission report, by the end of May 2008, almost three-quarters of
Taiwanese firms that had invested overseas had investment in the Chinese mainland.
The majority of investments over the past ten years have been in electronics, metal
products, petrochemicals and plastics, food and beverage processing, medical
equipment and services. Through the direct investment from Taiwan and indirect
investment via Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands, an
estimated 50 per cent of Taiwan’s outbound FDI is now invested in China.141 Taiwan
is becoming overly dependent on the PRC market which is still the major source of
trade surplus.142 Like Susan Strange’s interesting analogy about the credit system in 
140 Ibid, Robert Gilpin (1987), pp. 370–371.
141 The Permitted Overseas, Foreign, and Mainland Investment Report (July,2008), Investment
Commission, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Afairs (MOEA), Republic of China (ROC); The data 
can been seen on the website:
http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_external/ctlr?PRO=NewsLoad&id=607.
142 Shu Keng and Choung–sheng Lin (2005), “The Political Role of Taiwan Businessmen in Cross 
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any economy: “Credit is literaly the life blood of a developed economy. It has to 
circulate regularly and reliably. It has to stay healthy and stable or the society suffers,
just as the body suffers if there is disorder in the blood or too much or too little of
it”,143 Vice President Shao, who has been acknowledged as the most important
economic policy consultant for President Ma, had given a similar description
regarding the loss of money due to unilateral capital outflow from island to mainland:
“Taiwan is like a strong man who donates too much blood but without feedback from 
mainland, no matter how strong you are, you cannot live without enough blood to
nourish and renew your body”.144 Another factor influential to cross-strait trade is the
adjustment of the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate. The very low pay labour and vast
potential as a market have made China the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Like a successful developing country, China makes use of these
large infusions of outside capital to build the costly infrastructure required for their
economic development145 and a magnet “to atract new waves of investment”. China 
is now a national reserve surplus country, but the huge capital inflow created
difficulties for the Chinese government to control its price stability and maintain its
export competiveness.
Table 4.3 presents the contradictory perspectives (policy orientations, role of
China, trade relations, economic security and domestic interests) of the DPP and the
KMT on the nature of cross-strait trade relations. The DPP government policy
Strait Integration “, Mainland China Studies, Vol. 48, No. 1(March 2005), p. 5.
143 Ibid, Susan Strange (1994), p. 91.
144 Regarding the parable, please see the video in the KMT 2008 presidential Campaign website:
http://2008.ma19.net/policy4you/economy/reform
145 Regarding using the FDI to strengthen infrastructure to attract more capital, please see W. Arthur
Lewis (1978), The Evolution of the International Economy Order (Princeton University
Press),pp.28-34.
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orientation is a typical protectionism146 and views China as a competitor rather than a
labour-intensive processor for Taiwanese industries. 147 Taiwan suffered higher
vulnerability148 in the asymmetric cross-strait trade relations,149 especially higher
cost of a loss of national security, and potential risk of economic leverage from
Beijing.
Table 4.3: The differences in DPP and KMT mainland trade policy
DPP KMT
Policy orientation Protectionism (Top- down) Open- door (Bottom -up)
Role of China Competitor Co-operator
Trade relation Asymmetric dependence Complementary and equal interdependent
Economic security Vulnerable dependence on
mainland market
Good for
1.Innovation
2.Utilization of national resource
3. National efficiency
4. International competiveness
Domestic interest Winner and losers Protectionism transplant cost from
producers to consumers
Source: Author’s own compilation
146 Max Gorden (1993), “The Revival of Protectionism in Developed Countries “ inDominick
Salvatore (ed.), Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge and New York Cambridge University
Press,1998), pp. 54–57.
147 Tse-kang Leng (2002),” Securing Economic Relations across the Taiwan Straits: New Chalenges   
and Opportunities”, Journal of Contemporary China (2002), Vol. 11, No. 31, p. 262.
148 Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph .S. Nye (2001), Power and Interdependence, (3rd edition, New York:
Longman), pp.14-15.
149 Klaus Knorr (1977), “International Economic Leverage and Its Uses”, in Klaus Knorr and Frank N.
Trager (ed.), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, KA: University of Kansas Press ),
p. 102.
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The territorial distribution of core industry and technological capability is always
of the greatest concern to every state for the national security reasons.150 The
comparative advantage resulting from a natural supply supported by experience and
the nations with a head start in a particular technology tend to strengthen their
position over time.151 As Taiwan moves its IT manufacture into PRC, Taiwan’s 
security planners are concerned that Taiwanese business may be indirectly helping to
develop the PRC‘s military capabilities.152 Despite that Taiwanese business still
enjoys advantages on capital and technology, as more and more Taiwan businesses
gradually lose their international competiveness and transfer sales from the global
market to the mainland domestic market, the possibility for PRC to exercise economic
leverage becomes very high. Lin Choung-sheng argues that if China implements
economic warfare such as cutting Cross-Strait economic ties, “smal and democratic” 
Taiwan is obviously more sensitive and vulnerable, but China can tolerate more
impacts and enjoy greater autonomy owing to the huge domestic market under
authoritarian control.153 The final DPP consideration regards domestic factors. The
DPP government consider it would be a political risk to support further Cross-Strait
liberalization and integration, which is believed to be the major reason behind a
greater number of resentful losers (those who cannot compete with cheaper Chinese
labour) and just a few winners (businessmen who benefit from the cross-strait
150 Robert Gilpin (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton
University), p. 80.
151 Gene M. Grossman and Elhana Helpman (1990),“Comparative Advantage and Long Run Growth”, 
American Economic Review (September 1990), pp. 796–815.
152 Karen M. Suter (2002), “Business Dynamism Across the Taiwan Strait”, Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No.
3, p. 534.
153 Tse-kang Leng(1999), “The Nature of Cross Strait Economic Dynamism: The Interaction between 
State and Society” in Pao Tzong-ho and Wu Yu-Shen (ed.), Debates on Cross Strait Relations
Theory (Taipei: Wunan Publishers, 1999), pp. 232–236.
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economic integration and liberalization).154 Technological advances especially the
computer and information economy significantly increased the demand for low skilled
workers and greatly increased demand for skilled, especially college educated
workers. The “run-away” labour intensive plants and “take job away” from mainland 
workers have destroyed the internal vertical division of labour and caused the
“holowing out” of island industries.155 It is the typical case that the competition from
low wages countries has stimulated labour-saving technological changes in advanced
countries and thereby reduced the demand for low wage labour and caused
unemployment. 156 The DPP government is deemed to play the role of the
protectionist because its basic supporters on the whole consist of workers and
farmers–the typical resentful losers in the process of globalization.
The KMT consider Cross-Strait interaction is a normal part of growing East
Asian economic integration. Taiwan has become increasingly dependent on trade
within the region especially intermediate goods.157 Like general economists who
dispute the alleged benefits of trade protection, the KMT criticise that protectionism
will decrease the national international economic efficiency and the incentive for
firms to innovate and climb the technological ladder. It also discourages shifting
scarce national resources to profitable use and causes unfair redistribution of national
income from customers to protected producer interests.158As Gary Clyde Hufbauer
and Kimberly Ann Elliot researched, the past protection of 21 industries had actually
154 Ibid, Mancur Olsen (1996), pp. 122–127.
155 Robert Gilpin (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations (New Jersey: Princeton
University): p.204.
156 Adrian P. Wood (1994), North–South Trade, Employment, and Inequality: Changing Fortunes in a
Skill-Driven World (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
157 Karen M. Suter (2002),” Business Dynamism Across the Taiwan Strait”, Asian Survey, Vol.42,No.3,
p.528.
158 Max Gorden (1974), Trade Policy and Economic Welfare (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
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saved few jobs but the cost to consumers had been approximately $170,000 per job
saved. The equivalent figure for Japan is $600,000.159 Such protection constitutes a
heavy burden on an economy. The KMT views that cross-strait economic relations are
complementary and equally interdependent. Taiwan uses its huge trade surplus with
mainland China to upgrade Taiwan’s industrial levels and strengthen the economic 
foundation for Taiwanese independence. For China, the Taiwanese investments create
employment, promote technological know-how, and boost the prosperity of mainland
China’s localeconomy.160 For most Taiwanese businesses, occupying a strategic site
on the mainland’s booming coastal area is the major reason to relocate and imperative 
in order to keep its international competiveness. According to Porter, the national
governments do play an important role in helping or thwarting the efforts of firms to
create a competitive advantage in international markets. Porter’s research strongly 
supports the idea that advantage in international trade, at least in high-tech industries,
can be and is created by deliberate corporate and national policies. Government
policies can: support or hinder the supply-and-demand factors affecting the successes
of particular sectors; protect industries from international competition; foster
technological innovation through support of R&D; and protect proprietary knowledge
from foreign competitors.161 The KMT criticise the DPP government’s failure in 
cross-strait negotiations, and prohibited and limited investment162do not provide
159 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Kimberly Ann Elliot (1994), Measuring Costs of Protection in the United
States (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics).
160 Ibid, Tse-kang Leng (2002), p. 263.
161 Michael E. Porter (1990), The Comparative Advantages of Nations ( New York: Free
Press),pp.617-682.
162 The limitation is loose and was modified after Ma went to office after March 2008. According to
the latest modified “Guidelines for Evaluations of Technology Cooperation and Investment in 
Chinese Mainland”. (August 29, 2008), “the MOEA Investment Commission office still reviews
proposed investment on a case–by case basis and uses a rating system to assess a variety of factors
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Taiwanese businesses with support but rather increase the difficulty of economic
efficiency. In some cases, restrictions have encouraged Taiwanese entrepreneurs to
invest in Hong Kong or increasingly free ports like the Cayman Islands and British
Virgin Islands in order to bypass such rules. 163 The real guarantee to protect
Taiwanese interests is to further internationalise Taiwanese economic transactions
with mainland China, rather than imposing top-down restrictions.164
The Chinese government faces a trilemma, or the typical “ireconcilable trinity” 
regarding the adjustment of the Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate –no international
monetary and financial system can accommodate all three of desirable goals: fixed
exchange rates; independent monetary policy; and capital mobility, at most it can
incorporate two of these objectives.165 In the long term, freedom of capital movement
to facilitate the conduct of trade, foreign investment, and other international business
activities will undermine the fixed price and independent monetary policy which
promotes economic stability and enables the government to deal with various
domestic economic problems. In the short term, China faces international pressure to
appreciate the RMB price. The low production cost (especially patronage policy and
labour incentives) have made Chinese global export products very competitive in
price but have been attributed as the major reason of trade deficit, deflation, and
decline of manufacture competitiveness in the major industrialised countries. The
Chinese government’s RMB policy is suspected to be manipulation which did not
and the special case investments free from evaluation are generally supposed to be under NT$50
million. For small and medium-sized firm, the limit is justified from NT$60 million to NT$80
million; Private firms investment may not exceed 60 per cent of net assets or capital (40 per cent
before modification)”. The details can been seen at the folow website: 
http://www.moeaic.gov.tw/system_external/ctlr?PRO=LawsLoad&id=9.
163 Ibid, Karen M. Sutter (2002), p. 527.
164 Ibid, Tse-kang Leng (2002), p.264.
165 Robert A. Mundell (1968), International Economics (New York :Macmillan).
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reflect the real price in the market mechanism. In July 2003, the chairman of
European Union Commitee criticised China’s RMB policy as a kind of new 
protectionism.166 The US government even threatened to tax a “sanction cost” to 
China’s import goods for violation of unfair trade restrictions.167
In addition to international pressure and economic stability, the Chinese
government worries about the rising RMB price causing several negative effects. The
Chinese government increases its RMB supply to maintain RMB price stability due to
high foreign exchange reserve percentage in GDP.168 The increasing RMB supply
therefore causes the price of RMB to go up. The higher RMB price will increase the
cost of export enterprise and inevitably impact export competitiveness. 169 The
decreasing export170 and FDI171 will result in slowing the economic growth and
exacerbate deflation.172 The second worry is bubble economies. The speculation on
RMB price would draw a greater number of risky international investors into the
financial and housing market.173 According the 2004 statistic, the hot money is
166 Chen–yuan Tung (2005), The International Political Economic Analysis of the Renminbi Exchange
Rate, Issue and Studies, Vol. 44, No. 6 (Nov–Dec 2005), p. 145.
167 Ibíd., p. 146.
168 Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy, “China’s Revaluation Shows Size Realy Maters”, 
Financial Times, 22 July 2005.
169 Ji Zhou(2005), “The Change of RMB Exchange Rate and its Efects on Taiwan Economy”, Chung-
Hua Insitution for Economic Research Centre Report, pp. 3–17.
170 Robert A. Mundell (2006), Evolution of the International Monetary System and its Implications for
China, presentation at the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, September 6,
2006.
171 Hai Wen (2003),“There is Potential Possibility of RMB Devaluation”, Sina, Finance, November
2003.
172 Robert A. Mundell (2005), The Case for an Asian Currency?, presentation at the Symposium on
Monetary Affairs, Institute for International Monetary Affairs, Tokyo, 12 November 2005.
173 Ibid, Ji Zhou (2005), ibid., pp. 3–11-17.
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estimated at 11.9 percent of China’s GDP 174 Moreover, the weakness of the Chinese
financial system, such as an immature foreign exchange market and serious doubtful
accounting problems of state owned enterprises 175 has potentially made the bank
failure worse, and possibly the financial crisis. Third, the decreasing export
competitiveness and deflation will increase unemployment especially in rural areas.176
The instability of rural areas will be the greatest political risk to CCP legitimacy.
Finally, the appreciations of the RMB will weaken the international confidence in the
RMB’s credibility because it wil increase the debt, especialy in South East Asian
countries.177 Owing to so many problems, the Chinese government raised several
reasons to reject RMB appreciation. First, some economy experts think a high foreign
exchange reserve in GDP does not facilitate inflation–a major consequence of rising
inflation was increased food prices.178 Second, China’s global economic influence is 
exaggerated in that China’s GDP is only one-tenth of US’ and one-quarter of Japan’s 
production.179 Third, during 1994–1997, the price of the RMB was fundamentally
raised by 30 per cent –showing that the Chinese government did not manipulate the
price to keep its export competition.180 Actually, China faced more challenges after
its domestic market gradually integrated into the world economy. After the WTO
forum, foreign products will be easier to get to the Chinese domestic market and the
174 Ibid, Chen–yuan Tung (2005), p. 136.
175 Ibid, Robert A. Mundell (2006).
176 Chen-yuan Tung (2004) “The Dilemma of RMB Exchange Rate Policy: Fixed Exchange Rate or 
Independent Monetary Policy?” in Tung Chen-yuan (ed.), RMB Exchange Rate (Yuan Jing
Foundation ), pp. 46–51.
177 Ibid, Robert A. Mundell (2005).
178 Ibid, Chen-yuan Tung (2005), p142.
179 Ibid, Ji Zhou (2005), pp. 3–11-15.
180 Siao- chuan Zhou (2003), “Zhou Siao Chuan Reduces the Pressure of RMB Appreciation”, Beijing
Start Daily, 25 September 2003.
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trade surplus will not increase so obviously.181 As more and more overseas MNCs
gradually settle down in China, unlike previous stages, the FDI will not increase so
rapidly. The Chinese government considers that advanced countries overestimate the
RMB’s influence and have unrealistic expectations about the efects of RMB 
appreciation. Fundamental economic problems such as the low saving rate in the
United States are major factors to trade deficit.182 Moreover, the Chinese central bank
is the major holder of American government bonds which provide the creditability for
the US tax cutting policy and housing market. RMB appreciation will cause the
reducing ownership of US government bonds, and the outflow of Chinese capital will
force the Federal Reserve to increase the interest rate, which will risk a credit crunch
and burst the housing market bubble.183
Nevertheless, some economists think RMB appreciation brings advantages. The
compromise of RMB appreciation will help prevent the Chinese government from
international trade conflicts and economic sanctions.184 The revaluation of the RMB
wil develop capability and flexibility of the Chinese government’s financial sector 
and lower costs (money supply is considered a high cost measurement) to restore
equilibrium in their national reserve –the measurement of RMB revaluation is not
solely a narrow focus on reducing export loss, the Chinese government are greatly
concerned about this issue.185 The revaluation of the RMB will also alter the
181 Ibid, Hai Wen (2003), November 2003.
182 Paul R. Krugman (1994), “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession ”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No.
2 (March/April 1994), pp. 28–44.
183 Guo- zhong Xie ,” Domestic Pressure of RMB Appreciation Disappear, but Bubble House Market 
stil Exist”, 21st Century Economy Report, 28 March 2005.
184 John Williamson (2002), The Renminbi Exchange Rate and the Global Monetary System,
presentation at the Symposium on Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, 29
October 2002.
185 Fan Yang (2005), Perspective Exchange Rate (Beijing: China Economy).
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imbalance between export and non-export sectors.
4.3 The role of Taishang (Taiwan Businessmen in Mainland China)
The expansion of the Taishang (Taiwanese business) is another key feature of
Cross-Strait business dynamism. Even though the relocation of Taishang is attributed
to be the major reason behind Taiwan’s economic recession, Taishang behaviour is 
stil considered “economicaly rational” if it is defined as multi-national corporation
(MNC) activity. The global economy populated by MNCs has been described as a
“seamless web” in which there no longer are any purely national economies, 
corporations, or products.186 MNCs are strategic players187 who posses advantages of
monopoly, ownership, technology, location and internationality over purely domestic
corporations,188 but cannot escape the product cycle.
International business is a value-chain of activities ranging from extraction to
production to marketing. The R&D efforts such as a trademark or know-how (1.
monopolistic advantages) give individual firms an efficient and reliable strategy to
decide which and how many of these activities it wishes to pursue and in what
locations around the globe, especially how MNCs can employ country-specific
advantages such as access to low-cost skilled labour or to other special local resource
(2. locational advantage). The strategy includes not only FDI (3. ownership
advantage), but also strategic alliance, outsourcing of component production and
licensing technologies. These corporate activities create international complexes or
186 Robert Reich (1991), The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for the 21st Century Capitalism,
(New York: Knopf, 1991).
187 Michel E. Porter (1990), The Comparative Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press).
188 John N. Dunning (1988), Explaining International Production (London: Unwin Hyman).
102
networks of corporate relations with the parent MNCs in its home economy (4.
international advantages). Through modern information technology and monopoly of
information resources, the MNC can become dominant over its domestic competitor,
enjoy lower transaction costs, and be more able to pre-empt foreign competitors. (5.
technological advantage) However, every product follows a life cycle from innovation
through maturity to decline to eventual obsolescence.189 During the initial phase of
the product cycle, firms export new products from their home industrial base, but in
time a number of negative changes occur associated with the maturing of the product,
such as diffusion abroad of industrial know-how and stimulate the entry of foreign
imitators into the market.
Table 4.4 explains how Taiwanese firms (Taishang) enjoy the five advantages
discussed above when they go into the Chinese market. Especially in high-tech
industries, Taiwanese manpower advantages in marketing, financing, and legal
services help Taiwan to occupy a strategic position in China’s technological 
development (1. monopolistic advantage). Major cities like Shanghai have become the
main sites of this manpower cooperation and competition (2. location advantage).
Since Taiwan has a flourishing semiconductor and computer industry, the CASPA
(Chinese American Semiconductor Professional), one of the largest Chinese American
semiconductor professional organizations outside Taiwan and China, had suggested
the best policy for Taiwan to enter China market would be to create strategic alliances
with major international semiconductors producers (4. international advantage). They
also indicated that Taiwan, well equipped with venture capital (3. ownership
advantage) and production capacity (5. technology advantage) could play the role of
mediator to introduce international talent, and integrate human resources of the
189 Raymond Vernon (1971), Sovereignty at Bay: the multinational spread of US Enterprise (New York:
Basic Books) ,pp.65-76.
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Greater China region with a global high-tech centre. One good example is the work of
the Monte Jade Science and Technology Association, a Taiwanese
government-supported association established in 1990. The major goals of Monte
Jade have become to develop the Chinese market by introducing US technologies and
Taiwanese capital.190
Table 4.4: Taishang’s MNCs Advantages
No MNCs advantages Taishang’s advantages
1 Monopolistic R&D efforts Manpower
2 Location Country-specific advantages Major cities (i.e. IT in Shanghai)
3 Ownership FDI Venture capital
4 International Corporate activities Strategic alliances mediator
5 Technology IT and resources Production capacity
Source: Author’s own compilation
As Krugman said, MNCs are not merely a substitute for trade; moreover, they
atempt to extend their power and control over foreign economies. The MNCs’ desire 
is not only to earn immediate profits, but also to change and influence the rules or
regime governing trade and international competition in order to improve their
long-term position.191 Some theorists consider that MNCs have become powerful
independent actors rivalling and even outstripping the national state (shedding
national identity, providing a public good, and making decisions without special
190 Tse-kang Leng (2002a),”Economic Globalization and IT Talent Flows across the Taiwan Strait”, 
Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 235–240.
191 Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld (1994), International Economics: Theory and Practice,
3rd ed. (New York: HarperCollins).
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reference to their home economy) due to global corporate planning, unclear
ownership with equity sharing, joint ventures, corporate alliances, extensive
outsourcing, and integration of production that are stateless and independent.192 Each
MNC is a distinctive product of its home base and reflects its social, economic and
political values. MNCs are actually deeply embedded in, and very much a product of,
the history, culture, and economic systems of their home societies.193
As typical MNCs, whether the closer Cross-Strait interaction (even integration)
will motivate these business elites to negotiate their share in the political process
(both Taiwan and China) , the economic exchange with mainland will strengthen the
island’s democratic system , or the island’s democracy will cause any impact on the
mainland’s political reforms due to the movement of Taishang who are considered
as supporters of Taiwan democratic development are all interesting issues for a further
investigation. Lin argues that Taishang play four kinds of political role as partner,
lobbyist, agent and hostage.194 As a “partner”, especialy in the major cities along the
coast such as Kunshan, Dongguan, and Shenzhen, Taishang establish a “symbiotic” 
relationship with local bureaucracy, contribute to regional prosperity and
competiveness, and therefore enjoy having a voice of power and threat of
withdrawal.195 As a “lobbyist”, according Tung Chen-yuan’s investigation, there are 
stil no records showing that any Taishang’s suggestion have been rejected by CCP 
192 Ohmae Kenichi (1991), the Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy
(New York: Haper Business), pp.11-12.
193 Paul N. Doremus, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich (1998), The Myth of the
Global Corporation (Princeton:Princeton University Press),p.17.
194 Shu Keng and Choung–sheng Lin (2005), “The Political Role of Taiwan Businessmen in Cross 
Strait Integration”,Mainland China Studies, Vol. 48, No. 1 (March 2005), p.5.
195 Albert O. Hirchman (1986), Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays (New York:
Viking 1986), pp. 90–107.
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officials.196 After the formation of the WTO, the gradual maturation of the market
economy makes it more difficult for the Chinese government to implement its
“selective sanction or incentives” if they treat Taishang as “hostage” or “agent”.197
The Taiwanese Business Association (TBA) organized by Taiwan’s business 
community is even considered a quasi-interest group and tooccupy the “fifth ranking 
of leadership”, ranking after the CCP party cadre, government oficials, National 
People Congress (NPC) and National Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) representatives. 198 Winnie King analyzes
Taishang’s political influence on the island’s democracy in three dimensions. She
considered the economic exchange with mainland has made in strengthening
commitments and loyalties to Taiwan as a nation and ethnicity (democratic values),
securing and promoting the democratic institution (institutional stature and authority),
and the role of civic actors in the policy making process. The three multi-level
analytical dimensions is coincidently compatible with the four-level analytical
framework for a democracy created by the author in the last chapter. Especially in the
institutional levels, King had carefully clarified the various political role of Taishang
and their influence on the island’s democratic politics. In terms of establishment of a
credible democratic institutions and policies, Taishang are consultants and
information providers for the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and had actually
successfully influenced theMAC’spriorities including the“GoSouthPolicy”in 1994
196 Tung, Chen-yuan (2003), Cross Strait Economic Relations in Globalization (Tapei: Sheng Zhi,
2003).
197 Shu Keng (2006), “Taiwanese Identity, Found and Lost: Shifted Identity of the Taiwanese in 
Shanghai”, presented for the Conference on Political Economy: Dialogues between Philosophy,
Institution, and Policy, Department of Political Science (Taipei: National Chengchi University,
27-28 September 2006).
198 Ibid. Shu Keng and Choung-sheng Lin (2005), p. 17.
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“Go Slow, Be Patient Policy”in 1996. In terms of legitimization of Taiwan’s
democratic institutions, some of Taishang communities have established effective
institutional framework (i.e. existence of informal or secret clubs) to interact with
government offices (i.e. regular meeting between business leaders and high-ranking
bureaucrats and party leaders) , and participation in democratic process (i.e. returning
to vote; funding of parties and election candidates ).199
Nevertheless, the other scholars have different perspectives about the political
role of Taishang and impact of this community. Schubert Gunter point out the political
role of Taishang is quite limited and their influence on China’s political reform might
be overestimated and too much expected. According to his sophisticated scrutiny
during 2006-2008, Gunter found out even though Taishang are more interested in
Taiwan’s domestic politics, they actually possesses a“situational identity”and avoids
a public discussion or ideological debate with a Chinese about the issue of Taiwan
sovereignty status Meanwhile, due to the change of business climate and rapid
centralized capital in mainland China , Taishang are becoming powerless both
politically and economically. Taishang are not impossible as lobbyist, agents, or
hostages for two hostile governments since the communities are actually apolitical
(even anachronistic in sovereignty issue) pragmatic , not such a patriotic figures
who only care more about how to earn more money, keep their position in process of
economic globalization, and refrain for m the heavy social pressure from Chinese
society.200 Li Rui-hua questions the TBA as a strong organization according to
political and social capital theories. Lin found that regardless of “colective action” 
199 Winning King, How Cross-Strait economics has strengthened Taiwan’s political system: the impact
of economic actors, paper presented for the 2nd Annual European Association for Taiwan Studies
Conference, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum,1-2 April 2005.
200 Gunter Schubert (2010),“The Political Thinking of the Mainland Taishang :Some Preliminary
Observations from the Field”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1, pp.73-110.
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for group interest or “particular ties “for personal rent seeking,201 it is difficult for the
TBA to create political capital, such as bargaining power, due to the gradual loss of
economic superiority following the entry of stronger foreign MNCs into the Chinese
market and the relatively weaker role of the Taiwan Affairs Office (Taiban) in the
CCP authoritarian system. Like typical Chinese social behaviour, most Taishang are
used to create personal connections rather than voluntary participation and social
capital is helpful to reduce the transaction cost. The greater the social capital
accumulation, the less the transaction cost, and vice versa.202 There are also lots of
“free riders” who share the “selective benefits” provided by the TBA, including 
information sharing, expression of needs and emergency assistance. The participation
of these free riders therefore has weakened the TBA’s eficiency because most 
members will think the TBA is not capable to take care of the rights of their
membership.203
China’s strategy of a “peaceful rise” actualy provides MNCs another good 
international political environment for overseas expansion. As Robert Gilpin said,
while economic factors are obviously important for the emergence and success of
MNCs, they could not exist without a favourable international political environment
created by a dominant power whose economic and security interests favour an open
and liberal international economy.204 According to the earlier analysis in this section,
China is by and large a “satisfactory international investment regime” for Taishang 
201 Edward J. Lopez (2002),“The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital”,
Review of Austrian Economics 15 (June), pp. 211–228.
202 Hsiao-tung Fei (1998), Rural China, Institutions for Reproduction (Beijing : Beijing University).
203 Shu Keng and Rui- hua Lin (2007), “Institutional Origins of Weak Associations: Taiwanese 
Business Associations in the Yangtze and Zhu River Delta”, Taiwan Political Quarterly, Vol. 11, No.
2, pp. 93–171.
204 Ibid, Gilpin, Robert (1987), p.288
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which would have to embody several characteristics, including the rights of
establishment, national treatment, and non-discrimination. 205 The rights of
establishment means that firms of every nationality have the right to invest anywhere.
The principles of national treatment require that national government must treat the
subsidiaries of foreign firms as if they were their own. The provisions of
non-discrimination require that countries should not discriminate against the firms of
particular countries, the national policy governing inward-FDI should be transparent,
which types of national restrictions are legitimate and which should be prohibited.
Nevertheless, political obstacles to the incorporation of Taishang into the mainland
market in the name of “enemies of reunification” have occasionaly happened in 
previous years. These events proved that national identity problems still work and the
CCP authoritarian state occasionally interfere in the market, even though China
always proclaims itself neutral with respect to the market mechanism.
4.4 Three effects of Cross-Strait economic interaction onTaiwan’s democratic
development
The closer and rapid Cross-Strait economic integration influenced by the four
structural powers in different dimensions mentioned in the above sections
(international organization, trade policy, flow of RMB, and movement of Taishang)
have caused the following three effects on the development of island’s democracy. 
The first and second effects concern the shape of new democratic values; the third
effect produces a new social economic cleavage which is influential to the civil
society.
205 Sylvia Ostry (1997), A New Regime for Foreign Direct Investment (Washington D.C. Group of
Thirty).
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i. Cross strait economic issues have replaced national identity as a major
issue for Blue–Green Competition
As Wu Yu-shan had pointed out, Cross-Strait relations are constrained by two
major factors: external “power distribution” and internal “vote-maximizing”. The 
power distribution refers to the island’s foreign policy being generaly hedged by two 
options: either “balancing” or “bandwagon” in the Taiwan–Beijing–Washington
triangle.  The “vote-maximizing” refers to the reasonable behaviour of every 
political party trying to maximize votes and win elections that will lead them to
abandon their previous strongly-held positions (interest or identity) on mainland
policy and instead move toward the policy centre. The analytical theoretical
framework can be explained in Figure 4.1 and the four major political actors, KMT,
DPP, CCP, and US (the republicans and liberals are hypothesized to have the same
Taiwan policy) are located in two separate position in the quadrant. The KMT’s 
position is on the top left in that its mainland policy is relatively open,
interest-orientated and copes with balanced Sino-US relations that ignore Taiwan’s 
de-facto sovereignty. The DPP’s position is on the botom-right in that its China
policy is conservative, identity-orientated, desirable and provocative to change the
balance of Sino–US power distribution.206
206 Yu-shan Wu (1999), “Taiwan’s Mainland Trade Policy :Structure and Rationality ” in Pao
Tzong-ho and Wu Yu- shen (1999) (ed.), Debates on Cross Strait Relations Theory (Taipei: Wunan
1999).
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Figure 4.1: Two constraints on Cross-Strait relations: power distribution and vote maximizing
Interest
KMT, CCP, US
Balancing Bandwagon
DPP
Identity
Source: Author’s own compilation
Along with the growing asymmetric confrontation in international organizations
and narrower Cross-Strait economic ties discussed in the former sections, Taiwan has
become more powerless to do anything in international politics, but has increased
opportunities to access economic benefits from Cross-Strait interaction. Moreover,
people in Taiwan are tired of political party manipulation of ethnic differences which
divide people into two clear political camps –blue and green.207 In other words,
external power distribution and internal identity factors are not as influential as
previously to further Cross-Strait relations. The interest incentives start to play a more
important role in that Taiwanese people, for the time being, are becoming more
pragmatic to growing Chinese political and economic power and are not willing to
choose two contrasting ethnic identities,208 especially those young people with higher
207 Fuh-sheng Hsieh (2005),“ Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan”, Journal
of Asia and Africa Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1/2 (February/April 2005), p.13.
208 Shu Keng(2006), “Sense, Sensitivity, and Sophistication in Shaping the Future of Cross-Strait
Relations”, Issues and Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 2006), p. 40.
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education, professional superiority (especially IT and financial ability) and market
competitiveness.209 In a word, one political tendency can be predicted in the future of
Taiwan party politics: when the benefits brought by the cross-Strait economic
interaction are not easily foreseeable, and cannot even satisfy the general public’s 
expectations, the island’s people wil prefer to put the DPP back onto the front stage 
of Taiwan’s politics, and the government’s mainland policy wil therefore become 
more conservative in the name of consolidating Taiwan’s identity and democratic 
achievement.
ii. The values of consolidating democracy would possibly be ignored when
the cross economic integration goes too fast
According Susan Strange’s interesting description about difering 
authority–market relationships in different societies, security, wealth, freedom and
justice are four major societal values while ordering their own political economy. In
different stages, different values will be given priority over others. For example, in
Figure 4.2, when security is “in the seesaw nexus between authority and market, the
seesaw tips the opposite way, the state interfering as little as possible with market
force”.210
209 Ibid. p. 47.
210 Ibid, Susan Strange, (1994), pp. 5–6.
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Figure 4.2: Different values priorities of political economy policy
Security Wealth
Wealth Security
Freedom
Freedom
Justice
Justice
S M
M    ▲                     ▲    S
S: State M: Market
Source: Strange, Susan (1994), State and Market, 2nd Edition, London, Pinter Publishers, p. 5
Obviously, Ma’s administration policy orientation after the KMT returned to 
office in 2008 belongs to this type. The New KMT government had put the creation of
wealth by advancing closer cross-Strait economic integration as the priority value
over security, freedom, and social justice. Taiwan and China reopened the cross-Strait
talks and a series of interactions, but at same time, produced other potential political
and social problems, including sovereignty controversies (freedom), changed balance
in Sino–US–Taiwan triangle relations (security), and a possible worsening of the
island’s social economic inequality (justice) which are al important factors which 
might be harmful to maintaining the island’s democratic system. In order to get 
greater benefits from the mainland, the new government must have more compromise
with the CCP including fewer diplomatic activities in international organizations and
weaponry purchases from the United States.
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iii. The rapid movement of Taishang would hollow out the island’s economy 
and therefore expand the lower class base inside the island, even
producing a homogeneous, isolated community, or an extremist
anti-China group in the name of democratic consolidation
As discussed in Chapter 3.5, there is already a new social economic cleavage
between North and South Taiwan. Most people in North Taiwan are entrepreneurs, or
professionals in technology and financial service departments, benefiting from
cross-Strait economic interactions, and as a result favour the KMT’s policy orientation,
especially deregulating trade with and investment in China. People in South Taiwan
turn to DPP because they are traditional working class and became victims when
manufacturers were forced to move out to the mainland for the lower labour cost.
Moreover, the minor urban and rural working classes mostly located in South Taiwan
were at same time the most “deeply atached to a native Taiwanese identity” and 
“responsive to ethic mobilization”. A similar description can been also seen in Gordon 
Cheung’s observation on the change of Taiwanese society: 
The continuous investment by Taiwanese people in China is very likely
divide the islanders into haves and have-nots . . . The have-not are those
people who do not or could not invest in China . . .feel that their economic
opportunities and international space have been restrained . . .The only power
they have is their political vote, which has very often led to nationalistic
overtones in Taiwan political discourse since mid-2000s.211
According to the modernization theory discussed in Chapter 3.1, an “elongated 
211 Gordon C.K. Cheung (2010),“NewApproaches to Cross-Strait Integration and its Impacts on
Taiwan’s Domestic Economy: An Emerging“Chaiwan?”Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2010:
1–2, p. 22.
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pyramidal” society with a large lower class base (homogeneous and isolated 
community), and even an extremist group, is the major characteristic of
anti-democratic society. In a word, whether it ispossible that Taiwan’s society wil go 
in this direction owing to the rapid movement of business class is one of important
and interesting issues for further research and investigation.
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Chapter 5 Pre- democracy of Taiwan–under Two Chiang’s Control
Introduction
In this chapter, the researcher will try to review the democratic development
history of the past sixty years, folowing the KMT’s (the nationalist government) 
flight to Taiwan in 1949. The historical discussion will be divided over two chapters:
Chapter 5: Pre-democracy of Taiwan – Under Two Chiang’s Control; and Chapter 6: 
Democratic Transition under Two Taiwanese Presidents –Lee and Chen. The major
reason this researcher has classified the historical process into two stages is the
consideration that the democratic development of Taiwan obviously presents
diference faces and stories between the two mainlanders’ leadership (Chiang
Kai-shek, leadership 1949–1975; Chiang Ching-kuo, leadership 1975–1988) for
almost 40 years and the two native Taiwanese presidents’ leadership (Lee Teng-hui,
leadership 1989–1988; Chen Shui-bian, leadership 2000–2008) for 20 years. In each
chapter, the discussion will follow the pattern of the analytical framework built in the
theoretical chapters, and the researcher will endeavour to arrange the historical events
to support and approve the validity of the theoretical framework. The major focuses
wil be each leader’s democratic values (level 1), how these leaders put their values 
into practice and build up the institutions they thought to be of priority, necessary and
appropriate (level 2), the transformation of the island’s economy and society (level 3) 
and the external political economic factors during the process of these changes.
In chapter 5, the researcher will argue that even though Chiang Kai-shek and his
son Chiang Ching-kuo are both criticized (as dictators, that the father only cared about
the mainland’s recovery, and that the son’s real concern was how to maintain the 
power of the mainlanders’ KMT regime), it cannot be denied that some important
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democratic institutions (i.e. local elections) had been launched during Chiang’s 
tenure –especially the limited local elections begun in 1957 during the early KMT
authoritarian control period. Chiang Ching-kuo is even considered as an unexpected
reformer who successfully promoted the Taiwanization policy and showed high
tolerance on the growth of opposition power. Along with the island’s economic 
recovery after World War II and the later successful industrial upgrading and
integration into the global world market, the series of political and economic reforms
were actually helpful for reducing the tension of ethical conflict between minority
ruling mainlanders and the local Taiwanese populace. It also provided the regime with
a most important survival basis when Taiwan was forcibly expelled from the UN in
1970 and during the rapprochement of Sino-US Relations in 1980. Meanwhile,
nothing is more important to the island’s democratic development thanthe occurrence
of middle class after successful economic development. This factor is also believed to
be the major reason that there were not massive political riots when Chiang
Ching-kuo decide to lift martial law and ended nearly 40-years of
military–authoritarian control in 1987.
5.1 Chiang Kai-shek: dictatorship and KMT authoritarian control (1949–1975)
5.1.1 The émigrés regime and conflicts with local Taiwanese
The KMT regime retreated to Taiwan in 1949 and sowed the historical seed of
Blue–Green conflicts over the following 60 years. The arrival of corrupt government
officials and dispersed KMT troops from the mainland civil war launched a chaotic
confiscation which made the conflicts between the new wave of immigrants in 1949
(about two million soldiers and civilians ) and local Taiwanese residents (about six
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million civilians ) inevitable.212 In local Taiwanese people’s eye, the KMT regime, 
led by Chiang Kai-shek, was nothing but defeated nationalist troops in the Chinese
mainland civil war and a Leninists party machine for Chiang’s personal dictatorship 
fleeing to Taiwan for a temporary refuge. Moreover, the first encounters with the
mainlanders who arrived to replace the Japanese caused some Taiwanese to
acknowledge that in many ways, especially in relation to the degree of modernization
(education, urbanization, and rule of law); the Taiwanese were superior to the Chinese
after five decades of Japanese occupation. Even though the Taiwanese suffered
discrimination and restriction on their political power during the colonial period, most
of them considered the Japanese occupation was a heritage and created positive
consequences to the development of the island, especially the Japanese educational
system and liberal ideas regarding economic policies.213 The high level of education
and political maturity supported Taiwanese demands for greater autonomy, but not
outright independence until the KMT broke their expectation. Taiwanese people found
that the KMT landing troops were ill-disciplined, poorly educated, and engaged
themselves in scrounging and plundering the local community. Many of the
mainlander officials and their relatives who followed the ROC troops to Taiwan were
equaly interested in dominating government jobs, extracting the island’s wealth and
transferring confiscated Japanese property, but the KMT mainlanders’ government 
was very incompetent when it came to solving the island’s post-war economic
problems.214
However, on the other side, from the KMT’s perspective, friction with local 
212 Jia-xi Weng (2007), The 228 Incidents and Taiwan Economic Development, Taipei: Ju -Liu
Publishers pp. 57–59.
213 Maurice Meisner (1964), “The Development of Formosan Nationalism”, in Mark Mancal, ed., 
Formosa Today (New York: Praeger), pp. 153–154.
214 Ibid., Weng (2007), pp. 209–216.
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people is inescapable, but not the most serious or urgent issue. The arrogant KMT
landing troops considered themselves as the poorest victims and there was no need to
have any respect or sympathy for local residents.215 The island was just a “defeated 
enemy territory”, rather than a victim of Japanese imperialism. The Taiwanese had a 
patriotic duty to contribute to the subsistence of the KMT troops on the island and to
the reconstruction of the mainland because the KMT had made frantic effort to move
assets and property to Taiwan, including the national treasury –gold, silver and
foreign reserve which contributed to the island‘s economic stability –and in particular
the printing of New Taiwanese Dollars to put into circulation.216 Most mainlanders
even thought the Taiwanese had been corrupted by Japanese thinking and Communist
induction, despite the fact that the Taiwan Communist Party (TCP) members and
activities had been destroyed by Japanese security forces and on the brink of
extinction before the outbreak of World War II.217 For the KMT itself at this moment,
to survive the CCP threat, consolidate its control on the island, and reconstruct the
shaky island agrarian economy as the military base for “a sacred mission to recover 
mainland China” was more important than relations with the local Taiwanese, let
alone the establishment of democracy.
This high public disaffection set off the explosion of the 228 Incident on 27
February 1947 –the first large-scale turmoil and violence since the KMT émigré
215 Interview with Ze-ren Lee, 1 June 2008. Mr. Lee is author’s father, who was also a member of the 
KMT landing troops in 1949.
216 Hua-yuan Xue (ed.) (2009), Taiwan Trade History, published by Taiwan External Trade
Development Council (TETDC), p. 221.
217 Xiu-yi Lu (2006), The History of Taiwan Communist Party in Japanese Colonial Period, Taipei:
Avanguard Publishing House, pp. 135–140.
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regime took over the island. 218 To make matters worse, in the name of eliminating
the “traitors” and “colaborators” of Communist subversion, the KMT crushed most 
of the local Taiwanese elites –who were suspicious as the potential leadership of
future local democratic and Taiwanese nationalist movement. According to the ROC
government official statistics in 2004, there were 681 people killed, 177 missing, the
total number of deaths was 858 (including mainlanders),219 even though there were
still many different estimates of the number that the Taiwanese killed in the
“massacre”, perhaps even thousands.220 No matter what the exact number of deaths
was, the incident had actually caused severe damage to relations between the
Taiwanese and the mainlander-dominated ROC government. The incident continued
to be the KMT’s nightmare, even after the democratization of 1990 –to mitigate the
disaster of the 228 Incident the KMT were under obligation to make an apology and
provide compensation. The incident also provided the local Taiwanese with the best
reason, perhaps even the privilege, to strive for greater political power.
218 The 228 Incident, also known as the 228 Massacre, was an anti-government uprising in Taiwan that
began on February 27, 1947, and was violently suppressed by the Kuomintang (KMT) government.
Estimates of the number of deaths are controversial and vary from 10,000 to 30,000 or more. The
Incident marked the beginning of the Kuomintang's White Terror period in Taiwan, in which
thousands more local Taiwanese vanished, died, or were imprisoned. The number "228" refers to
the day the massacre began.
219 The Memorial Foundation of 228, “The Statistic of Victim in the 228 Incident in County and City”, 
online at: http://www.228.org.tw/pay228_statistics_case.php.
220 Regarding different estimates of how many Taiwanese were killed, please refer to Table 8-3 in
Jia-xi Weng (2007), The 228 Incidents and Taiwan Economic Development, Taipei: Ju -Liu
publishers, p 173.
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5.1.2 The experience of failure in the civil war, and KMT’s reforms
The mistakes in the mainland civil war provided the KMT the lessons by which
to implement a series of political and economic reforms. The KMT attributed its
failure to the weak social basis such that party control in the mainland only reached
landlord level, which was easily overthrown by the Communist rebellion. Meanwhile,
the cooperation between the KMT administration and the bourgeoisie in the city was
notorious for widespread corruption and nepotism. Therefore, the KMT started to
reconstruct the party by employing thorough KMT organizational reform and
development of an intricate KMT party network presence at the grassroots level and
in all sectors of society (i.e. military, union, farmers association, professional
organizations and educational institutions). The party also recruited local Taiwanese
as party members, especially the elites and intellectuals.
The nightmare of mobilized and agitated peasants in the Communist military
rebellion in the mainland civil war prompted the KMT to undertake land reform and
resettle the retiring tens of thousands of old soldiers. From 1949 to 1953, three stages
of land reform programmes, named “375 farm rents” (1949), 221 “sales of public 
farm lands” (1948–1951), “land-to-the-tiler” (1953),222 were put into action by the
KMT government and later had affected one-quarter of the island’s cultivated land, 
with a majorly positive effect on reducing the disparity of income and improving
living conditions in rural areas. 223 Meanwhile, the government controlled the
221 The 37.5% Rent Reduction Act has been carried out since 7th of June, 1951. It is beneficial to
tenants. It provides a minimum civil living standard for tenants. Later the Act was amended to add
“compensation to tenants”（equivalent to one third land value）when the lease contract is terminated.
The landlords are not satisfied it.
222 Cheng Chen (1963), Land Reform in Taiwan, Taipei: China Publishing Company.
223 Martin M.C. Yang (1970), Social–Economic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan, Honolulu:
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peasants politicaly by the Farmers’ Association, and economicaly by the 
rice–fertilizer barter.224 The government organized peasants and rural residents into
340 KMT-controlled farmers associations, which offered credit, introduced
technology, supplied inputs and served as marketing cooperatives. 225 The state
squeezed agriculture to feed the huge urban population, to supply materials and funds
for later industrialization,226 and to sell its products abroad to earn hard currency.227
In 1955, the government established the Vocational Assistance Commission for
Retired Servicemen, charged with training and resettling demobilized old soliders and
caring for those who were ill. Able-bodied retirees found themselves engaged in
major infrastructure construction –creating highways through rugged mountain
terrain, opening up virgin farmland, building factories and so on.228 The measurement
made a contribution to pacify the immigrant mainlander soldiers and to ease possible
tensions between them and the local Taiwanese. The surrendered number and the
defectors from the KMT troops were generally believed to be a contributory factor as
to why the CCP could easily defeat the KMT in the Chinese civil war in 1949.
The land reform programme was later proved successful; not only it was one of
the most ambitious land redistribution programmes in history, but also it brought
important a socioeconomic boost without the bloodshed that often accompanies
East–West Centre Press, pp. 313–351.
224 You-zhao Wang (1971), “The Review of Rice- Fertilizer Barter “, The Issues of Taiwan Agricultural
Development, Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) publishers, p.79.
225 Ibid. Yang (1970), pp. 407–411.
226 Hsin-huang Hsiao, “Changesin State Agricultural Strategies in Taiwan: 1953-1982”, Thought and
Word, Vol. 20, No. 6, p. 17.
227 Shi-yong Chen (2000), “US Aid and Forest Protection in Taiwan, 1950–1965”, The Case Studies of
US–ROC Relations, Taipei: Dao-Xiang Publishers, pp. 153–163.
228 Veterans Affair Commission Executive Yuan, ROC, History, Mission and Function of VAC, online,
at: http://www.vac.gov.tw/content/index.asp?pno=54
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large-scale land redistribution. The task was eased by the comparative lack of
opposition by the local political powerful elites who had been a major obstacle to
other countries but were eliminated by the KMT in post war Taiwan. Meanwhile, the
KMT allowed elections for representatives to the farmers association that gave
ordinary people in Taiwan additional experience in grass-roots democracy and would
hasten the pressures on the KMT to liberalize the political system as a whole.229
The series of reforms did not include party democratizing, but the limited
democratization began with elections for members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly,
and county mayors and magistrates were promoted from 1951. These democratic
institutions were quite significant for Taiwanese democratic development, and
provided the local Taiwanese with limited political participation while helping the
KMT to ease tensions with society –which was advantageous for peaceful and
incremental changes in the later democratization in 1980.230 The KMT still insisted
on its one-party authoritarian control and the 1947 ROC constitution. The KMT
invoked three basic laws made in the three years before they fled to Taiwan (1947
ROC constitution, 1948 Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of
Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, and 1949 Martial Law)
to consolidate Chiang’s dictatorship. The enactment of emergency orders (martial law)
was the provision of the constitutions to fit the unusual circumstance of Taiwan’s 
standoff with the CCP-dominated mainland. The KMT reform reflected the typical
problems of a missionary party: the KMT believed itself as the only vanguard to make
China (of course including Taiwan) independent from the invasion from the West and
229 John H.C. Fei, Gustav Ranis, and Shirley W.Y. Kuo (1979) (ed.) , Growth with Equity: The Taiwan
Case (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1979), p. 38.
230 Bo-shu Zhang (2008), “The Lessons of Taiwan ‘s Democratic Transition and Political 
Modernization on Constitutional Reforms in Mainland China”, The Research on Possibility of China
Constitutional Reforms, Hong Kong: Chen Zhong Publishers 2008, p. 10.
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to establish the necessary preconditions –including national autonomy, material
prosperity, and the mass public understanding and respect for democratic
institutions–for successful democratization.231
However, paradoxically, a period of dictatorship under the KMT was necessary
to build up these conditions even though the party itself usually becomes a major
obstacle when democracy is promoted. The early post-war KMT believed themselves
to contain a germ of democracy. The KMT under Chiang Kai-shek retained the goal
of democracy and defined it as anti-Communism, fighting corruption, educating the
mass public, and protecting the freedoms of religion and academic discussion.
However, ironically, the features of the Leninist party system, including the one China
patriotic disclosure, personal worship, emergency orders, intricate party network and
huge and expensive military establishment made the KMT look and feel more like its
purported enemy, the Communist dictatorship.232 In fact, the experience of failure in
the mainland civil war and the 228 Incident made the KMT in 1949 become more
confused, conservative, and refuse to negotiate with any dissention or political groups
The KMT attributed the political consultative mechanism to be one of the major
reasons for the CCP’s successful rebelion alowing the CCP to delay the KMT’s 
efficient suppression by making use of negotiations in name of democratic
consultation. The KMT’s authoritarian control during this period is also a typical case
in Chinese history that strong men can overthrow the rule of law in the name of
231 According to the theories of KMT’s ideology, the Three Principle of the People (San-min Chu-i),
democracy is the eventual goal and the KMT should have withdrawn its control on society after the
political order settled down .The role of the KMT is as a revolutionary vanguard whose mission is
to safeguard (military period) train people (tutelage period) to exercise their political power
including four civil rights (election, recall, initiatives, and referendum) before the constitution is on
the road.
232 Steven J. Hood (1997), The Koumintang and the Democratization of Taiwan, (Boulder, CO:
West-view Press), p. 29.
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national security and social ability. Even though the KMT started to face external
diplomatic setbacks and internal challenges of a growing Taiwanese consciousness in
the late 1970s, the KMT still believed that successful economic development and
prosperity on the island were more important than any social justice and the best way
to maintain both the KMT’s legitimacy and the minority mainlanders’ privileges. 
Authoritarian control was the only method to achieve those objectives.
5.1.3 The Cold War and the ROC expulsion from UN
The KMT learnt a lot of lessons in the Chinese civil war which they used in their
initial control of Taiwan, however, at the same time the KMT’s failure brought a 
larger crisis from its most important international allies –the support of the US.
Washington gradualy lost the confidence in Chiang’s leadership and atributed the 
loss of the civil war to the KMT’s coruption and incompetent governance. From 
Washington’s perspective, the ideal scenario was a separated Taiwan under a 
US-allied, non-Communist ruler other than Chiang.233 Ultimately, Washington hoped
to improve relations with China and draw Beijing away from the Soviet Union.
Washington paid more atention to Taiwan’s geographical strategic importance than 
Chiang’s ROC subsistence. Washington even thought about placing Taiwan under a 
UN trusteeship, supporting a coup d’état to replace Chiang with a leader Washington
perceived as more competent and respectable.234 Nevertheless, the outbreak of the
Korean War and the large scale PLA participation in June 1950 caused the overnight
233 Nancy B. Tucker (2005), “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity”, Dangerous Strait: the
U.S.–Taiwan–China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press), p.189.
234 “An inside story of the U.S. five plans to alienate Taiwan from China after 1949”, www.huaxia.com, 
http://big5.huaxia.com/thpl/jwgc/2009/01/1282011.html.
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reversal of US policy toward Taiwan. The Truman administration ordered the US
Navy Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan and guarantee Taiwan protection through US
military deployment.235 In December 1954, Washington and Taipei signed the Mutual
Defence Treaty; due to the first Taiwan Strait Crisis, Chiang wanted a public
commitment of assistance from the US government in defending the remaining
ROC-held islands when 100,000 PLA troops moved to the Fujian coast and the
captured Yi Kiang Shen, just eight miles from the Dachen.236 On 23 August 1958, the
CCP launched an intense artillery bombardment (known as 823 Artillery
Bombardment) 237 on Jinmen and later provoked the United States to use nuclear
weapons against China. The crisis passed in November 1958 after Beijing announced
that the PLA guns would shell Jinmen only on odd-numbered days, before the
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1960s and China’s successful 
development of atomic bombs in 1965 during the Vietnam War.238 Within the larger
context of “the global anti-Communist crusade”, the KMT was lucky to become one 
member of America’s front line alies239 and the relationship between the US and the
235 Ta-jen Liu (1997), U.S-China Relations, 1784-1992 (New York: University Press of America, Inc.),
p.204.
236 Ibid., Liu (1997), pp. 220-224.
237 The Second Taiwan Strait crisis started with the 823 Artillery Bombardments at 5:30PM on August
23, 1958, when People's Liberation Army forces began an intense artillery bombardment against
Quemoy. ROC forces in Quemoy dug in and returned fire. In the heavy exchange of fire, roughly
2,500 ROC troops and 200 PRC troops were killed. The battle was a continuation of the First
Taiwan Strait Crisis, which had started immediately after the Korean War. Chiang Kai-shek had
begun to build on the two islands of Matsu and Quemoy. In 1954, PRC began firing artillery at both
the islands of Quemoy and Matsu focusing most of the attack on Quemoy.
238 John W. Garver (1997), The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War
Strategy in Asia (Armonk ,N.Y. Sharpe 1997), p.213.
239 Huan-gui Guo (2005), “US-Taiwan Issues ”, The future of Taiwan: International Politics and
Taiwan Issue, pp.87-88, Taipei: Zhi-Liang Publishers.
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KMT government was quite ambiguous but pragmatic. The US–ROC defence
commitment made it more difficult for Washington to concede Taiwan to the PRC,
and was advantageous for the KMT in respect of gaining prestige for its leadership
and control on the island.240 For Washington, the United States needed a stable alley,
but it was constrained by its ability to soften the KMT dictatorship. Washington
woried about “Finlandization of Taiwan”, that Taipei would threaten to sacrifice its
own sovereignty with the opposing USSR and therefore cause an impact on US allies
like Finland did in 1948.241 However, the US assistance did not mean Washington
supported Chiang’s plan to recover mainland China, a precondition for the United
States to support Taiwan was that the island should keep a neutral status (no
independence, no reunification with China).
The stable relations between Taipei and Washington were only to last until 1970
when the Sino-American rapprochement resulted mainly from both countries seeking
support against their common adversary: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR).242 This rapprochement also opened a floodgate of diplomatic recognition of
Beijing, because while the argument of the international community for seating the
PRC rather than the ROC in the UN was based on the fact that the CCP had effective
control of the territory of mainland China and represented the voice of hundreds of
millions of Chinese people was gradually popular,243 Taipei only relied on US
support. The CCP also made use of this opportunity to seek diplomatic breakthrough
of the international isolation. Beijing established normal relations with several other
governments without requiring them to sever relations with the ROC; however, in
240 Ibid. John W. Garver (1997), p.54.
241 Ibid. John W. Garver (1997), p.126.
242 Ibid. Liu (1997), pp.285-89.
243 Chinese Institute for International Affairs, China and the United Nations (New York: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace 1959), p. 258.
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contrast, Taipei’s diplomatic policy appeared to be inflexible and emotional; Taipei 
refused to accept any bilateral recognition and proclaimed that the KMT government
legally represented China and still enjoyed jurisdiction over the mainland. Except for
the dramatic loss of diplomatic relations with 38 countries, Taipei’s stubborn 
insistence paid the biggest price in 1971, when a resolution was proposed by Albania
to expel the ROC and allow the PRC to occupy the Chinese seat .The resolution was
successfully passed by a General Assembly vote of 76 to 35, when most US allies saw
no further need to oppose China’s entry into the UN because Taipei rejected the idea 
of dual representation as suggested by Washington – the ROC’s only chance to avoid
being ousted.244
5.1.4 Economic recovery and changed social class
Chiang Kai-shek’s dictatorship during this period was generaly criticized as a 
kind of “White Teror”,245 in addition, the foreign setback and ethnic problems of
244 Guo pointed out that before the ROC was expelled from the UN, there were seven occasions that
Taipei could have kept the seat if Chang Kai-shek could accept dual representation, but all were
rejected by Chang’s stubborn insistence on the “One China Principle”. For more details, please see
Guo Zheng-liang, “Chang Xiao-yian Always Stands on the Wrong Side of History, Opposing the
ROC Return to UN in the Name of Taiwan”, online at: 
http://kuojulian.blogspot.com/2007/12/blog-post_28.html, accessed 28 December 2007
245 White Terror is the violence carried out by reactionary (usually monarchist or conservative) groups
as part of a counter-revolution. In particular, during the 20th century, in several countries the term
White Terror was applied to acts of violence against real or suspected socialists and communists. In
Taiwan, the "White Terror" refers to the suppression of political dissidents under the martial law
period from May 19, 1949 to July 15, 1987, following Kuomintang's retreat to Taiwan and start the
authoritarian control on the island. It resulted in part from 228 Incident and included later
repression of democrats, communists and Taiwan independence supporters. (The incident and
condition had been mentioned in the first two sections of this chapter )
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tense mainlanders–Taiwanese conflicts mentioned above had caused a potential crisis
and instability of the Taiwan society. However, in other perspectives, the KMT’s 
authoritarian control during this period was advantageous for the development of the
island’s economy. First, except for military protection, the US also provided several
economic aid programmes to help the KMT government to maintain their giant
military machine, which was consuming an average of 85 per cent of the national
government‘s expenditure. In 1950, Taiwan became the second US military aid
recipient country in the world.246 In the 15 years from 1951 to 1965, Taiwan annually
received an average of $100 million of non-military aid which provides about 40 per
cent of the ROC’s capital formation.247 American aid during this period accounted for
more than one-third of Taiwan’s total investment and 74 per cent of al investment in 
agriculture.248 Moreover, 50 per cent of government expenditure relied on US Aid,249
and only 33.3 per cent of US aid was applied to the development of state–private
cooperation (27.2 per cent) and private enterprise (6.1 per cent, also mainly in
agriculture).250 The government made use of this money mainly in the building of
infrastructure and investment in state-owned industry (electricity power, public
transportation and mining). In fact, the US Aid was not only in the form of financial
grants (even though that was over 80 per cent of its make up) and the ROC
246 International Economy Cooperation and Development Association, “USpublished the military aid
in the past ten years”, International Economy Data Monthly, Vol.4, No.6 (1960), pp.104-5.
247 Peter Chen-main Wang (1999), “A bastion Created, A Regime Reformed, An Economy 
Reengineered, 1949-1970, ”in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History (New York: M.E.
Sharpe,1999 ) ,p.328.
248 Neil H. Jacoby (1966), U.S. Aid to Taiwan ( New York: Praeger,1966 ), p.38.
249 Itowaku(1992), “Financial system and Capital Raise ”, in The Formation of International
Processing Export Processing Base, Taipei: Ren Jian Publishers, 1992, p.61.
250 Zhi-huai Zhou (1990),”Essays on Taiwan State-Owned Enterprise and change of its role”, Journal
of Taiwan Studies, No.2, Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Science Publishers, p.38.
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government was not required to repay. The US Aid also included commodity imports,
loans and technical assistance. From 1950–1961, imported commodity goods –
mainly the basic necessities (wheat, cotton, fertilizer, oil, soy beans) –cost $827
million in which the US import cost was $502 million (61 per cent).251 It was also
very helpful to ease inflationary pressure and the balance of international fiscal
revenues and expenditures (Taiwan imported extensively while exporting little more
than rice and sugar, resulting in a large trade deficit and a lack of foreign currency
reserves). According to Jacob’s analysis, without American aid, the economic growth 
rate in Taiwan between 1951–1965 might only have been 3.5 per cent, rather than the
actual 7.6 per cent.252 Shirley Kuo considers that US Aid was an indispensable factor
to the Taiwanese economic recovery after World War II. Without American aid, the
GNP in 1965 was estimated at only 60 per cent of real production and employment
was only 85 per cent of actual estimation.253
US aid to Taiwan ceased in 1965, but Taiwan had gained a reputation as a model
of a US aid recipient. Washington considered Taiwan had already stood up and was
economically capable to defeat the Communist threat, even though Taiwan was
unwiling to accept Washington’s unilateral cuting of the assistance.254 The US aid
did not only contribute to the island’s economy materialy, but also contributed to the 
further push of the development of privatization, entrepreneurship and openness to
foreign investment. The US advisors and their suggestion and guidance could be
251 Ibid., Hua-yuan Xue (2009) (ed.), p. 253.
252 Ibid., Neil H. Jacoby (1966), p. 53.
253 Shirley W.Y.Kuo, Gustav Ranis, and John C. H. Fei (1981), The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid
Growth with Improved Distribution in the Republic of China, 1952–1979 (Boulder, CO.: West-view
Press, 1981), p. 65.
254 Xin-ying Wen, Behind the Economic Miracle: The Political Economic Analysis of US Aid in Taiwan,
1951–1965, Taipei: Zi-Li Evening News, 1989, p. 104.
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considered as another kind of indirect control and interference on the economic
reforms which meant the KMT government did not have the final say over its policy.
For example, the Chinese members, fluent in English and American-oriented, carried
the ideology and methods learned from the Council of US Aid (CUSA) experience
into their leadership of Taiwan’s economy over the subsequent decades. In fact, the 
political leaders, notably Chiang Kai-shek and Premier and later Vice President Chen
Cheng became more chastened, intervened less and gave greater scope over economic
policy making to these Western-trained experts.255
From 1953 to 1964, the KMT government implemented three Four-Year
Economic Plans: The first (1953–1956) and second plans (1957–1960) related to the
applications for AID monies; the third plan (1961–1964), incorporated the
Nineteen-Point Programme of Economic and Financial reforms implemented
1958–1960 and the Statute for Encouragement of Investment made in 1960, and was
intended to speed up economic development, push Taiwan toward graduation from
foreign aid, and promoted exports and created a business climate to stimulate private,
local and foreign investment.256 The most significant economic transformation on the
island during this time was shifted from an import-substitution strategy to an export
orientation.257
Even though the KMT government still worried that the series of reduction of
control would pose a potential danger to hard-won price stability, brings back
inflation, and evaporate the scarce foreign exchange, they did not have confidence and
255 Thomas B. Gold (1986), State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.
Sharpe, c1986), pp.67-68
256 K.T. Li (1988), The Evolution of Policy beyond Taiwan’s Development Success, New Heaven: Yale
University Press, p.136.
257 Tien-shou Chen and Tai- shan Tsai (2009), The History of Economic Development in Taiwan, Taipei:
Lan–Tai Publishers, p.221.
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questioned whether the rise in trade would increase the island’s vulnerability to the 
global economy. Would an overcrowded island with a small domestic market, limited
industry, no resource and a precarious political culture successfully attract foreign and
local capital ? It was considered as a practical to establish the island as an offshore
assembly of American firms, the new investment climate had comparative advantage
in lower labour costs but high efficiency, helping Taiwan to competitively establish
global parts-and-components manufacturing ability, and therefore enter the emerging
international division of labour at the bottom end of the product life cycle.258 The
government took another important step to solicit FDI and further integrate Taiwan’s 
economy with the global one. In 1965, the Executive Yuan promulgated the Statute
for the Establishment and Management of Export Processing Zone and selected a plot
of reclaimed land in the harbour of Kaohsiung, a port city in the south of island.
Investing firms, both foreign and local, enjoyed tax incentives and avoided import
duties on equipment and parts as long as they exported all that they manufactured or
assembled.259 In the same year, the government increased the number of years of
compulsory education from six to nine, and all primary education was publicly
subsidized. This measurement enhanced the training and development of technical
expertise and skilled labour.260 The external environment was also advantageous for
the island’s development. The relaxation of cold war tensions facilitated the general 
expansion of world trade. In the middle of the 1960s, the Cultural Revolution erupted
and sealed China off from the rest of the world, strengthening Taiwan’s position. The 
258 Jing-han Fei, “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Economic Development”, The Essays on Taiwan
Industries Development, pp. 115–116.
259 Zhen-ou Ge, The Establishment of Export Processing Zone, Taipei: Lian Jing Publishers, 1983, pp.
51–52.
260 Jia-qi Mao (2001)(ed.), The Hundred Years of Vicissitudes-The Party History of the KMT, Xia Men:
Egret River Publishers, 2001, p. 1031.
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outbreak of the Vietnam War made Taiwan the US troops’ destination for rest and 
recreation. In order to purchase agricultural and industrial commodities, use military
facilities and depots for repair of equipment, the US pumped vast amounts of foreign
currency into the island economy.261 The gradually expanding scope for private
enterprise and the government commitment to industrialization released the latent
productive forces on the island.262
The initially successful growth of economic development and improved physical
quality of life made the local Taiwanese people become apolitical and apathetic to
public affairs. They were too busy in changing their life to think about politics, fearful
of any instability or political change which would risk their hard earned material
gains.263 The KMT regime made use of this popular mentality and social psychology
to skilfully separate the economy from the politics. The strategy based its legitimacy
on its ability to promote economic growth, create commonality of interest with the
new capitalist class, while repressing labour and squeezing agriculture. The minority
mainlanders were over-represented in prestigious business positions, larger enterprises,
state-owned industries and utilities. They also dominated as government bureaucrats,
university professors and principals of elementary and middle schools. The majority
local Taiwanese were generally discriminated against in respect of hiring and
promotion, but gradually predominated as owners of agricultural lands and controlled
many small and medium-sized businesses. The situation did not change until the
democratization in 1980.
261 Ibid., Thomas B. Gold (1986), p.84.
262 Ibid., p.71.
263 Ibid., p.90.
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5.2 Chiang Ching-kuo: political reforms and Taiwan economic miracle
(1975–1988)
5.2.1 An unexpected supporter of reform
Chiang Ching-kuo was appointed as Premier of the Executive Yuan in 1972 –
three years before the death of his father–and took the presidency in 1978. According
to an interesting popular investigation, Chiang Ching-kuo is considered as the most
influential leader with great contribution after 1949 by Taiwanese people. 264 Unlike
his father’s authoritarian dictatorship which enjoyed complete US military protection 
and economic support but only cared about recovering mainland China, Chiang
Ching-kuo faced an unprecedented series of major challenges from the dramatically
changing international environment, including two serious energy crises in
1973–1974 and 1978–1979, the successful PRC atomic bomb test in 1964, and the
establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC in 1978.
Chiang Ching-kuo was pragmatic and soon realized there was less hope for the KMT
regime to return to the mainland and it was urgent to build up Taiwan as a permanent
territory rather than a temporary military base. He started to implement a series of
political reforms and economic plans including the Taiwanisation of political decision
making bodies, pluralisation of the political system and his famous “Ten Major 
Development Projects”. The political reforms justified the KMT’s relations with local 
Taiwanese society, strengthened the KMT’s autonomy and further eased the minority 
mainlanders’ governing crisis. The “Ten Major Development Projects” and a series of 
later economic plans strengthened the island’s infrastructural foundation, upgraded the
264  “TVBS Survey: most Taiwanese people cherish memory of Chiang Ching -kuo”, 
http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/news_list.asp?no=keri20030113181219.
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industry, and helped the economy to ride out the economic crisis.
Chiang Ching-kuo’s background and experience made him an unexpected 
supporter of reform, and his decision was surprising to both his inner circle and the
general public. Before he succeeded his father as ROC president, he was often given
difficult assignments that reflected a high degree of trust. 265 Based on his
background –supervisor of the commissar system in the armed forces, head of the
internal security network, founder of a youth “anticommunist” organization that 
indoctrinated and spied on young people, and defence minister – “Junior Chiang” 
seemed a not unlikely reformer.266 However, he soon showed his favour towards
giving the Taiwanese and younger mainlanders more positions of responsibility in the
party and the government. Chiang favoured technocrats, particularly those with higher
education from overseas. Chiang had also on several occasions stressed the
importance of building a clean government; he strictly prohibited corrupt relations
between bureaucracy and the business community, ruling that that any government
officials or civil servants would be downgraded or fired if they were found in bars or
nightclubs or hosting excessively costly wedding banquets. Chiang said that he
favoured human rights–he even proclaimed a human rights year in Taiwan in 1976–
but needed to protect public order under the unusual circumstance of the Communist
Chinese threat that required the restriction of some civil liberties. In the summer of
1975, under Chiang’s direction, the Legislative Yuan passed a law granting clemency 
to 3,600 prisoners, many convicted of political offences.
265 Ibid., Bo-shu Zhang (2008), pp.14–15.
266 Ibid., p. 16.
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5.2.2 Taiwanisation policy and tolerance on opposition
Chiang’s Taiwanisation policy consisted of two major parts: recruitment of local
born Taiwanese talents for the party machine, and nominations of local born
Taiwanese for high government positions. At the party level, the locally born
Taiwanese membership of the KMT reached 67.23 per cent in 1980; the local
Taiwanese representatives of the KMT Central Committee (CC) increased from 9.3
percent after the Tenth Party Congress in 1969 to 20.7 percent after the Twelfth Party
Congress in 1981. In the highest decision making organizations of the party, the
Standing Committee of the KMT Central Committee , the local Taiwanese members
increased from 3 out of 21 (14.29 per cent) in 1972 to 12 out of 31 (38.7 per cent) in
1984.267 The nomination of local born Taiwanese as the higher government officials
both in the central and local levels was more symbolic: In the executive Yuan, there
were only 3 Taiwanese of 19 cabinet members in 1972. In 1986, there were already 7
out of 19, increasing from 15 per cent to 46 per cent. The governor of the island
province and mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung cities have, since 1972, all been locally
born Taiwanese.268 On the other side, under Chiang’s support, the political system 
was gradually pluralized and therefore provided local Taiwanese with another kind of
official channel for political participation. In fact, since 1954, in the provincial level,
the county mayors, magistrates and Taiwan Provincial Assembly were already elected
by the people, and opposition known as “Dangwai” had a certain degree of support.
After the election in 1972 when the KMT took over the whole 20 seats of county
mayors, the opposition got an average of 4 seats in the regular quadrennial election up
267 The author took the notes when visiting the KMT Party Bureau on September 23 2009.
268 George Tsai Woei and Peter Yu Kien-hong (2001) , Taiwanisation : Its origins and Politics (World
Scientific Publishers; Singapore University Press), p.32.
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to 1985 (the last quadrennial election in Chiang Ching-kuo’s term of ofice) (Figure
5.1). In the Provincial Assembly Election, the opposition increased its seats from 11
seats in the beginning to 17 seats in 1985, with a maximum of 21 in 1977 (Figure
5.2).269 At the central level, when Chiang had become the Premier of Executive Yuan
in 1972, he started to rapidly renew the central legislative bodies by increasing the
members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. In 1969, the first time
by-elections were held, there were only 15 National Assembly Delegates and 11
legislators who were elected from the local Taiwanese constituency; in 1986, there
were already new 100 seats in the Legislative Yuan and 84 new seats in the National
Assembly from the direct election (Figure 5.3). The KMT won 79 seats in the
Legislative Yuan and 68 in the National Assembly; the opposition, majorly the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Candidates, won 21 in the Legislative Yuan and
16 in the National Assembly.270 Compared with those 1,141 National Assembly
Delegates and 396 Legislators who were elected in Nanking in 1948 and followed the
KMT to Taiwan in 1949 in name of the relocation of central government, the newly
elected representative enjoyed complete legitimacy from the island’s popular support 
and many famous politicians in later years all rose from this series of elections.
269 The Central Office of Elections, Proceedings of Provincial Assembly Election, County Mayors and
Magistrates Elections on the Provincial Level in the Republic of China, 1951-1985.
270 The Central Office of Elections, Proceedings of the By-election and Election of Additional
Members to Elective offices on the Central Government Level in the Republic of China, 1969-1986
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Figure 5.1 The County Mayors and Magistrates Elections from 1951-1985
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Source: The Central Office of Elections (ROC), Proceedings of the By-election and Election of Additional Members to Elective
offices on the Central Government Level in the Republic of China, 1969-1986.
Figure 5.2: Taiwan Provincial Assembly Elections from 1951-1985
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Figures 5.3: The increasing members in the central legislative bodies from 1969 to 1986
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During Chiang’s tenure, the opposition (Dangwai) started to grow up quickly by
publishing magazines, organizing political groups, and nominating candidates for the
gradually opening elections even though the government still very often suppressed
dissidents by labeling them “Communist agitators”.271 For example, journal Tahsueh
(the Intellectual) in 1971, the United Independent Front in 1973, and the Taiwan
Political Review in 1975 were all newly published magazines and organizations with
provocative political comments or statements which criticized the KMT’s privileges 
and argued sensitive political issues –including respect for human rights and calling
for political reforms. The government responded to these challenges by warning them
not to overstep their bounds, firing some dissidents from their academic jobs, and
even putting the chief editor or organizer into jail.272 In 1977, Hsu Hsin-liang, the
former KMT provincial councilor, failed to get nomination from the KMT for the Tao
Yuan County Magistracy and was expelled from the party for his published critical
memoir about his bad experience with the KMT’s coruption in the Provincial 
Assembly. Hsu finally got an overwhelming victory thanks to cheating in the counting
of votes manipulated by the local electoral commission. The cheating also angered
Shu’s supporters, who surounded the police station and burned several police
vehicles.273 This anti-KMT Chung Li Incident was the first significant political
rioting since the 228 Incident but did incur the expected consequences of Chiang
Ching-kuo’s command.274 Some people criticized, suspecting that Chiang’s temperate 
271 Steven J. Hood (1997), The Kuomingtang and the Democratization of Taiwan (Boulder, Colo:
West-view Press,1997),p.50
272 Fu-chung Chang and Wan-hsing Chiu (2005), Green Era-Taiwan Democratic Movement 1975-1987,
Taipei: INK Publishers, pp.24-31
273 Ibid. pp.38-48.
274 In 1977, the loose group of opposition candidates won 34% of the vote in the elections for the
Taiwan Provincial Assembly. The growing opposition began to have an effect inside the
Kuomintang. One popular figure, Hsu Hsin-liang, left the party and ran as a Tangwai for a local
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decision was part of his preparations to take the presidency in the following year
(1978) and that the cost of suppression was higher than that of tolerance.275 However,
the establishment of Sino-Us diplomatic relations on 16 December messed up the
schedule in 1978 and the island-wide elections for offices at all levels of government
were cancelled by Chiang Ching-kuo who also placed the ROC military on a state of
alert to react to the diplomatic crisis. The discontent over the cancelled elections was
generally believed to be a major reason which directly led to the Kaohsiung incident
in the following year (1979) when the editors of Mei-li-tao (Formosa) magazine –
which had become the second most popular publication on the island276 –organized a
political group and the more radical of them began in October to open regional offices
of the journal around the island and took on some of the functions of a political party,
including sponsoring meetings to discuss political issues. On 10 December, a mass
demonstration, in the name of the memory of international human rights, turned into a
violent conflict with the security force.277 Hundreds of civilians and police got hurt,
and the police arrested the eight rally organizers and charged them with rebellion. The
state convicted them in a series of court-marital during March and April 1980. The
ringleader, Shih Ming-de received a life sentence; Lu Hsiu-lian (she became vice
president of ROC after 2000 when the opposition DPP went into power) and Chen Ju
county magistrate's position in November 1977. For fear that the Kuomintang would forge the
election, 10,000 of Hsu's supporters gathered in the town of Zhongli to object to the use of paper
ballots. Believing there was election fraud, the protestors rioted, burning down the Zhongli police
station. The Kuomintang called in soldiers to suppress the riot (some 90% of whom were
Taiwanese youths) .The riot later became known as the "Chungli incident"[1]. It was the first
political protest on the streets since the 1940s.
275 Dai-yao Sun (2003), The research of Taiwan authoritarian system and its transformation, Beijing:
China Social Science Publishers, p.85.
276 Marc J. Cohen (1988), Taiwan at the Crossroads (Washington ,D.C.: Asia Resource Centre) ,p.38.
277 Xiu-lian Lu (2008), Re-judgment of Me-Li-Dao, Taipei: Zi-Li Evening News Publishers, p.81
140
were each sentenced for 12 years. (Chen Ju became Kaohsiung Mayor after 2006.)
For the opposition, the “Dangwai” had been weakened by the imprisonment/loss of 
key leaders after the Kaohsiung incident, but in the long run, gained a huge
momentum of increasing political support among the public for democratic reforms.
Those defenders and attorney at law also later became major figures of opposition,
easily attaining important political positions through the coming open elections. The
best example is Chen Shui-bian, who was the attorney of defendant Huang Hsin-
chieh (he was also later successfully elected as legislator and acted as the longest
serving DPP party chairman), started to rise up in the political platform and was
successfully elected as ROC president in 2000. After the event, the government closed
down 15 publications including Meilidao magazine but surprisingly, the authority
permitted the media coverage of the Kaohsiung Eight Trial which aroused the
sympathy of most Taiwanese towards the raly’s organizers. In the folowing years of 
1982–1984, the opposition did not back down and kept on chalenging the KMT’s 
authority. In 1983, the opposition organized the Tangwai Research Association for
Public Policy (TRAPP) which was actually a de facto party in circumvention of the
ban in order to coordinate more consolidated opposition activities. In 1984, the
Taiwan Association for Human Rights was founded and the opposition used the
organization as the basis for further demonstration and denunciation of the regime. On
28th of September 1986, Tangwai politicians gathered in a meeting room of Taipei’s 
Grand Hotel. The meeting’s original purpose was to determine the Tangwai’s 
nomination of candidates for the upcoming election but the participants decided to use
the occasion to form a new party. The meeting yielded a declaration marking the birth
of the Democratic Progressive Party signed by 132 participants knowing they were in
danger of the KMT’s suppression. However, it was surprising that the government
response was restrained, only declaring the DPP illegal, and did not send the police to
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round up the members generally believed to be under Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
guidance.278 In fact, in March, six months before the DPP was formed, the KMT had
formed a 12-man committee to formulate a plan for lifting martial law, legalizing new
political parties, and implementing other political reforms including the removal of
restrictions on press. On 14 July 1987, the ROC government lifted martial law on
Taiwan’s teritory –except Jinmen and Matsu –which ended nearly four decades of
military-authoritarian control. On 1 January 1988, the number of licenses granted for
publications was expanded and the permissible number of pages per newspaper
increased. In 1989, a new Civic Organization Law finally passed and granted legal
status to the DPP and at least ten other new parties.
5.2.3 Industrial upgrading and liberalization
When Taiwan was gradually integrated with the international division of labour
in the 1960s, the external threats, especially the instability of the global economy,
posed a much more serious challenge than any domestic constraints facing the regime.
The external threats were mainly from the developed countries and the oil crisis.
When Taiwan sold its cheap goods and benefited from the trade surplus, the
developed countries started to adopt a neo-protectionist no tariff measurement to
restrict imports. In 1974, the island experienced its first trade deficit since 1970,
amounting to 1.3 billion dollars.279 To make matters worse, the extended global
recession followed two oil crises (1973–1974 and 1978–1979) and brought the island
278 Xiao-feng Li (1991), The Forty Years of Taiwan Democratic Movement, Taipei: Zili Evening News
Culture Publishers p. 242.
279 Ibid., Thomas. B. Gold (1986), p.98.
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inflation, stagflation, and impacted on the many years of hard won price stability.280
The severe economic challenges required more state intervention and pushed the state
to the front as the only actor when the domestic society lacked of confidence. In 1974,
the government raised the ambitious “Ten Major Development Projects“ in order to 
stimulate the domestic economy and create a new niche in the international division
of labour by building up a stronger and more complete infrastructure and upgraded
industrial modernization. 281 From 1976 to 1981, the Economic Planning Council
(EPC) also issued a Six Year Plan which emphasized capital and heavy industry –
notably steel and petrochemicals –which also related to several projects already
underway as the Ten Major Development Projects.282 After 1980, the new established
Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), expanded from the EPC in
1977, issued another Ten-Year Plan for 1980–1989 and a Four-Year Plan for
1982–1986 which emphasized technology –intensive, non polluting and no energy
consuming industries, notably information and electronics.283
The series of economic plans were proved successful later. When the global
economy recovered in 1983, the island economy resumed its high growth rates.284
280 The economic growth rate dropped from 12.8％ in 1973 to 1.1％ in 1974，not rebound until 4.2％
in 1975; The Wholesale Price Index (WPI) increased from 22.9％ in 1973 to 40.6％ in 1974；
Consumer Price Index in 1974 increased up to 47.5%; food price increased 47.4％。
281 The Ten Major Construction Projects were national infrastructure projects during the 1970s in
Taiwan. The government believed the state lacked key utilities such as highways, seaports, airports,
and power plants. Moreover, Taiwan was experiencing significant effects from the 1973 oil crisis.
Therefore, to upgrade the industry and the development of the country, the government planned to
take on ten massive building projects. They were proposed by the Premier Chiang Ching-kuo,
beginning in 1974, with a planned completion by 1979. There were six transportation projects,
three industrial projects, and one power-plant construction project, which ultimately cost over
NT$300 billion in total.
282 Ibid, Thomas. B. Gold (1986), p.100.
283 Ibid, p.102.
284 According to the ROC ‘s Bureau of Directorate General of Budget Accounting and Statistic,
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Except for a more consolidated infrastructure, the established steel, petrochemicals
and electronic industries become the major backbone of Taiwan’s economy in the 
coming of years. For example, the China Steel Corporation, one of the “Ten Major 
Development Projects”, became one of the world’s most profitable steel companies, 
but was virtually a 100 per cent government enterprise; 285 the Formosa Plastics
Groups, the most famous Taiwan petroleum and chemical giants, was developed in
the established petrochemical industry, one of the Ten Projects which integrated
verticaly two of Taiwan’s major industries –synthetic textiles and plastics, produced
finished goods and contributed to reducing vulnerability to crude oil price
fluctuation.286 The Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park, established in 1980, was
designed to concentrate talent and resources in the electronic sectors. Proximity to the
two leading technical universities (University of Tsing-Hua and University of Chaio
Tung) and the availability of the state-run Industrial Technology and Research
Institute (ITRI) meant that the small innovative companies–headed by entrepreneurs
with experience abroad and MNC linkages –were able to grow up quickly, utilizing
the relatively low-cost engineers, technology transfer, and government financial
support. United Microelectronic Corporations (UMC) and the Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacture Company (TSMC), two famous Taiwan world-leading semiconductor
foundries, were separately established in the park in 1980 and 1987 - a typical
Executive Yuan，in 1974, the econo mic growth, industry growth, and inflation rate were
separately 1.16%，-4.5%，and 47.5%; In 1976, the economic and industry rate rebounded to 13.86%
and 24.4%，the inflation rate was reduced to 2.48%.
285 Yu-zhen Liu (2002),The Iron Story: Wang Zhong Yu’s life time in CSC, Taipei: Tian Xia Culture
publishers.
286 Wan-wen Qu (2002), the mechanism of economic development–the case study on Taiwan
petrochemical and bicycle industry, Taipei: Taiwan Social Research Magazine Publishers, p.8.
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example of this successful story.
In addition to the industrial integration, the government also liberalized the
banking system including the deregulation of the interest rate in three stages from
1976–1989, adapting a floating exchange rate in 1978, and establishing a foreign
exchange market in 1979. This series of measurements broadened the scope of
banking practices which in turn caused the expansion of investment and trust
companies.287 By 1980, when Taiwan had become the world’s sixteenth largest 
exporter, trade was still 50 per cent concentrated on the United States (export) and
Japan (import). In order to prevent overreliance on these two markets and due to some
frustrations regarding US quotas and Japan’s frequent critical refusal of Taiwanese 
exported products, the government started to diversify trading partners, encouraging
investment from other regions, such as Europe and the Caribbean Basin. Except for
the reducing economic risk, this policy was also helpful for Taiwan to both maintain
and develop commercial relations and international identity with most countries
around the world.288 The strategy of substituting economic ties was nothing but a
flexible way of reducing economic risk when the international environment became
unfavourable to the island. It also became the rationale of the later “pragmatic 
diplomacy” implemented in the 1990s when China continued to suppress Taiwan’s 
international space.289
287 Jin-ying Hou and Qi Xui (2005) (ed.), The History of Taiwan Financial Development, Taipei:
Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance publishers, pp. 216–223.
288 Chyuan-jenq Shiau, Economic Development and Taiwan Democratization, Taiwan Democracy
Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2004), p. 13.
289 Ibid, Shiau (2004) p.16.
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5.2.4 The establishment of US–PRC relations
While the KMT government engaged themselves in progressive political and
economic reforms, the establishment of US–PRC relations gave the KMT government
a diplomatic blow and made the nightmare of Sino-American rapprochement come
true. On 16th December 1978, US President Carter announced that Washington would
recognize Beijing and broke official relations with Taipei on 1st January 1979: the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty would be terminated one year later and all US forces in
Taiwan would be withdrawn within four months. Similar to the 1972 Shanghai
Communiqué, the 1978 Joint Communiqué marking the establishment of official
Sino-US relations contained a weak American affirmation of the One-China
principle.290 The former US embassy in Taiwan devolved into the American Institute
in Taiwan (AIT), technically a private corporation run by diplomats and civil servants
who were retired or on leave from government service. In the meantime, Washington
also enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which became law in April 1979. The
TRA emphasized that normal US relations with China were based upon the
expectation that the future of Taiwan would be determined by peaceful means and the
US promised to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defence capability by
continued arms sales.291 Despite President Carter was later electorally defeated by
Republican Ronald Regan, who was noted for his anti-communist and hawkish stance,
there are several records of pro-ROC statements. In a third joint communiqué in
August 1982, the US pledged to gradually reduce its sales of arms to Taiwan and
promised that its arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed the limitation, either in
290 Ibid, Liu (1997), pp. 332–333.
291 Ibid., Huan-gui Guo (2005), p. 94.
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qualitative or quantitative terms.292
The Taiwan Relations Act could be considered as the product of Washington’s 
eclectic calculation. 293 Washington worried that the ROC might seek a separate
peace with the Communists if pushed too hard.294 In fact, Washington’s fear was in 
some degree reasonable. It was advantageous to Taipei to play the Soviet Card,
Soviet–ROC hostility had decreased since 1970 with the PRC maintaining a
substantial military capability on the Chinese south-east coast, limiting the military
resource available to deploy at the Sino–Soviet border; Soviet support for China’s 
goal of reincorporating Taiwan faded such that the Soviet press and diplomats gave
indications of accepting the idea the ROC in Taiwan was a state rather than a province
of China.295 Taipei’s plan was to host a Soviet military base if the US switched
diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. Taipei even thought about developing the
nuclear weapons under Soviet technological support. Taipei’s nuclear aspiration was 
aimed at preventing the possibility of the PRC wiping out the ROC’s defences in a 
single swift attack and then occupying and controlling the island long before the
292 Harvey J. Feldman (1998), “Development of US–Taiwan Relations 1948–1987”, in Harvey J. 
Feldman, Michael Y.M. Kau, and Ilpyong Kim (1988) (ed.), Taiwan in a Time of Transition, New
York: Paragon House, p.159.
293 The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA; Pub.L. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, enacted April 10, 1979; H.R. 2479 ) is an
act of the United States Congress passed in 1979 after the establishment of diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the breaking of relations between the United States
and the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan by President Jimmy Carter. It more
clearly defines the American position on Taiwan and its cross-strait relationship with Beijing.
Congress rejected the State Department's proposed draft and replaced it with language that has
remained in effect since 1979.
294 John F. Copper (1981), “PoliticalDevelopment in TaiwanTaiwan ”in James C. Hsiung (1981) (ed.),
Contemporary Republic of China: The Taiwan Experience, 1950–1980, New York: Praeger, 1981,
pp. 491–492.
295 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (1994), Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992, New York:
Twayne, p. 92.
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American military could intervene.296 In the end, Taipei did not run risk of alienating
US support and changed its foreign minister, Chow Shu-kai, who believed that the
threat of improved ROC relations with the USSR would induce the United States and
China to treat Taiwan with greater consideration.
Conclusion
Even though the period of authoritarian control by two Chiang presidents is often
criticised as anti-democratic and inflexible as their insistence in the “One China 
principle ” had forced Taiwan into greater international isolation, after the discussion 
of this chapter, the researcher found that the island’s rapid economic recovery in 
1950–1970 and successful industrial upgrading and integration into the global market
in 1970–1980 had actually created a solid social economy basis for the later
democratic transition in the 1990s when the first Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui,
began to implement a series of political reforms. The KMT party also enjoyed high
support and legitimacy due to the island’s economic success, the efective policy of 
Taiwanization inside the KMT, and the low level of conflicts between the KMT and
the opposition; which were both helpful in easing the challenges of the crisis of
minority mainlander-dominated governance and advantageous for its later incremental
and moderate reforms. Nevertheless, the progress of Taiwan’s democratic 
development so far is not altogether a good story.
As the first hypothesis of this research mentioned in Chapter 2, the nature and
function of the island’s democracy had slowly and underneath changed its direction: 
democratization had strengthened the island’s self-identity to secede from China. It
296 David Albright and Corey Gay (1998), “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January /February 1998), pp.54-60.
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meant the later political leaders gradualy showed the intention to abandon the “One 
China principle” and build Taiwan as a new country. The situation would undoubtedly 
cause more conflicts with China while the cross-Strait economic interaction was
gaining speed, becoming closer after 1990. More details are discussed in the next
chapters.
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Chapter 6 Democratic transition under two Taiwanese presidents
Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian
Introduction
In this chapter, the researcher will argue that when Lee Teng-hui acted as the first
native Taiwanese president in early 1990, along with his successor Chen Shui-bian
after 2000, the Taiwan people’s wilingness to seek more autonomy internationaly 
and greater social justice inside the island had actually provided these two native
Taiwanese presidents (Father and Son of Taiwan) a legitimate basis to implement a
series of political reforms (i.e. Lee’s three stages of constitutional reforms and the 
public referendum raised by Chen) during their 20-year tenure, despite suspicions that
the reforms were the outcome of a political power struggle and the manipulation of a
growing Taiwanese consciousness. However, as China matured into another political
and economic superpower (especially its significant influence on the global economic
order) in late 1990, how a suitable cross strait relation with the PRC could be built (i.e.
how to regulate the rapid movement and immigrant of Taishang) became a hard but
inevitable lesson for each Taiwanese leader to face. The researcher will argue that
even though Lee Teng-hui’s controversial “Go Slow, Be Patient ” mainland policy and 
“Special State-to-State” relations theories had actualy given Taiwan more space to 
secede from the PRC’s One China scenario, the island’s gradualy worsening
economy and expanding social inequality (including imbalanced north–south regional
development) actualy weakened its ability to assist China’s influence, reflecting on 
Chen Shui-bian’s ineficient and inconsistent mainland policy despite his efforts to be
proactive in diplomacy during his tenure.
150
6.1 Lee Teng-hui: the first Taiwanese president (1988–2000)
6.1.1 The Father of Taiwan and Mr. Democracy
When Chiang Ching-kuo died on 13 January 1988, Lee Teng-hui ascended to the
presidency in accordance with the ROC constitution and was nominated as party
chairman on 27 January after the thirteenth KMT congress. Lee’s ascension is 
symbolic of the KMT’s Taiwanization policy; public expectation was that there was 
finally a Taiwanese who had the chance to be in the highest position of the ROC
government and the KMT. During his 12-year stay in office, Lee pushed through a
series of peaceful political reforms which contributed to the growth of Taiwan’s 
identity and the successful transition of the KMT in the 1990s. The process was
praised as a “Quiet Revolution” and Lee enjoyed the reputation of being the “Father 
of Taiwan” and “Mr. Democracy”.297 However, even though Lee’s commitment 
towards expanding Taiwan’s sovereignty helped him to receive huge popular support
on his reforms –including the abolition of the Temporary Provisions, renewing
parliamentary bodies, the direct election of the president, downsizing of the provincial
government, and expanding Taiwan’s international space in name of pragmatic
diplomacy298 – Lee’s decline in popularity in the final years of his term was generaly 
believed to be the result of people coming to think he was more interested in revising
the constitution to both enlarge his presidential powers and expand the Taiwanese
faction in order to expel the mainlanders’ influence; Lee created the notorious oficial 
corruption inside the KMT and government linked with organized crime (black gold
297 Jason C. Hu (1997), Say Yes to Taiwan, Arlington, Virginia: SIFT, Inc.
298 Zi-hua Huwang (2006), The Ideas and Policies of Lee Teng-Hui‘s Governing,pp. 49–56, Taipei: Li
Ming Publishers.
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politics).299 He was also suspicious of manipulating US support in order to provoke
China while Cross-Strait economic ties became deeper and important.
Lee Teng-hui’s Japanese colonial life experience, overseas study, and career 
development inside the authoritarian KMT hierarchy made his style of leadership
unique and sometimes complex, even controversial. As a National Taiwan University
(NTU) professor with a PhD from Cornell University, one of the leading schools in
the United States, Lee’s qualifications in agricultural economy, image of liberal 
scholarship, and low-key style–humble, and modest without factions–helped him to
quickly win Chiang Ching-kuo’s atention, trust and promotion. However, after Lee 
went to power, he gradually became the strongman of a patriarchy,300 and did not pay
attention to technocrats from a similar background, gradually favouring the rich
Taiwanese businessman with huge political and economic influence in the local areas.
Moreover, Lee also quickly demonstrated his dissatisfaction with the ROC’s political 
structure and Taiwan’s international status, intending to seek more changes and
greater independence. Lee compared himself to the biblical prophet Moses, who led
the enslaved minority Israelites out of Egypt on a journey toward establishing a
country of their own,301 and that is why Beijing so easily considered Lee a separatist.
Some researchers have atributed Lee’s provocative style to his “double faced 
personality” (superficialy quiet and obedient, but underneath passionate and hungry 
for power) which developed from his early life during the Japanese colonial
depression and later the KMT’s authoritarian control.302 In some aspects, this style
was negative to Taiwan’s democratization during his stay in ofice in 1990 because 
299 Zhen Xia (2000), The Sunset of KMT, Taipei: Tian Xia Culture Publishers, pp. 15–16.
300 Nian Huwang (1998),The Portrait of Lee Deng Hui’s Mind, Introduction, Taipei: Lian Jing
Publishers.
301 Shiba Ryotaro (1994), Travel Notes in Taiwan, Tokyo: Asahi News, pp. 537–538.
302 Ming Ruan (2000), Democracy in Taiwan, Taipei: Yuan-Liu Publishers, pp. 172–175.
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Lee’s strong Taiwanese patriotic sentiment (rather than rational calculation) 
sometimes made his reforms and policymaking lose focus and often caused greater
controversies.
6.1.2 Three stages of political reforms
President Lee’s tenure can be classified as three stages (1988–1990; 1990–1996;
1996–2000) and each stage reflects his different ideas and strategies to implement his
reforms. In the first three years (1988–1990), because Lee directly received his power
from Chiang Ching-kuo for whom he had been vice president, he was expected to
perform as a “weak president” who stil faced big challenges from the sensitive and
hostile mainlanders’faction –which was still the mainstream inside the KMT.303
Some research posit that Chiang Ching-kuo choose Lee as a successor not only
because Lee was Taiwanese, but also because he was a good balance for the power
struggle inside the KMT (in Chiang’s mind, Lee acted very independently without any 
factional support inside the KMT).304 However, Lee skilfully made use of his
presidential power to nominate the mainlander opponents as premiers and then had
them resign for different reasons. Lee initially retained Yu Kuo hwa as premier for
one year, but replaced him with Li Huan –who was considered the most influential
member of KMT central committee.305 Li Huan’s premiership was also for one year 
and he was later replaced by General Hau Po-tusn, the military heavyweight, who was
famous for his successful command on Kinmen during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis
303 Taiwan Association of University Professors (1996), Consultations on Lee Teng-hui, Taipei:
Qian-Wei Publishers, p. 20.
304 Jing-wen Zou (2001), The Real Record of Lee Teng- hui in Power, Taipei: Yin-ke Publishers, p.63.
305 Ibid., pp. 66–67.
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and was known as a strong supporter of the One China Principle.306 Lee ascribed the
outbreak of the “March Students Demonstration”307 to Li Huan’s improper response 
to the students’ requirements; however, the movement on the other side led to the 
holding of the National Affairs Conference (Kuoshih hui, NAC) in the summer of
1990 (June–July), three months after (March 21) Lee won an uncontested vote to
become the ROC’s eighth president by the National Assembly. The holding of the 
NAC was advantageous for Lee with regard to consolidating his power and promoting
the later substantive political reforms –and especially advantageous in respect of
allowing direct elections for the highest political offices including the governor of
Taiwan, the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung in 1994, and the presidential election in
1996. The NAC’s decision also suggested that al theparliamentarians (members of
the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan) elected by constituencies
on the mainland had to retire by the end of 1991 and that all the seats of the
parliamentary bodies would be renewed from Taiwanese constituencies, beginning
with the National Assembly in 1992; similar elections for the Legislative Yuan and the
Control Yuan would follow in 1994 and 1993 respectively. 308 On 30 April 1991, Lee
announced the abolition of the Temporary Provisions and the termination of the
Period of the National Mobilization of the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion.
The announcement explained “the ROC was no longer formaly at civil war with the 
PRC” and implied recognition of the legitimacy of CCP rule on the 
mainland. 309 However, the announcement was later considered as intentionally
ambiguous, even a very controversial political idea raised by President Lee. From a
306 Yu-Kuo Zhou (1993), Lee Teng- hui’s One Thousand Days, Taipei: Mai-Tien Publishers, p 289.
307 Ibid., Ming Ruan (2000), pp. 181–183.
308 Ibid., pp. 186–187.
309 Office of President (ROC), Constitution History,
http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/print.php?id=1105496082.
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positive perspective, the announcement can be interpreted as a bilateral friendly
message released by the ROC government which implied that the Taiwan Strait
situation was no longer a confrontation between “two Chinese governments” (ROC 
and PRC) and the situation was necessary for the ROC to foster the healthy
development of constitutional democracy and enhance social harmony and progress.
However, from the subversive perspective, along with the abolishment of the
mainland-elected members, the political significance of these changes are the
weakening of the ROC’s claim to jurisdiction over China (Fa-tung) which had
gradually aroused the suspicion of the KMT conservatives and the CCP with regard to
Lee’s “separatist motivation” from China in the name of political and economic 
reforms.
As mentioned above, Lee won an uncontested vote and was elected as the ROC’s 
eighth president by the National Assembly on 21 March 1990. After this final
“cosmetic election” for president, Lee found his personal power was further 
consolidated and it was the time for him to put his ideas into practice despite that
there was no timetable for implementing the decision of the National Affairs
Conference (NAC). Over the following six years, the second tenure of his presidency
(1990–1996), Lee and his Taiwanese faction gradually became the mainstream of the
KMT and began to dominate the work of “revising the constitution” in accordance 
with the agreement and suggestion of the NAC.310
310 Yao-song Lin (2004), Lee Teng- hui and the Split of KMT. Taipei: Cross- Strait Academy Publishers
P, 125.
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Table 6.1: Constitutional reforms during Lee’s tenure
Lee’s tenure Year Major issues and decisions Political controversies
1991 1. Abolishment of the mainland-elected
members
2. Establishment of the National
Security Council (NSC)
1.Secession from the One
China Policy
2. Strong presidency
1992 The direct election for the Governor
of Taiwan, Mayors of Taipei and
Kaohsiung City, and County Chief
Executives in 1994
Mai stream and
non-mainstream political
struggle inside the KMT
The second term
(1990–1996)
1994 The direct election for the president in
1996
The split of the new party
from the KMT
1997 1 The relationship between the
president and the premier
2. Downsizing provincial government
The split of James Soong
from the KMT for 2000
presidential election
The third term
(1996–2000)
2000 Abolishment of the Provincial
Government
Bilateral legislative bodies
were transformed into
unilateral form
Source: Author’s compilation
Along with Lee’s third tenure (1996–2000), there were five phases of
constitutional revision in ten years. According to Table 6.1, in the first phase of
constitutional revision in 1991, folowing the NAC’s decision (mentioned above), the
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National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment which stipulated that all the
seats elected by constituencies on the mainland had to retire by the end of 1991 and be
renewed from a Taiwanese constituency in 1992. Before the members of first National
Assembly (mainland-elected members) retired, the work of these mainlander
representatives was considered as a contribution, with their major role and task being
to authorize the second National Assembly to push constitutional reforms. The KMT
defined the process as “one assembly, two stages” and proclaimed it a wise and 
peaceful measurement.311 As mentioned above, the abolishment of the mainland
-elected members is symbolic of the weakening of the ROC‘s claim to jurisdiction 
over China (fa-tung) and to some extent caused the controversies concerning whether
the ROC would gradualy secede from the “One China Policy” to de facto Taiwanese 
Independence. Even though they were criticized by the Taiwanese people as “rubber 
stamps of the executive” or bantered as an “old thief” who occupied parliament for a 
long time, the elderly mainlander parliamentarians still believed themselves the first
born Chinese democratic bodies who should not be removed in the “free China” area. 
The other issue in the 1991 reform was the establishment of the National Security
Council (NSC). This caused controversy in that certain residential authoritarian
elements were preserved and transplanted into new amendments so that the
presidential power was expanded after the creation of emergency powers and the
National Security Agency under the president’s ofice.312
The second phase of constitution revisions in 1992 made a significant
contribution to democratic transition in Taiwan. In addition to being the first election
for Taiwanese people to elect representatives in the central legislative body (the
311 Ibid., Zi-hua Huwang (2006), p. 71.
312 Yun-han Chu (2001), “Democratic Consolidation in the Post-KMT Era: the Challenge of
Governance” in Muthiah Alagappa (2001) (ed.), Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization 
and Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe), p. 89.
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National Assembly), the new National Assembly also passed constitutional
amendments which stipulated that the highest political offices in different levels
including Governor of Taiwan, Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung City, and County
Chief Executives would be selected from popular election rather than appointment in
1993 and 1994. The changes were actualy the milestone of the building of Taiwan’s 
democratic institutions and were advantageous for the development of popular
sovereignty. However, whether the president and vice president in 1996 would be also
directly selected from the general public was not the consensus inside the KMT but
resulted in “mainstream and non-mainstream conflicts” between the Taiwanese
faction led by President Lee who supported direct public election and the mainlanders
faction led by Premier Hau who suspected that direct election would produce a
president of the “Republic of Taiwan” and so provide Lee a good opportunity to wield
his personal power. The dispute was not resolved until the third phase of constitution
revisions in 1994 when the mainlanders faction had broken away to establish the New
Party in 1993.313 In 1994, the scenario to adapt the plural mandate, rather than
majority formula for presidential election was confirmed, despite the potential to
create a trouble “minority president” and executive–legislative deadlock if another
majority in the Legislative Yuan occurred. Nevertheless, the choice was generally
believed to be favoured by President Lee’s and indicative that he wanted to reduce the 
risk of failure when he joined the first direct presidential election in 1996.314
313 The Chinese New Party was formed out of a split from the then-ruling Kuomintang (KMT) by
members of the New Kuomintang Alliance in August 1993. Members of the Alliance had accused
KMT Chairman Lee Teng-hui of dictatorial tendencies and moving the party away from Chinese
reunification. Originally, the party wanted to keep the name of the faction, but was prevented from
doing so due to the similarity of names. The name "New Party" was seemingly inspired by the
contemporary electoral success of the Japan New Party.
314 Nian Huwang (2008), Such a Chen Shui- bian! The Records of Eight Years in Power, Taipei:
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However, while the KMT enjoyed the presidency and majority in the Legislative Yuan,
the executive–legislative dispute could be solved via a party channel mechanism.
When the KMT lost its power in 2000, the reform left the DPP not the heritage but the
disaster of eight years of minority government sufferings.
The fourth phase of constitution revision in 1997 focused on more details about
the new form of government, but the improper and disputable modifications to the
constitution made the ROC Constitution more complex, vague and open to dispute –
especially the unreasonable expansion of presidential power and unclear relationship
between the president, premier (executive Yuan), and legislative check. Firstly, under
the new way of presidential election, the president was elected by plurality, not
majority mandate. It is easy to create a deadlock between a minority president and a
majority assembly during a period of “cohabitation” like the French system. Secondly, 
as the analysis and argument in Chapter 3.2 demonstrated, the new constitutional
revision did not define a clear relationship between the president and the premier. The
confusion included questions regarding whether the new form of government was a
presidential or parliamentary system and if the president or premier was the highest
executive in central government. Compared with general presidential system, the
ROC president did not have veto power to break the deadlock but enjoyed extensive
powers of premier nomination and pre-eminence in areas of foreign policy, defense,
and relations with the mainland, without the legislature’s check and consent.
Compared with the parliamentary system, the ROC premier enjoyed the right to ask
the president to dissolve the Legislative Yuan if the Legislative Yuan unseated the
cabinet with a vote of no-confidence; however, the premier is not guaranteed to be the
major party leader in parliament and members of the cabinet are not guaranteed to be
Linking Books Publishers, p. 29.
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legislators (incompatibility). Therefore, it makes sense that the premier has the power
to ask the president to dissolve the Legislative Yuan and that the Legislative Yuan can
unseat a cabinet through a normal vote of no-confidence because the government is a
form of presidential cabinet, not an alternative parliament with a clear collective
responsibility.315 In fact, in the later development of the political situation, it never
happened either that the premier dissolved the Legislative Yuan or that the Legislative
Yuan unseated the cabinet with a vote of no-confidence because the subsequent
election would actually be a high cost for legislators. The only way to break such an
executive legislative deadlock would be for the president to nominate a new premier
who would reorganize a new cabinet.
As argued in Chapter 3.1, designing and deciding the form of government and
the method of election “a country’s adoption depends more upon its political
consideration than upon abstract consideration of electoral justice or efficient
government”. The story of Taiwan’s constitutional reforms mentioned above proves 
the theory that the KMT dominated the process which carried too many elements of
unilateral imposition, short-term partisan calculation and tactical moves rather than a
315 In the general parliamentary system, either the premier asks president to dissolve legislators or the
legislative body unseats a cabinet through a normal vote of no-confidence, it is a useful mechanism
to break the executive–legislative deadlock and reconfirm that there is a stable majority in the
legislative body; when the above situation happens, it means the stable majority in the legislative
body has altered and needs to be reconfirmed by a follow up election. If the premier successfully
dissolves legislators and wins support from the follow up election, it means he has cleaned up the
betrayers inside his party or coalition and re-controls the majority support in the legislative body;
on the other hand, if the premier fails or the cabinet is unseated a through a no-confidence vote
successfully passed, it means the general public expect and support a new majority in the legislative
body who will reorganize a new cabinet (government). Under this circumstance, the old cabinet
should resign and will be replaced by the new one organized by the new legislators. In other words,
for the old legislator, unseating a cabinet through a normal vote of no-confidence is a risk for
themselves but also a good chance to change apremiership which they don’t support or like.
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final and lasting accord over constitutional arrangements.316 The controversies of the
1997 constitutional reforms about the abolishment of provincial government (in the
KMT’s interpretation, the reform is the cessation of the function of provincial 
government, not the abolishment) explained this KMT manipulation and President
Lee’s personal prejudice. Soong Chu-yu (or James Soong) was the first elected
Governor of Taiwan. He had been elected by a direct and island-wide vote, but had
enjoyed an earlier victory in 1994 and wider marginal support than President Lee (57
per cent to Lee’s 54 per cent). However, the decision to cut back the provincial 
government’s size and responsibilities, and suspend the elections for the governor and 
Provincial Assembly were considered to be a strategy to weaken Soong’s power base, 
even though the reform was actually advantageous for advancing government
efficiency by reducing the economic cost of the old redundant central government.317
Soong’s mainlander background and high popular support was considered to be the 
most serious threat to Lee-Lien faction inside the KMT (Lien Chen was gradually
acknowledged as the successor by President Lee in the late 1990s) even though he had
supported Lee to fight against the mainlanders faction in his first term. For Taiwan’s 
democracy, the political struggle was another bad story of Mainlander–Taiwanese
conflict, especially raised by the highest political elites in the name of democratic
reform.
316 Ibid., Yun-han Chu (2001), pp. 91–93.
317 Gerald A. McBeath (2000), “Restructuring Government in Taiwan,” Asian Survey ,Vol. 40, No. 2
(March/April 2000), pp. 251–268.
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6.1.3 Deepening Cross-Strait economic linkage and policy of “Go slow, be Patient” 
Taiwan’s trade with China began in the mid-1980s and the volume of trade had
increased ever since. For Taiwan’s businesses (Taishang), in order to defend their 
global market share especially in the Western world, mainland China had become the
best choice for Taishang to relocate their bases for lower production costs (lower
labour costs, a potentially huge market, and government’s tax concessions), and land
provision from Taiwan island where the business environment gradually worsened.
(Taiwan dollar appreciation, the wake of the environmental movement and working
class consciousness).318 Closer Cross-Strait economic interaction has led to three
waves of Taiwanese investment in China to date. The traditional labour-intensive
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) went first for lower labour costs in the
late 1980s (i.e. garments and shoe making). In the second wave (the middle of 1990),
large enterprises, mostly public-listed companies followed to supply intermediate
goods to SMEs and look for cheap and accessible land for expansion (i.e.
petrochemical industry). Other big firms, especially those in the food processing
industry began to penetrate China’s market. Firms in information technology 
spearheaded the large third wave of investment beginning in the late 1990s.319
Except for tapping the domestic market and cheaper brainpower, the requests from
Western contractor to ask Taishang to use China’s production costs as the base to 
quote prices become the major reason for the relocation of the semiconductor
industry. 320 Following these three waves of Taiwanese investment, the local
318 T.J. Cheng (2005), “China – Economic Linkage: between Insulation and Superconductivity”, in 
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (2005) (ed.), Dangerous Strait: The US–Taiwan–China Crisis (New York:
Columbia University Press), p. 95.
319 Ibid., p. 97.
320 Ibid., p. 99.
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market-oriented industries, including cement, real estate, banking, are queuing up and
are predicted to be the next wave of Taiwanese investment.
Despite Taishang benefitting from the closer and deepening Cross-Strait
economic exchange, the problems of national security (i.e. three direct links reduce
the space to defeat a possible PLA invasion; Taishang gave China economic leverage
to coerce Taiwan politicaly and militarily) and negative impacts on the island’s 
domestic economy (i.e. al “holowing out” of industry reduces the government
revenue and labour job opportunities) force the Taiwanese government to pursue a
“Go South” policy in 1994,321 and President Lee’s public appeal, the “Go Slow, Be 
Patient!” policy in 1996. The policy constrained the investment in the mainland, 
especially the high technology sector, preventing from the loss of core technology to
Chinese competitors. 322 However, the policy was not welcomed by Taishang, and
some research showed that the hollowing out warning proved to be a false alarm and
that the outward FDI to mainland China has brought Taiwan a high level of foreign
exchange earnings which were returned to Taiwan and contributed to industrial
upgrading and production expansion; the government ignored the fact that “the 
manufacturing sector in Taiwan’s GDP increased, the share of service sector
increased” and that this is a normal process and that al mature economies in the West 
had gone through such structural changes.323 As argued in Chapter4.2, the diversified
perspectives on the nature of Cross-Strait relations had been influenced by problems
321 Zhen-zhao Song, “The Political Economical Analysis of ROC’s ‘Go South Policy’ ”, Zhong-Shan
Journal of Social Science, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 67–92.
322 China Times, Lee Teng- hui raised this idea in the National Managers Conference speech,
4 September 1996, A2.
323 Chen-yuan Tung (2002), “The Impact on Taiwan” (An Interim Assessment of the Impact of 
Taiwan's Investment in China on Taiwan's Economic Development), in Shang-jin Wei, Wen
Guan-zhong, and Hui-zhong Zhou (2002) (ed.), The Globalization of the Chinese Economy
(Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2002), pp. 190–204.
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of a national identity cleavage. How to evaluate the proper degree (depth and width)
of cross strait economic interaction had become the most important lesson, but was
controversial issue when Lee Teng-hui was in the office.
6.1.4 The Koo–Wang Meeting and 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis
Cross-Strait economic interaction and the related social issues it caused (i.e.
smuggling, fishing disputes, illegal immigrants and crime) had made the need for
coordination between the two governments inescapable. Taipei established the Straits
Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 1991. Similar to the AIT in Taiwan, the SEF was
technically a private organization staffed by ROC government officials who were on
leave or retired from government, but supervised by the Mainland Affairs Council and
funded mostly by the government. China formed a counterpart to the SEF, the
Associations for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).324 In 1992, negotiators
for Taiwan and China agreed to “shelve” the tough political issue of disagreement
over the One China principle and arrange a meeting between SEF and ARTAS to
discuss practical matters. The promise later became the famous “92 consensus”,
where both sides had actually reached a consensus that they could hold different
interpretations of the One China principle –there is still some controversy whether
both sides reached a consensus or just a simple understanding on record.325 On 27–29
April 1993, the first chairmen of the two organizations, Koo Chen-fu (SEF) and Wang
Dao-han (ARATS) met for discussion in the neutral site of Singapore. They secured
agreements on the postal service and on verifying documents and committed to meet
324 Straits Exchange Foundation ,“ The Review of the SEF in the past 18 Years ”, online, available at: 
http://www.sef.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=50338&ctNode=4328&mp=1, accessed 12 March 2007.
325 Liberty Times, “The Memory of Koo Chen-fu: There was no ‘92 Consensus”, 6 March 2005.  
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again,326 but achieved no political breakthrough.
In January 1995, PRC president Jiang Zemin presented the “Eight-points” 
proposal for reunification.327 Even though the announcement did not specify that
China would stop the use of force against Taiwan, the speech was notable for its
conciliatory tone and the promise of resolving the Taiwan question through peaceful
negotiation.328 In April, Lee Teng-hui responded to Jiang’s Eight Points with his own 
“Six Principles”.329 Lee expressed willingness for high-level negotiations, peaceful
means to solve any disputes, but that Beijing should accept the two separate Chinese
governments first.330  In June, Lee’s visit to his US alma-mater, Cornell University
with the permission of US Congress was more disappointing to China. Beijing felt
very angry and concluded that the US broke its promise to provide cover for Lee to
fulfil his alleged separatist agenda. Beijing also considered that Lee was taking
advantage of the PRC’s conciliatory posture toward independence while claiming 
commitment to the One China Principle.
In July, the PLA launched test-fire missiles into waters off the Taiwan coast. Two
large scale military exercises, naval in August and amphibious in November (the
largest one in the PLA history), were held in the Taiwan Strait and it was admitted by
the Chinese government that the exercises were a response to Lee’s actions. In 
326 United Daily News, 30 April 1993, A4.
327 On January 30, 1995, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China and the President of China Jiang Zemin delivered an important speech entitled “Continuing 
to Strive toward the Reunification of China”. In his speech Jiang Zemin put forward eight 
propositions on the development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and the
peaceful reunification of China on the current stage. For more information and the full text of the
statement, please see : http://www.strait2taiwan.tw/content/jiang-zemins-eight-point-proposal.
328 China Times, “How to Evaluate Jiang’s Talk on Cross Strait Relations?” 5 February 1995, p. 10. 
329 The RMMA, “President Lee’s Speech at the Tenth Commitee of the Whole of the National 
Unification Council”, pp. 5–6.
330 China Times, 9 April 1995, A10.
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February 1996, soon after Taiwan’s first direct popular presidential election campaign 
formally began, Beijing announced another round of missile firings into the Taiwan
Strait: PLA tests on 8–15 March sent missiles toimpact areas close to Taiwan’s north 
and south principal ports, Keelung and Kaohsiung.331 During this 1995–1996 Taiwan
Strait Crisis, in the first wave of missile threats, the Clinton administration ordered the
aircraft carrier Nimitz and its supporting ships to pass through the Taiwan Strait for
the first time in 17 years. In the second wave, two aircraft battle groups (Nimitz and
Independence) were deployed to international waters near Taiwan. Sending one
carrier in support of Taiwan was a symbolic gesture, but sending two was a much
stronger signal that suggested readiness to do battle. Compared with its counterpart,
the PLA force mobilized was far too smal to atempt an actual invasion. The PLA’s 
missile test and exercise was clearly no more than a show of force designed to warn
Taiwan what might happen in the future.332
For Taiwan, the crisis had caused mixed consequences. Taiwan benefitted from
international sympathy and US security support, but it meant that Taiwan would spend
more on US arms sales for its stronger self-defence. Meanwhile, the willingness of the
United States to support Taiwan’s separatism reduced: Washington obviously had 
eliminated some of the ambiguity in America’s strategy for fewer opportunities by 
which Taiwan could provoke China, even though American domestic public opinion
became more sympathetic toward democratic Taiwan and concerns about the potential
of the PRC threat after the event.333 The crisis also strengthened the US–Japan
security treaty and therefore increased the potential role that Japan might play in
331 Ibid., Zi-hua Huwang (2006), pp. 83–84.
332 Susan Berfield and Alejandro Reyes, “Eye of the Storm”, Asia Week, March 29, 1996, p.23.
333 Alan Wachman, (2001), “America’s Taiwan Quandary: How Much Does Chen’s Election Matter?
“ in Muthiah Alagappa (2001) (ed)., Taiwan’s Presidential Politics: Democratization and 
Cross-Strait Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001), p.247.
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support of US military action in the region. In fact, both super powers had learned the
lesson that the Taiwan issue would become a serious conflict between China and the
United States if Washington and Beijing continued to have having misunderstandings
or misinterpretations regarding each side’s policy making. In particular, Washington 
had realized nationalism and CCP self-preservation would suddenly trump the need
for modernization and China might risk breaking the economic ties with the United
States even though its dependence on the US market was very high.334
334 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (2005), “Strategic Ambiguity or Strategic Clarity”, in Dangerous Strait:
the U.S.–Taiwan–China Crisis, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, p.195.
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6.2 Chen Shui-bian: the first party alternation (2000–2008)
6.2.1 The minority government and the DPP’s inexperience 
Chen Shui-bian won the ROC presidential election on 18 March 2000 with only
39.3 per cent of the vote (4,977,737 ballots) when James Soong ran for the presidency
as an independent (36.84 per cent, 4,664,932 ballots) against the party nominee Lien
Chan (23.1 per cent, 22,925,513 ballots).335 The DPP’s victory could be considered as 
very lucky and also surprising that the minority president electoral formula provided
them an unprecedented opportunity to win the election when there was a split of
factions within the KMT. As argued in the previous section, the adaption of a plural
mandate, rather than a majority formula, was generally believed to be in President
Lee’s favour –Lee wanted to reduce the risk of failure when he joined the first direct
presidential election in 1996 (in the 1996 presidential election there was also a split
inside the KMT). However, the KMT never imagined that this institutional change
would become the major reason leading to their failure in 2000 despite they still
enjoyed 60 per cent popular support at that time. The DPP’s victory was also 
significant because Taiwanese people for a long time expected that the DPP
government would improve the unfair social economic resource allocation and lessen
corruption following the half-century of KMT rule (1949–2000). However, the
Taiwanese people began to experience disappointment as soon as the new DPP took
over the central government, it seemed that the DPP was incapable of satisfying
people’s expectations because of its own weakness on governing and the structural 
limitations they faced. The DPP’s lengthy time in opposition, its lack of 
335 China Times, “The 10th ROC Presidential Election”, 19 March 2000, p.8.
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administration experience, and minority in the legislature led them into ineffective
policy making and Pan–Blue Coalition obstructionism.336
The third (1994) and fourth (1997) phases of constitution revision caused a
deadlock between a minority president and a majority assembly, without clear
legislative checks on the president, especialy the confirmation on the premier’s 
nomination.337 During the confrontation, according to major political theories, the
only way to break the deadlock was for the president to respect the majority in the
Legislative Yuan and nominate a member of majority party as premier. Similar to the
French cohabitation system, there would be a temporary expedient division of labour
between president and premier if they were both able to respect each other’s range of 
powers (the president is responsible for diplomacy and national defense; the premier
is responsible for domestic affairs and economy) before the next election was held
and a stable majority was produced. Unfortunately, the scenario was proved to be a
failure in Taiwan’s case in that President Chen only adopted this method once in the 
initial three months (105 days) of his first tenure: Chen proclaimed he would be the
“president of al the people”, nominated the former defense minister Tang Fei who
was also a senior KMT member, and thought would be acceptable to Pan–Blue
legislators even though Tang did not actually have recognition from KMT
high-ranking leaders. In the controversies surrounding the construction of a fourth
nuclear power plant, even though president Chen personally supported Premier Tang,
the DPP major factions had entirely different perspectives to Premier Tang and forced
Chen to implement his presidential prerogative, causing Tang to resign the
336 Sheley Rigger (2005), “The Unfinished Business of Taiwan’s Democratization” in Nancy 
Bernkopf Tucker (2005) (ed.), Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan–China Crisis, New York:
Columbia University Press, p. 17.
337 Ibid., p. 30.
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premiership.338 After Tang’s premiership, from his replacement, Chang Chun-hsiung
to the final premier, Xie Chang-ting in 2007 (he was also the DPP presidential
candidate in 2008), there were seven premiers in the eight-year DPP administration.
The short premierships caused unstable central policy making and exacerbated the
weakness of the DPP minority government. Meanwhile, during Chen’s tenure, the 
DPP government had no way to overcome Pan–Blue Coalition obstructionism. The
Pan-Blue Coalition including the KMT and the People First Party (PFP) constantly
dominated the Legislative Yuan and enjoyed majority seats. In the 2001 legislative
election, the KMT and PFP took 114 seats (68 + 46), 50.6 per cent, the DPP took 70
seats, 31.1 per cent. In 2004, even though Chen won the presidency and central
government, the KMT and PFP took 113 seats (79+34), 50.2 per cent, the DPP took
89 seats, 35.1 per cent,339 and in January 2008, the KMT took an incredible 81
seats340 and the DPP only 27 seats, the asymmetric electoral results signaled the
coming of failure and end of the DPP administration.
Meanwhile, President Chen’s personality and the DPP’s inexperience had 
worsened the inefficient and inconsistent policy making mentioned above. Like
President Chen, the DPP never thought they could win the 2000 presidential election
and were not able to change their role of opposition to a competent government in
time. The previously active and liberal opposition party with more plural discussion,
autonomous factions, and creative ideas compared with the bureaucratic KMT was
338 China Times, 13 October 2000, A1.
339 The 6th ROC Legislators Election Results, United Evening News, 2 December 2 2001 A4; The 6th
ROC Legislators Election Results, China Times, December 12, 2004, A10 ; The 7th ROC
Legislators Election Results, United Daily News, 14 January 2008, A4.
340 Before the election, the People First Party (PFP), the other major party in the Pan–Blue group,
proclaimed there would be ten candidates joining the election in the name of the KMT, and that
the PFP would merge with the KMT after the 2008 legislative election, China Times, 14
November 2007.
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now becoming a weak new government who lacked governmental experience, had a
shortage of technocrats, and experienced continued ideological disputes between
various DPP factions. Moreover, Chen’s background and personal style also made 
him a very controversial candidate to be the ROC’s highest leader. Chen grew up in an 
impoverished tenant farming village in southern Taiwan. From National Tainan First
Senior High School to National Taiwan University, he was always top of the class
academicaly and became Taiwan’s youngest lawyer before the completion of his 
junior year with the highest score. When he entered into the politics, from attorney for
the defendant of the Kaohsiung Incident to legislator and Taipei mayor, Chen always
played an active role of an opposition lawyer who was used to challenging authority
and representing the minority to demand greater political reforms. To be a public
representative, his flexibility and adaptability along with his lawyerly style helped
him to be an eloquent and attractive spokesman for the people. His hard working
experience in his early youth helped him to enjoy the reputation of a real “Son of 
Taiwan” and to win the support of the younger generation and the population of the
southern region of Taiwan. Nevertheless, when he became the president, Chen
suddenly afforded people the impression that he was a proactive, changeable, and
unaccountable leader who was neither a neutral arbitrator to solve the serious internal
Blue–Green conflicts, nor a wise helmsman to lead Taiwan to stability in the Sino-US
Confrontation. Chen’s preference for working with opportunistic politicians and 
young people was also criticized as the major source of his inconsistent and rough
policy making with no respect for regulations and institutions. For Taiwan’s 
democratic development, Chen and the DPP actually did make a contribution to
overthrowing the long time KMT authoritarian control. However, for long term
democratic consolidation, a mature democracy requires more institutional
establishments and the removal of unreasonable or unpractical rules. To make matters
171
worse, Chen’s manipulation of the election and coruption inside his family’s inner 
circle, especially in the latter years of his second tenure, proved that this job was
impossible during his tenure and Chen’s administration obviously lacked respect for 
democratic values, let alone establishing institutions.
6.2.2 Defensive referendum and legislators’ electoral reform
The Pan-Blue Coalition obstructionism stimulated Bian’s administration to think 
about how to bypass elected officials and reduce legislative influence. Promoting
referendum and legislative reform were considered by the DPP government as the
best way to achieve these goals but had caused controversies about whether the use of
a referendum was good for a DPP minority government to put policy prudence aside
in order to gain a short term political cleavage.341 In general, in democratic countries
referendums are limited to domestic public issues and have a more modest goal: using
popular votes to pressure elected officials into passing legislation mirroring a
referendum question; but during Taiwan 2000, the holding of a referendum might
have caused a suspicion that the DPP government wanted to make use of the
referendum to ratify a new constitution –an overt statement of independence which
would be troubling to both Washington and Beijing but domestically very helpful for
the DPP to consolidate Chen’s core supporters and mobilize undecided voters for the 
presidential elections.342 Moreover, since the DPP loudly preached the concept of a
referendum which would be the first time the people of Taiwan directly determined
their fate in certain issues, the promotion of the referendum enjoyed high support and
341 Ibid., Shelly Rigger (2005), p. 20.
342 Yi-hua Jiang, “Monocracy? Constitutional development is thwarted by disputable referendum”, 
China Times, 20 February 2004, A15.
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gained unprecedented momentum in the summer of 2003.343 KMT legislators did not
want a referendum bill at all, but were under pressure from their constituents to
support some kind of referendum measure (they should have preferred the DPP’s 
caucus version, as it more closely reflected their own caution in dealing with the
PRC).344 Each camp was more interested in gaining a political advantage than in
advancing public policy goals.345 The Pan-Blue alliance seemed to have stopped the
referendum juggernaut in November 2003 when they passed legislation to enable
national referendums, but under conditions that were impossible for Chen to meet in
time for a March 2004 vote.346 Nevertheless, the Chen administration skilfully made
a new law to allow the referendum to skip time-consuming procedure: a “defensive 
referendum” that could be immediately held in the event that Taiwan’s sovereignty 
was threatened; Chen declared that the precondition had been met when PRC missile
deployments targeting Taiwan constituted a threat to sovereignty and he announced
that he would proceed with plans for such a vote on 20 March 2004, presidential
election day.347 The newly passed Referendum Law stipulated a narrow range of
topics for a defensive referendum, and in the end the two questions put before the
voters proved anodyne. Responding to a Pan-Blue call to boycott the referendum,
many voters declined to ask for ballots, so that the tally failed to reach the level of 50
343 Yung-ming Hsu (2004), “Referendums and Representative Democracy, A Case Study of Taiwan”, 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, No. 2 (June 2004), p. 17.
344 Zhi-wei Chen (2004), “320 Public Referendum and Analysis of Taiwan Political Development”, 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, No. 2 (June 2004), p. 48.
345 Ibid., Shelly Rigger (2005), p. 20.
346 China Times, 28 November 2003, A1.
347 According to Article 17 of the Referendum Law, the president may place national security matters
before the public in a referendum when the nation is exposed to an external threat. The measure is
known as a defensive referendum. A defensive referendum is a presidential prerogative and does
not require the consent of the legislature but only ratification by the Executive Yuan. Trong-rong
Chai, Take Care of Taiwan, Taipei: FTV Culture Publisher s (April 2010), p. 61.
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per cent participation by eligible voters, as required in the Referendum Law.348 But
although Chen had insisted that succeeding in the referendum was more important to
him than his re-election, the failed referendum actually represented a significant
victory for Chen: he had not only forced the Pan-Blues to drop their position to
referendums in general but had also skilfuly mobilized the DPP’s core supporters and 
won the sympathy from independent voters. When the general voters saw the two
questions: “Do you agree with strengthening defence and entering into talks with
China based on equality?”, and “Under the precondition of ensuring Taiwan’s 
sovereignty, dignity and security, do you agree the government should immediately
initiate a task force to promote a peace and stability framework for Cross-Strait
relations”349 the relative works had already started. However, on the other side, to the
DPP core supporters or independent voters, the questions aroused in them an
anti-China sentiment which at the same time stimulated their preference to vote for
the DPP candidates.350
To promote legislators electoral reform became the DPP government’s second 
strategy against Pan-Blue Coalition obstructionism. The DPP government’s major 
appeal was to reduce the size of legislatures by half which would help the Legislative
Yuan to run more efficiently and improve the quality of staff.351 The DPP government
also advocated reforming the electoral system to replace the SNTV system with a
German-style two-vote system, lengthening the legislative terms from three years to
348 China Times, “Two Referendum Results”, 21 March 2004, A11.  
349 Patrick Goodenough (2004), “Taiwan Referendum Plan Takes Shape”, Crosswalk, 2 February 2004,
http://www.crosswalk.com/1244268/.
350 Xian-long Zhu (2007), The Political Situation of Taiwan after DPP in Power, Macau: Macao
Polytechnic Institute, (April 2007), p. 108.
351 Tie-zhi Chang, “Reduce Half!, Not the Aim of Congressional Revolution”, China News, 27
February 2004, A15.
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four, (synchronizing presidential and legislative elections, so that the two branches
could be brought to account in a single election and the likelihood of a divided
government would be reduced), abolishing completely the national assembly, an ad
hoc body charged with debating constitutional revisions. 352 The reforms the DPP
proposed quickly became popular because the long existing problems of the poor
quality of legislators’ performance had angered the people and so provided the reform 
with both momentum and public support.353 The elections driven by personality and
clientelism contributed to the overall poor quality of legislators (especially the
extremists). Under the SNTV system, there is typically more competition than just
one candidate in each district, also each candidate can be elected with fewer votes.
Vote buying thus become easier and candidates have more incentives to cultivate the
“personal vote” which strengthens intra-party conflicts and weakens party discipline.
Politicians are more concerned with their own constituencies and personal career
development rather than the demands of party leadership. Therefore, the DPP’s 
proposal made little concrete progress toward implementing the reform because the
biggest obstacles to legislative reform were the legislatures themselves.354 It was
impossible for major Pan-Blue legislators to do something that would deprive them of
their power and interests, even though so many of them had pledged to carry out the
reforms in 2001. However, ironically, when the DPP was appealing to the public to
demonize the Legislative Yuan, many legislators with negative images also included
the DPP’s own politicians. The situation had actualy weakened its own powers to 
persuade the public to support this electrical reform.
352 Legislative Yuan Communiqué, Constitutional Reform, Vol. 93, No. 36 (2004), pp. 73–112.
353 Shiang–yuan Sheng and Shih-hao Huwang (2006), “Why Does the Taiwanese Public Hate the 
Legislative Yuan?”, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2006).
354 Zhong–hua Gu, “It is the Time for Congress Revolution”, China Times, 27 February 2003, p. 15.
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6.2.3 Inconsistent mainland policy and invalid provocative diplomacy
The DPP’s long term policy was to build an independent sovereign Taiwan; 
however, when Chen went to office in 2000, he did not declare independence but
rather proclaimed a passive Cross-Straitpolicy, known as the so caled “four no’s, one 
have-not”: as long as China did not hold the intention of using military force against 
Taiwan, he would not declare independence, change the national title, put the
inclusion of the so caled “state-to-state” description in the constitution, promote a 
referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or
unification, and there was no question of abolishing the Guidelines and Councils for
National Unification. 355 Nevertheless, while re-examining Chen’s speech and actions 
in the following eight years, it can be found that Chen did not follow this policy
coherently but occasionally expressed contrary statements or ambiguous
interpretations which were surprising and confusing to the public, especially in his
second term. On 3 August 2002, Chen emphasized that the nature of Cross-Strait
relations was “each country on each side”, but this explanation was a description of 
the status quo, not a change from the status quo.356 In November 2003, Chen declared
a “defensive referendum” would be held on the coming presidential Election Day (20
March 2004), but it would be not be relevant to the sovereignty issue. The aim of this
referendum was to consolidate and test people’s support forstrengthening national
defence and Cross-Strait negotiations. In his second term inaugural speech on 20 May
2004, Chen Shui-bian mentioned a new version of the Taiwan Constitution would be
355 Mainland Affairs Council (ROC), “President Chen’s 520 Inaugural Speech: Taiwan Stands up: 
Advancing to an Uplifting Era”, htp: /www.mac.gov.tw/ English/ macpolicy/cb0520e.htm, 
accessed 7 May 2009.
356 Liberty Times, “President: Taiwan Cross Strait, Each Country on Each Side ”, August 2002
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introduced to the people of Taiwan, but that the issues related to national sovereignty,
territory and the subject of unification and independence should be excluded from the
present consistorial re-engineering project.357 In 2006’s Chinese New Year speech, 
Chen proclaimed that he was considering the abolishment of the Guidelines and
Councils for National Unification 358 and applying for full membership of the UN
(United Nations) under the name “Taiwan”. About two weeks later, on 27 February 
2006, Chen officially proclaimed that the National Unification Council (NUC) and the
Guidelines for National Unification (NUG) would cease to function. This decision
was based on the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, the need for the
Taiwan’s government to safeguard the important principles of upholding democracy 
and maintaining the status quo, and major consideration of China’s continuous 
intentions to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait by non-peaceful
means such as military intimidation and passage of its anti-secession law.359
On 19 July 2007, Taiwan submitted a membership application to the United
Nations for the first time under the name of Taiwan but was rejected by the UN
Secretariat again, based on Resolution 2758, which was adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 1971 recognizing the representatives of the People’s Republic of China 
government as “the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations”
and expelling representatives of the Republic of China on Taiwan.360 In fact, during
Chen’s tenure, he was trying to use diferent ways to push Taiwan’s international 
357 Office of the President (ROC), “President Chen’s 520 Inaugural Address: Paving the Way for a 
Sustainable Taiwan”, 20 May 2004.
358 Liberty Times, 27 February 2006, A1.
359 Mainland Affairs Council (ROC), “Position Paper on the National Unification Council Ceasing to 
Function and the Guidelines for National Unification Ceasing to Apply”, 
www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/4-oa/20060301/2006030101.html, accessed 1 March 2006.
360 United Daily News, 20 September 2007, A4.
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recognition forward including economic aid and official visits to diplomatic allies, but
unfortunately, Taiwan experienced a loss of money and humiliation rather than
recognition and respect; diplomatic funds were embezzled by the “brokers” and 
stopovers in the United States for brief periods before continuing on to other countries
became more limited.361 To make it worse, the number of countries with diplomatic
relations with Taiwan was reduced from 31 to 23; eight countries were lost in Chen’s 
tenure.362
Chen actually provided people the impression that he said one thing but meant
another. In one way, his inconsistence could be sympathized as a typical impotent
reaction to Taiwan’s weak position in the closer Sino-US rapprochement. Some
people supported this idea and believed that occasionally provocative rhetoric and
actions were necessary as the only way for Taiwan to articulate the existence of its
sovereignty to the international community. However, the series of changed policies
was often criticized as a tactical manipulation for short term political leverage which
was advantageous for Chen to keep his ideological commitment to Taiwan’s 
independence while placating his core supporters. The strategies later caused greater
political controversy and confrontation inside the island increased and even angered
361 Taiwan's leaders have in general been granted permission to stopover in the United States for brief
periods before continuing on to other countries. In 1995, Lee Teng-hui was granted a visit to
Cornell University. However in 2006, after eleven years, on 3 May 3 2006, while Chen pass
through the United States on his way to Latin America, he was hoping to stop by either San
Francisco or New York City to refuel and stay overnight, but the US refused his request instead
limiting him to a brief refueling stopover in Anchorage, Alaska where Chen would not be allowed
to step off the plane. Chen and Taiwan saw this as a snub and led to Chen's cancellation.
362 Taiwan News, “ Taiwan sever diplomatic ties diplomatic ties with Malawi －MOEA accuses
Beijing of using bribery, threats to lure alies away ”, 1 January 2008, p.1. 
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=586629
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Table 6.2: Chen’s “four no’s, one have-not” and the later inconsistent mainland policy
  Source: Author’s compilation 
the external policy makers in Beijing and Washington, which might have provoked a
war despite it was not the intention of either side. In fact, as mentioned in the previous
section, after the 1995–1996 Cross Strait crisis, Washington had started to eliminate
Chen’s “four no’s, one have-not” The later contrary or ambiguous policies
1 Taiwan would not declare
independence
3 August 2002 Chen emphasized the nature of
cross strait relations was “each country on 
each side”
2 Taiwan would not change the
national title
19 July 2007 Taiwan submitted a membership
application to the United Nations
3 Taiwan would not push forth the
inclusion of the so called
“state-to-state” description in the 
constitution
20 May 2004 a new version of the Taiwan
Constitutions would be introduced to the
people of Taiwan
4 Taiwan would not promote a
referendum to change the status
quo
November 2003 the “defensive referendum” 
would be held
5 There was no question of
abolishing the Guidelines and
Councils for National Unification.
27 February 2006 Chen officially proclaimed
that the National Unification Council (NUC)
would cease to function and that the
Guidelines for National Unification (NUG)
would cease to apply.
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strategy ambiguity and left litle space for Taipei’s manipulation of US 
support.363Washington’s concerns were: keeping the stabilityof the Taiwan Strait;
constant benefits from arms sales for the Taiwan government; and opposing any
unilateral change of cross strait status. Therefore, any provocative or radical rhetoric
or actions from either side of the straits was to be suppressed by Washington; the
White House anticipated more efficient talks and negotiations between the two
sides.364
For China, Beijing learned lessons from previous experience that any
intervention in Taiwan’s major elections could have a counter-productive effect. The
best strategy for Beijing was to utilize the United States to suppress Taiwan while
China and the United States gradually gained common interest.365 In Beijing’s mind, 
the Taiwan issue would not delay or undermine China’s long- term policy goal –the
progress of China’s economic development unless the cross strait relations became 
unstable . As long as China persisted with a certain degree of PLA military threats on
Taiwan, Beijing could make use of this US political leverage to suppress any
Taiwanese independence movement.366 On 10 December 2003, when US president
George W. Bush met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, he publicly criticized
Taiwan’s advocacy of peaceful referendum, clearly opposing the proposal and 
defining the action as being with intent to unilaterally change the status quo.367 In
363 Ibid., Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (2005), p. 199.
364 Ibid., p. 200.
365 Chen-yuan Tung (2005), “Cross- Strait Relations After Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election: A New 
Era of Constructive Interaction or Spiral Conflicts”, American Journal of Chinese Studies, June
2005, p. 515.
366 Yun-han Chu and Andrew J. Nathan (2007), “Seizing the Opportunity for Changes in the Taiwan 
Strait”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, (Winter 2007–2008), p. 78.
367 United Daily News, 10 December 2003, A2.
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early February 2004, about one month before the presidential election, Beijing urged
Washington to intervene more decisively to prevent Taiwan from holding the peace
referendum on 20 March 2004.368 In 2005, the PRC National People’s Congress 
passed the Anti-Secession Law, which threatened the use of “non-peaceful means” in 
the event that Taiwan seceded from China. 369 To make this threat credible even in the
face of potential US intervention, Beijing also reiterated several times that China
would pay any price to deal with the Taiwan issue Even if it meant not hosting the
2008 Olympic Games.370
While political relations were still in deadlock, Cross-Strait economic
interaction continued at a rapid pace in Chen’s term, China had been Taiwan’s largest 
export market since 2002 and largest trade partner since 2003. 371 The economic
issues, including reducing the restriction of Taiwan’s investment to China, alowing 
China’s investment in Taiwan, three direct links (direct trade, postal, and
transportation links), the protection of rights and interests of Taishang, had all forced
the DPP government to modify various regulations and seek for more effective
negotiation with China.372 In the 2001 New Year’s speech, Chen’s administration 
discarded the long held “no haste, be patient” policy and adopted a new policy of 
368 Joseph Kahn, “Beijing Urges Bush to Act to Forestal Taiwan Vote”, New York Times, 6 February
2004, A3.
369 The Anti-Secession Law formalized the long-standing policy of the People's Republic of China to
use "non-peaceful means" against the "Taiwan independence movement" in the event of a
declaration of Taiwan independence. The Law is composed of ten articles. Articles one to five are
basic guidelines. Articles six to nine set out in general terms the procedures for promoting
cross-strait relations, negotiation, and resolution of the issue. Article ten sets the date of operation.
370 Xian-long Zhu, Cross Strait Relations after Chen Shui-bian in Power, Macau: Macao Polytechnic
Institute, Publishers (March, 2006), p. 100.
371 Ibid., Chen-yuan Tung (2005), p. 507.
372 Ibid., Yun-han Chu and Andrew J. Nathan (2007), p. 82.
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“active openness and efective management” to relax its regulation on cross strait 
investment. 373 Taiwan’s investors were alowed to invest in China’s high-tech
industry and investment projects over US$20 million were to be reviewed and would
be rejected and prohibited if the project was in excess of US$50 million. In the 2006
New Year’s speech, Chen announced that the policy of “active openness and efective 
management” would be changed to “active management and efective openness” 
which was very confusing because it was very difficult to distinguish how this
difered from 2003’s policy.374 Among several issues about how expand cross strait
economic interaction, the direct link had become the major issue of the negotiation.
Since the second half of 2003, Taiwan had indicated increased commitment to the
negotiation of direct transportation links. On 31 March 2004 (interview with Wall
Street Journal), 10 October 2004 (ROC National Day address), and 10 November
2004 (National Security Meeting statement), Chen reiterated Taiwan’s wilingness to 
promote three direct links (trade, transportation, and postal services) and pledged to
resume direct links with China by the end of 2004.375 In fact, Beijing’s atitude to 
negotiations of three direct links was considered more flexible and to send signs of
conciliation. On 17 December 2003, Beijing issued a policy paper on promoting direct
links between Taiwan and China, and in March 2004’s National People’s Congress 
Beijing stressed that no mater who won Taiwan’s election and wanted to negotiate 
with China over direct links, Beijing would cooperate and push for three direct links
across the Taiwan Strait. After Chen was re-elected as Taiwan’s president in May
373 Commercial Times, 1 January 2001, p. 1–2.
374 United Daily News, 2 January, A1–2.
375 Jason Dean, “Taiwan’s Chen Touts Peace, Bigger US Role in Region”, Wall Street Journal, 1 April
2004, A12; “President Chen’s Address to the National Day Raly”, Ofice of the President(ROC),
10 October 2004; “President Chen Presides over a High-level National Security Meeting”, Ofice of 
the President (ROC), 10 November 2004.
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2004, Beijing express its hope that both sides should not politicize the result and
should continue promoting economic exchange, despite the fact that President Chen
did not recognize the One-China principle.376 In fact, in early January 2003, both
sides across Taiwan Strait reached an agreement and implemented passenger chartered
flights during the lunar New Year holidays.377
6.2.4 Corruption and the decline of the DPP
While people were still in confusion and shock from the 3-19 shooting accident
which was widely believed to be a set-up to help Chen win the re-election campaign
in 2004 through earning sympathy votes,378 the outbreak of a series of scandals in the
middle of 2006 –centred on the Chen Shui-bian family and the president’s ofice, 
including his wife, son-in-law and inner circle–had a destructive impact on the DPP
administration and its possible loss in the coming 2008 presidential election. Chao
Chien-ming, Chen’s son in law, was taken into custody by the Taipei police on 
charges of insider trading and embezzlement. Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen, was also
accused of pocketing special government funds including confidential expenses on
president and foreign affairs, illegal trading in stocks and taking bribes from large
private banks and enterprises. Some high ranking government officials in the
presidential office were also accused of being collaborators and laundering the illegal
376 Ibid., Chen-yuan Tung (2005), pp. 519–520.
377 United Daily News, 27 January 2003, p. 2.
378 Chen was shot in the stomach while campaigning in the city of Tainan on Friday, 19 March 2004,
the day before polls opened. The following day, Chen narrowly won the election with a margin of
less than 30,000 votes out of 12.9 million votes counted. The Pan-Blue candidate Lien Chan
refused to concede and sued both for a recount and for a nullification of the outcome while
supporters held a week-long riot led by the Pan-Blues in front of the presidential office in Taipei
due to alleged election irregularities throughout the island.
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income. The series of scandals not only drasticaly damaged the DPP government’s 
public support but also stimulated an unprecedented street social movement under the
name of the “anti-coruption and depose Bian campaign” in September 2006 after a 
recall motion to remove Chen from power via a public referendum failed in the
Legislative Yuan.379 On 9 September, tens of thousands of people wearing red (the
volunteer demonstrators were therefore known as the “Red Army”) demonstrated in 
the streets of Taiwan. According to organizers, around 200,000 to 300,000 people
joined the protest outside the presidential offices.380 In fact, since late 2005, the DPP
government had begun to be influenced by this series of scandals and suffered a
significant electoral setback, especially in the 2005 county mayor election. The DPP
kept only eight seats in southern Taiwan, including the Kaohsiung City Mayor
election in December 2006.381 In early 2008, the DPP won less than 25 per cent of the
379 Of 221 lawmakers in the Legislature, all 119 Pan-Blue and independent legislators voted in favour
of the measure, 29 votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to pass the motion. Pan-Green
legislators from the president's own party, the DPP, refused to receive ballots. Pan-Green legislators
from the allied TSU cast abstaining ballots. No legislator voted against the recall motion. China
Times, 28 June 2006, A2.
380 The "Million Voices against Corruption" campaign began in August of 2006 when former DPP
chairman and long-term democracy and independence activist Shih Ming-te announced that he
would launch a protest campaign to force the president to resign. During questioning at the
presidential office on the afternoon of 7 August 2006, the president detailed to the prosecutor how
he spent the fund and presented relevant receipts and bank remittance statements. On the same day,
Shih Ming-te wrote a letter to Chen urging him to resign from office and to admit wrongdoing so as
to "set a good example for the Taiwanese people". The proposal was rejected. On 8 August Shih
announced his intention to open a bank account and collect NT$100 from supporters, which would
be used to fund a protest in Taipei aimed at ousting the president. On 14 August 2006, Shih and his
allies began the fundraising event, raising NT$9,340,000 on the first day. On 24 August 2006, all
donation accounts were closed, and the next day Shih announced that the fundraising campaign had
raised NT$111,211,563 –well over the original amount. On 9 September 2006, the demonstration
began as a gathering in front of the presidential office. China Post, “Anti-corruption, depose-Chen
Totem to Emerge in Taipei”, 5 September 2006.  
381 The Pan-Blue coalition captured 16 of 23 county and city government offices under the leadership
184
seats in the new Legislative Yuan382 and lost its power finally in the presidential
election in March.
Conclusion
After the discussions and historical research of Chapters 5 and 6, several
characteristics and paterns of Taiwan’s democratic development have been found, 
and these findings are useful evidence to support the three major hypotheses written
in Chapter 2.
Table 6.3 shows a more systematic conclusion of this chapter including the
political ideas (including democratic values) of these four presidents , the effects on
democratic institutions design and building (the first and second row of Table 6.3),
and dynamic change of internal social economic structure and external political
economic environment - especially the growing influence from China instead of US.
(the third and fourth row of Table 6.3). It is obvious that the determination of insisting
on the One China Principle (Chiang Kai-shek was only concerned with mainland
recovery; Chiang Ching-kuo pragmatically improved ethnical tensions between
mainlanders and local Taiwanese) was strong and efective under the two Chiang’s 
authoritarian control (due to the successful economic growth) even when Taiwan
faced international isolation (expulsion from UN) and foreign setbacks (the
establishment of US–PRC relations). The idea of the One China Principle gradually
became weak and lost popular support as the strong Taiwan consciousness grew
of popular Taipei mayor and KMT Party Chairman Ma Ying-jeou; China Times, 5 December 2005,
A5.
382 Ibid., The 7th ROC Legislators Election Results , United Daily News, 14 January 2008, A4.
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Table 6.3: The Typology of Taiwan Democratic History
Source: Author’s own compilation
rapidly when the two Taiwanese presidents Lee and Chen stepped into power after the
1990s. The change also explains and supports Hypothesis 1 mentioned in Chapter 2
Chiang Kai-shek Chiang Ching-kuo Lee Teng-hui Chen Shui-bian
Time 1949–1975
(26 years)
1976–1988
(12 years)
1988–2000
(12 years)
2000–2008
(8 years)
Political
ideas
Mainland recovery Improving ethnical
tensions between
mainlanders and
local Taiwanese
Father of Taiwan and
Mr. Democracy
Son of Taiwan
Democratic
institutions
Dictatorship and
authoritarian
control with limited
local elections
Taiwanization
policy and tolerance
on opposition
Five phases of
constitutional
revision
Defensive
referendum and
reducing legislators
by half
Economy
and society
Economic
recovery ,US Aid
and Import
Substitution
Industrial upgrading
and liberalization
Deeping Cross Strait
economic linkage
and “Go Slow, Be 
Patient Policy”
Direct link and
North–South
cleavage
Sino-US-
Taiwan
relations
The Cold War and
expulsion from the
UN
The establishment
of US–PRC
relations
The Koo–Wang
meeting and
1995–1996 Taiwan
Strait Crisis
Inconsistent
mainland policy
and provocative
diplomacy
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that the function of democracy in Taiwan had changed from being the difference
between the democratic ROC and communist CCP to being the justification for
Taiwan’s independence. The strong Taiwanese consciousness of Presidents Lee and 
Chen (Lee Teng-hui consider himself as Father of Taiwan and Chen Shui-bian treated
himself as Son of Formosa) and their appeal to greater political autonomy, and even
independence for the island, were very helpful for them to obtain domestic public
support and implement their political ideas. However, the research of this chapter
concluded that .their decision making was another kind of rushed, hasty, ideological
manipulation rather than a rational calculation, which caused a blind or inappropriate
institutional transplant from other leading countries (Hypothesis 2) when people of
the island were still confused about the difference between the parliamentary and the
presidential system, the suitable numbers of the legislative body, and the effects of
SNTV and the dual balot electoral system. Of course, in the general public’s view, the 
idea of a defensive referendum as raised by President Chen was certainly not an
important direct democratic mechanism, but rather a new term which took time to
understand.
Moreover, the growing Taiwanese consciousness mentioned above was not only
harmful to rational decision making and reasonable institutional design, it also
produced side efects such that the direction of Taiwan’s democratic development was 
gradually distinguished from CCP China and a reject of further political integration
with the mainland, as argued in Hypothesis 1. It goes without saying that Chiang
Ching-kuo’s decision to abolish authoritarian control in his final years and give his 
power to the first local Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-hui, was actually a milestone in
Taiwan’s democratic development, however, as discussed in Chapter 6.1, Lee’sstrong
patriotic sentiment toward Taiwan in some aspects also negatively impacted the
island’s balance of Sino-US confrontation externally (Table 6.3, row 4). The changed
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process of the political system from large, cumbersome and overlapping central
government with the National Assembly, Provincial government and large Legislative
Yuan were actually removed or reduced to the simplified and more efficient central
executives and representatives through a series of constitutional reforms that were
advantageous to the island’s future development; but these changes were also likely to 
cause a controversy as to whether the process of seeking a modern and effective
democratic government on the other side equaled abandoning the “One China
principle” and going to the island’s independence. Therefore, when Chen Shui-bian
went to ofice in 2000, the DPP’s weakness in the Sino-US intentionally blockade and
institutional difficulties of minority government could be considered as the price of
Lee’s manipulation on political reforms and a provocative mainland policy which was 
impractical and beyond Taiwan’s depth. Chen Shui-bian could not but adopt a
cosmetic provocative mainland policy and appeal for the ineffective public
referendum, the direct democratic method to bypass Pan-Blue Coalition
obstructionism in the legislative bodies. Finally, he made little contribution to the
democratic institutions: the notorious legislators were reduced by half but still
produced by the unfair single-member district dual ballot system.
Finaly, in a political economic analysis (Table 6.3, row 3), China’s growing 
economic power and the decline of US political influence might be the most serious
issues for future Taiwanese democratic development, and how to evaluate a proper
degree of cross economic interaction had become the most important lesson that any
future ROC political leader must face and deal with . After the huge mainland Chinese
awakening as they started to enter the international division of labour at the bottom
end of the economic product life cycle, along with the international isolation
suppressed by Beijing government, Taiwan gradually started to lose its share of global
economic advantages which was the fruit of the island’s rapid economic recovery 
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after World War II –successful industrial upgrading and integration into global
market during the two Chiang’s authoritarian control period, which were also actualy 
the key factors for Taiwan to keep its political autonomy. Moreover, as predicted in
Hypothesis 3 of this research, deeper integration with the Chinese mainland market
will also worsen the island’s economic inequality, especialy after the rapid 
cross-strait economic interaction since 1990, and even produced extremist politics in
the island’s North and South cleavage which worsened in President Chen’s tenure. 
The argument needs to be further investigated in the following two chapters.
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Chapter 7 Democratic development and Cross Strait Relations after
the KMT’s return to power in 2008   
Introduction
Ma Ying-jeou’s landslide victory in the 2008 ROC presidential election helped 
the KMT to return to the governing role it had played for more than five decades prior
to being replaced by the Democratic Progressive Party in 2000. Ma garnered more
than 7.6 million votes, or 58.45 per cent, defeating DPP rival candidate Frank Hsieh,
who won more than 5.4 million votes, or 41.55 per cent.383 Ma had unprecedented
public support, almost 5 percent more than that of President Lee Teng-hui in his
victory in 1996 (54 per cent) and 1.5 per cent more than the other influential
mainlander politician, provincial governor Soong Chu-yu in his victory in 1994. The
election result demonstrated the following three significant changes of Taiwan
democratic development. First, it seemed that the ethnic problems (between
mainlanders and local Taiwanese) was not significantly influential in the major
election since Ma was not local Taiwanese –born in Hong Kong –and his family
were typical immigrates in 1949. Second, along with a more than two-thirds majority
in the Legislative Yuan, the victory was also a clear and strong mandate for Ma to be a
“President of al people” and for the KMT government to push policies to improve
stagnated Cross-Strait relations and bolsters an economy. Finally, some researchers
point out there is some similarity between South Korea and Taiwan in 2008 in that
people in both countries preferred political stability rather than the chaos caused by
democratic struggling. Like Taiwan, the new government of South Korea also faced
383 Taipei Times, “Decisive Victory for Ma Ying–jeou”, 23 March 2008, A1.
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/03/23/2003406711.
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high pressure from public expectation to cope with the threat from North Korea and
bolster an economy that had lagged behind some of its Asian peers.384
After the success in the presidential election, the new administration started
work to fulfill Ma’s campaign pledge to improve relations with China and reconstruct 
the island’s economy. According to Ma Ying- jeou’s plan, the basic idea to improve 
Cross-Strait relations was stop competition with Beijing in the international arena but
seek more space on both-sides negotiations. There were three strategies designed and
it was expected to resume dialogue and talks.385 The first step was a Cross-Strait
"truce" in the diplomatic arena: to end the tug-of-war with China over each other’s 
allies and carve a greater international presence for Taiwan. The second step was
liberalizing Cross-Strait economic restrictions for more economic interactions and
greater cooperation. The third step concerned the establishment of a Cross-Strait
peace accord, a mechanism set up for mutual military trust, or the signing of a peace
agreement between China and Taiwan. Even though this policy could be thought of as
sacrificing Taiwan’s sovereignty, President Ma Ying-jeou still claimed that this plan
could be achieved during his tenure as president,386 and the basic principles of
maintaining Cross-Strait peace were "no reunification, no independence and no war"
laid out in his inaugural address.387 How to reconstruct the island’s economy, the 
external normalization of cross economic relations and the increase of internal
384 Zeng- jia Tsai, “When there is also One Party Dominance in South Korea”, China Times, 10 April
2008, A19.
385 China Times, “Ma: Constitutional Amendment for Signing the Cross Strait Peace Agreement in his 
Term”, 19 October 2008, http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/081019/4/17vx4.html.
386 Taipei Times, “Ma Hopes a Peace Deal while he is in Ofice”, 19 October 2008,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/19/2003426312.
387 Sina News, “ Inaugural Speech: Ma Ying-jeou Emphasized the Principle of Three No’s and 
Appealed for Further Cross-Strait Negotiations”,20 May 2008,
http://news.sina.com/int/sinchewdaily/105-103-102-101/2008-05-20/02332912835.html
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government expenditure to stimulate domestic consumption are basic ideas by which
to accelerate economic growth. Government expenditure plans included several
packages of proposals, named with slogans consisting of easily remembered digits:
“633” policy for macroeconomic targets; “I-Taiwan 12” infrastructure projects for 
expanding  domestic demand by boosting infrastructure investment; “345” strategies
for building new industry and global competition; and “468” government subsidies 
for low income family.388 Seeking a series of efficient negotiations with China for
greater cross strait economic interaction and cooperation was viewed as a more
important and useful method by Ma’s administration to revive the island’s economy.  
As per the discussion of Susan Strange’s IPE theories in Chapter 4, in diferent 
societies, the priority of four major values (security, wealth, freedom and justice) will
be the deciding factor in various aspects –e.g. market relationships and different
orders of political economy. Obviously, the new KMT government had prioritized the
creation of wealth over security, freedom, and social justice (Figure 7.1). Taiwan and
China reopened cross-strait talks and interaction, but at the same time, revealed other
potential political and social problems, including sovereignty controversies (freedom),
the changed balance of Sino–US–Taiwan relations (security), and possible worsening
of the island’s social economic inequality (justice) which was more serious issues for
388 The “633”, “The I-Taiwan 12 Projects”,”345” and “468” are those slogan designed while Ma  
Ying-jeou was running his presidential campaign in 2008; The “633” plan was to achieve economic 
growth of 6 per cent, a jobless rate of 3 per cent and per capita GDP of $30,000. “The I-Taiwan 12
Projects” was to spend NT$4 trilion (US$130 bilion) on 12 infrastructure projects before 2016.
These projects intended to create 120,000 job opportunities every year. The “345” was to use three 
strategies, encouraging new industry, innovation and deregulation to attract the inflow of NT$4
trillion overseas savings and create 50,000 job opportunities; The “468” was the labour tax cut plan 
for those low income families who would receive NT$46,800 in government subsidies if their
annual income was under NT$360,000. For more on President Ma Ying-jeou’s economic 
development and social welfare policy, please see the KMT presidential campaign website “Go 
Ahead! Taiwan”, http://2008.ma19.net/policy4you/economy/taiwan12.
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the smaller Taiwan to face.
Figure 7.1: Taiwan’s political economy priority had changed after 2008 
DPP KMT
Security Wealth
Wealth Security
Freedom
Freedom
Justice
Justice
M M
                S    ▲                      ▲    S
S: State M: Market
Source: Author’s own compilation
This chapter will focus on these changes and discuss the possible effects on the
island’s democratic development after 2008. The author wil also try to substantiate 
his argument in the theoretical chapter that although both sides of the strait had taken
a big step forward, the rapid Cross-Strait economic interaction did not influence the
island’s democracy too much since the rules of the games had matured after the 
second party alternation. In the first section, the author wil examine Ma’s open-door
policy and the major hot issues (direct links, signing of MOU and ECFA) after four
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Chang–Chen Talks in the first two years of the KMT administration. The discussion is
significant to IPE theorists in that the dramatic change in Cross-Strait relations during
2008–2009 is a good case to test whether new forms of traffic, trade relations, and
capital flow would actually influence international politics, especially the special
status of Cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China. The second section
discusses the traditional Sino–US–Taiwan triangle issues of arms sales and Taiwan’s 
participation in international organizations: these issues have been excluded
historically from the negotiation tables but still have weight on newly built cross strait
relations. The third section examines the global economic crisis that took place at the
end of 2008. The impact of this global economic downturn was actually a heavy blow
to Ma’s administration and revealed the island’s fundamental economic weakness. In 
the final section, the relation between the performance of Ma’s administration and the 
efects of the changes covered in the previous sections wil be discussed. Ma’s 
leadership and the performance of the KMT have been questioned and might have
influenced whether it will remain in power after the 2012 presidential election.
However, the possible second party alternation seems to not be significant to the
island’s democratic development.Like the rapprochement of cross strait relations, the
impacts of possible changes are very limited and not so complex since both sides
intentionally control the pace of interaction.
7.1 Ma’s open-door policies and Cross-Strait negotiations
As the analysis in Chapter 4.2 showed, compared with the DPP’s protectionism 
policy during 2000–2008, the new KMT cabinet, led by Premier Liu Chao-shiuan,
viewed China as a co-operator more than competitor, and the Cross-Strait relation
should be a bilateral complementary and equal interdependent interaction rather than
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Taiwan’s unilateral asymmetric dependence on mainland market. Similar with vice 
president Vincent Siew’s “blood flow” theory, President Ma defined his open door 
policy as a “living water strategy” rather than the “iron cage ideology” during the 
DPP ruling period, which is attributed to be the major reason for the slow economic
development between 2000 and 2008. 389 The normalization of Cross-Strait
economic relations means that unrestricted interaction will create a new division of
labour according to the mutual comparative advantages both in the mainland and on
the island.
The new cabinet started to “open the door”to the mainland when it was
inaugurated in May 2008 to mainland including a series of deregulation and
cooperation policies which were believed to be helpful in reducing the transportation
costs and utilizing cross strait resources. Until July 2008, the KMT’s open-door policy
consisted of 15 deregulation projects in five major fields (Table 7.1), including
encouraging the FDI (including overseas Taiwanese companies and Taishang) (Field
1), losing the limitation of cross strait economic and commercial exchanges (Field 2),
facilitating mainland tourists, professionals, and talent flows (Field 3), direct links
(Field 4), and building up a cooperation mechanism for cracking down on Cross-Strait
criminals (Field 5). 390 The cabinet proclaimed that the series of policies would be
finished by the end of 2008 and there would be a further 23 deregulation and
liberalization projects implemented in 2009. An interesting economic report describes
the series of policies as the lifting of “economic martial law” but impacting on cross 
strait relations at this time.391 In fact, the series of open-door policies were mostly
389 Lei Zhu, “Victory in Economy – Review of Ma Ying Jeou’s Economic Policy”, China .Org.Cn, 4
April 2008, http://big5.china.com.cn/overseas/txt/2008-04/04/content_14277429_2.htm.
390 Economic Daily News, “The Coming of Mainland Capital, Five Filed are Liberalized,” 26 July
2008.
391 United Daily News, “The Lift of Economic Marital Law, Forty Six Cross Strait Items Liberalized at 
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achieved in the cross negotiations known as the Chen–Chiang Talks, which had been
held seven times before the end of 2011 (Table7.2).
Table 7.1: KMT Open-Door policies between 2008 and 2009 (CC Talk(s): Chiang–Chen talk(s))
No Field Items Achieved
1 Asia Pacific financial centre
2
Encourage
FDI Encourage investment
a. Return of overseas Taiwanese company
b. Widening the prohibited and limited
investment (range)
3 Taiwan stock, futures and venture companies are
allowed to invest in China
4 Widening the prohibited and limited investment
(range)
5 Chinese capital invest in Taiwan stock market
6 Chinese capital invest in Taiwan infrastructure,
service and manufacture industry (not housing
sector)
7
Cross strait
economic and
commercial
exchange
QDII
The third CC Talk
8 Simplified commercial visa application procedure
9
Mainland
professionals Widening mainland professionals’ technology 
interaction
10 Daily charter flights
11 Regular freight flights
12 Direct shipping
13 Direct postal services
14
Direct links
Expending “smal direct links” scale
The first to third CC
Talks
15 Others Joint mechanism to combat crime The second CC Talk
Source: Author’s compilation
the End of Year,” 8 August 2008, http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS5/4461973.shtml.
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Table 7.2: Cross-Strait negotiations between 2008 and 2010 (CC Talk(s): Chiang–Chen talk(s))
Source: Author’s compilation
Meeting Time and place Issues and consensus
First CC Talk 12 June 2008
Beijing
1. Regular 36 weekend cross-strait Direct charter
passenger flights
2. Daily 3,000 Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan
Second CC Talk 4 November 2008
Taipei, Taiwan
3. Regular 108 daily cross-strait direct charter
passenger flights
4. Direct maritime shipping
5. Direct mail service
6. Public food security
Third CC Talk 26 April 2009
Nanjing, China
7. Regular 270 daily cross-strait direct charter
passenger flights
8. Financial cooperation
9. Joint force to combat crime
Fourth CC Talk 22 December 2009
Taichung, Taiwan
10. Fishing crew cooperation
11. Agricultural and food quarantine inspection
12. Industrial production standards, inspection
and certification
Fifth CC Talk 29 June 2010
Chongqing, China
13. Signing of ECFA
14. Properties Rights protection
Sixth CC Talk 20 December 2010
Taichung, Taiwan
15. Sharing medical information and cooperating
in development of new drugs
Seventh CC Talk 20 October 2011
Tianjin China
16.Seal Nuclear Safety Pact
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Under the 1992 consensus basis,392 pragmatic matters –mainly concerning
economic issues including direct links and various cooperation proposals –had been
discussed on a six-monthly basis from June 2008 to December 2009.393 These new
institutionalized cross strait negotiations were expected to be more efficient for the
prevention of sovereignty disputes via the non-governmental (or semi-official)
organizations such as ARATS (Associations for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits,
headed by Chen Yun- lin) and SEF (Strait Exchange Foundation, headed by Chiang
Pin Kung, former ROC economy affairs minister). In the 16 agreements completed in
the seven rounds of CC Talks, the issues of direct links, mainland tourists, the signing
of the MOU (Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation) and ECFA were the major foci
popularly discussed in 2008–2009. As described in the introduction, the discussion
was significant to IPE theorists in that the dramatic change in cross strait relations
during 2008–2009 is a good case to test whether new forms of traffic (direct links),
trade relations (ECFA), and capital flows (MOU) can actually influence international
politics, especially the special status of cross strait relations between Taiwan and
China. The following paragraphs hold the details and analysis of these four major
issues.
392 Before the inauguration of Chiang–Chen Talks, the KMT’s highest-level leaders, including ROC
vice president elect Vincent Siew and KMT party chairman Wu Po-hsiung, had separately met
PRC president Hu Jintao in Bo'ao (April) and Beijing (May) and reached a consensus for greater
economic cooperation and mutual respect to each other’s political stance.
393 Central News Agency,“Lai Shin-Yuan: SEF and ARATS will have Regular Meeting every Half an
Year”, 24 September 2008.
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7.1.1 Direct Links and Mainland tourists
In the nine agreements signed in the first three rounds of the Chen–Chiang Talks,
five are related with direct links issues, the cross-Taiwan Strait flights were in
particular a main focus in the negotiations. The 36 weekend charter flights (confirmed
in the first CC Talk) was expanded to 108 daily charted ones (confirmed in the second
talk), and even later to 270 regular ones (confirmed in the third talk). Passenger flights
were also allowed to carry cargo, and the cross-strait carriers were able to extend their
flights to more than one city in China (Pudong and Guangzhou) and Taiwan (Taoyuan
and Kaoshiung). The right to provide connecting flights was also confirmed in the
third talk, known as the “fifth freedom of the air”, meaning that an airline could cary 
passengers from one country to another, and then on to a third country.394 In fact, in
2008 the weekly flights between Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau were estimated at
600–700, which meant there was still a significant opportunity to expand regular
cross-strait flights.395 The right of the “fifth freedom of the air” would also be 
advantageous for Taiwan’s airline companies if China agrees to Taiwan’s airplanes 
flying through broad air teritorial space, since Taiwan’s airline companies have 
enjoyed the reputation of offering better service and stronger cargo transportation. So
far, China is still considering this issue and it will become the major focus for the
trafic department of Taiwan’s government in the next rounds of Cross-Strait
negotiations.396
394 Sheley Shan, “Expansion of Air Service next on Cross-Strait Agenda,”17 March 2009, Taipei
Times, p. 3.
395 China Times, “Welcome to New Era of Cross Strait Relations after Direct Link”, 15December
2008, A13.
396 NOW news,“Wilthe Five Freedom of the Air Discussed in the 4th Talks? Transportation and
Communication Ministry will Reflect Opinions to MAC”,19 October, 2009,
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The “fifth freedom” refers to the right which allows an airline to carry revenue
traffic between foreign countries as a part of services connecting the airline's own
country. It is the right to carry passengers from one's own country to a second country
and from that country to a third country (and so on). In the previous cross strait flights,
the airlines had four freedoms of the air: to fly over a foreign country without landing
(1), to stop in one country solely for refueling or other maintenance on the way to
another country (2), to carry passengers or cargo (3), and to carry passengers or cargo
from another country to one's own (4). If Taiwan does receive the fifth freedom on the
China’s air territorial space, Taiwan’s airline companies wil become more 
competitive as the new air-routes via the Chinese mainland will be very economical
and beneficial. The best example is a flight to Europe: the airplanes do not need to
pass via Hong Kong or Bangkok which is good for time and fuel saving. In addition,
the growing numbers of passengers and cargo transportation in the Chinese mainland
undoubtedly has foreseeable economic benefits for the major airline companies; no
mater they are Taiwanese or Chinese. Moreover, it is also helpful for Taiwan’s airline 
companies to exchange the Asia–Europe air route. (i.e. Hong Kong to London) for the
Asia–America air route (i.e. Hong Kong to Los Angles).397
Direct Maritime Shipping also brings benefits for the island’s economy. After 
direct links, voyages from Taiwan to the mainland do not need to detour and are
expected to save an average of 16–27 hours which is a 15–30 per cent cost reduction.
The 1.2 billion total transportation cost can be saved annually in the total 4,000 cross
strait voyages.398 For the other industries, the direct links, especially the air flight, is
http://www.nownews.com/2009/10/19/301-2521428.htm.
397 Interview with Mr. Jia-rong Sun, the former captain of Eva Air, the biggest airline company in
Taiwan, 1 May 2009.
398 United Daily News, “After Four Agreements Signed, it only takes 82 Minutes from Taoyuan to
Shanghai”, November 4 2008, http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT2/4586503.shtml.
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also very advantageous for the shipping of high-tech and fresh agricultural products
from the island.399
However, the direct link does not influence the island’s public too much: 
passengers on the direct flights are mostly composed of Taishang and mainland
tourists.400 Meanwhile, the lower shipping transportation cost is not a strong enough
motive for the Taishang to move their investment back to the island, As an
interviewee said, people do not have strong feeling about the convenience and
economic benefits the direct link had brought as most people on the island do not
need to take cross strait flights very often.401 A similar situation happened with
respect to the arrival of mainland tourists. Although after the first Chen–Chiang Talk,
both sides achieved a consensus that there would be 3,000 mainland Chinese tourists
visiting Taiwan daily, the “slow coming” of mainland tourists in the first couples of 
months disappointed the public; the average number of daily mainland tourists before
August 2008 was only 260, which is obviously far less than the estimated numbers
according to the agreed quota of 3,000 mainland visitors made by the ROC tourism
bureau.402 The complex application procedure and strict regulations for national
security considerations made by the Taiwan government are believed to have reduced
tourists’ incentives to visit;403 similar complex regulations of the Chinese government
in order to control the “quality” and “quantity” of visitors for fear of unexpected 
399 Interview with Mr. Shou-shen Chen, the deputy manager of Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp,
which is one of major marine transportation companies in Taiwan, 12 December 2009.
400 Chou-hua Chang, “Direct Link Charted Flight, the Spring of Aviation Industry”, China Times, 5
July 2008, A19.
401 Interview with Mr. Wu Yi-long, the general manager of the travel service the Dragon Group, 16
November 2009.
402 China Post, “One in Three Unimpressed by Chinese Tourists: Survey”, 11 May 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/print/207634.htm.
403 For example, mainland tourists must travel as a group and stay in Taiwan no longer than ten days.
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events (such as some Chinese tourists making use of the opportunity of a trip to stay
longer illegally in Taiwan, or conflicts with local Taiwanese over political issues) are
also believed to have been influential to the movement of mainland tourists. For
example, the PRC government stipulated that the tourist must pay a RMB 50,000
deposit in advance; this limitation has obviously become another kind of mechanism
for classification: only rich people wil not disturb Taiwan’s society or leave bad 
images.404 Looking at the Hong Kong experience, it is predicted that it might take
Taiwanese people five to six years to get used to and develop a suitable way to
accommodate the mainland guests.405
The visiting of mainland tourists is also political. Taiwan is attractive to the
Chinese not only for its beautiful scenery406 or luxury shopping malls like the one in
Hong Kong, in the Chinese people’s mind, Taiwan is a “renegade province” which 
Chiang Kai-shek fled to in 1949 and it must be returned to the mainland someday.
However, while mainland tourists enjoy feeling the winner in the civil war, Taiwan’s 
democratic development and good service do actually impress them and are
undoubtedly advantageous for further cross strait interaction. According to a ROC
tourism bureau investigation, 86 per cent of mainland tourists are satisfied with the
tour service and legal assistance when they visit Taiwan.407 Another interesting
investigation pointed out that the Taiwanese political talk show TV programmes are
mainland tourists’ favourites when they stay in a hotel,even though the members of
404 Jing-qing Zhong, “The Deposit is the Major Boundaries for Mainland Tourists to Visit Taiwan ”, 
China Times, August 6, 2008, A12
405 Zhi-qiang Tan, “HK’s Experience of MainlandTourists”, China Times, 1 July 2008, A19.
406 Mainland tourists are very interested in visiting Ali Mountain and Sun Moon Lack. The psychology
is believed to have been developed by the general CCP official impression of Taiwan.
407 China Times, “Mainland Tourists are Predicted above 1.5 Milion this Year”, 3 June 2010, 
http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/100603/4/26rqi.html.
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Falun Dafa occasionally protest in front of them. This good news explains why
Chinese tourists not only bring economic benefits, but also opportunities for Taiwan
to promote ideas of democracy.
7.1.2 Memorandums of Understanding or MOUs
The centrepiece of the third Chen–Chiang Talk was a joint statement agreement
regarding setting up a Cross-Strait financial cooperation mechanism, a regular
framework for financial services on both sides to invest and do business in each
other’s market. The two delegates signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) on 
banking, securities and futures, and insurance shortly after a third round of
cross-Taiwan Strait talks was slated to be held 25–29th April 2009 in Nanjing.408 The
MOUs covered bilateral financial supervision cooperation, the establishment of a
currency settlement mechanism (a clearing system between Taiwan dollars and RMB)
increasing access to each other's financial markets, and the establishment of a system
to help Taiwanese businessmen in China to obtain loans.409 The two sides also agreed
to gradually set up a consensus that the Taiwan government allow a certain form of
Chinese investment into Taiwan. Specifically, the pact would allow Taiwan banks to
set up branches or subsidiaries in China and provide Chinese Yuan services. Although
in July 2008 Taiwan had authorized some 1,240 local bank outlets to begin exchanges
between New Taiwan dollars and the Chinese Yuan, with a daily transaction limit of
20,000 Yuan per person per day and Taiwan's banks bought Chinese Yuan mainly
408 The China Post,“MOUs to be Signed in Nanjing”,20 April 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2009/04/20/204964/MOUs-to.htm.
409 The China Post,“SEF Chair Chiang Arrives in Nanjing for Cross-Strait Signing”, 26 April 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2009/04/26/205713/SEF-chair.htm.
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from the HSBC and Bank of America, the supplies of Yuan were insufficient and the
cost of buying the Chinese currency was too high, as China's monetary authority had
yet to promise to provide Taiwan with Yuan on a regular basis.410 The agreement also
included relaxing the restrictions on foreign insurance companies wishing to set up
companies in China, and the lifting restrictions on Chinese investment in Taiwan's
real estate, services and manufacturing sectors.411
Taiwan MAC Chairman, Lai Shin-yuan said that opening up to investment from
China would be an important step in normalizing trade and economic ties across the
strait. She said the one-way movement of investment from Taiwan to China over the
past 20 years has tilted the balance of cross-strait capital flows. 412 Taiwanese
financial firms have been clamouring to enter China's fast-growing market. Their
executives say Taiwanese banks, some of which have offices in China but cannot offer
banking services there (i.e. in 2002, the seven major Taiwanese banks including the
First Bank and Chang Hua Bank had set up branch offices in the mainland, but could
not work for 7 years), particularly could serve the estimated one million Taiwanese
business people based in China.413 Once a banking MOU is inked, Taiwan's banking
and financial industry is expected to post a 20 per cent growth for five consecutive
years thanks to the potential benefits from wealth management services, including an
estimated NT$3,000 billion increase in loan demand, NT$80 billion in net interest
revenue and NT$8 billion in service fees, according to a foreign bank with operations
410 Radio Taiwan International, “Central Bank: Chinese Yuan is Insufficient on the Market, Need is
2.5 to Supply”, 19 April 2010, http://tw.news.yahoo.com/article/url/d/a/100419/58/2451u.html.
411 Reuters, “China, Taiwan in Landmark Financial Services Deal”,26 April 2009,
http://in.reuters.com/article/marketsNewsUS/idINTP34815320090426.
412 SinaNews, “Lai Shin-yuan Explained the 3rd CC Talk Issues”, 23 April 2009, 
http://news.sina.com/000-000-101-103/2009-04-23/0237577281.html.
413 China Times, “Welcome to the New Era of Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation”, 27 April 2009, 
A15.
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in Taiwan.414 The future scale of Taiwan's banking and financial industry is predicted
to expand to 30 times the current level.415 In fact, the signing of the MOU had
actually brought the island significant positive economic effects: High hopes for both
deals supercharged Taiwan's stock market in 2009, making it the world's second best
performer after only Shanghai. Taiwan stocks are up 28 per cent years to date,
compared with a 4 per cent decline for the S&P 500. Taiwan's banking and insurance
sub-index has rallied 33 per cent since the beginning of March 2009 alone, with
foreign investors pumping a net NT$63.2 billion (US$1.9 billion) into Taiwan stocks
over that period as the island is increasingly seen as the next big China play.416
National and economy securities are still the major worry for the Taiwan
government and businesses after the establishment of this closer economic interaction.
Taiwan worries that almost all Chinese investment abroad uses state-owned capital,
which draws on the political influence of the Chinese Communist Party. In the case of
China’s strategic withdrawal of investment, Taiwan must be prepared to take over key
businesses in the interests of national security. Meanwhile, Taiwanese financial
institutes also find that it would be hard to compete with their much bigger Chinese
counterparts.417 Moreover, the benefits from China’s purchase and investment were
over-estimated in 2009, although there are already three waves of procurement
missions from China have come to Taiwan and the Ma’s administration predict the 
purchase will be close to US$10 billion in consumer electronics, processed foods, and
other goods, the total amount of Chinese purchase after official contract is only half of
414 Ibid., China Post, 20 April 2009.
415 Wealth Invest Weekly,“The Layout of MOU, the Sweet Dream of Stocks inFinancial Sector”, 4
July 2009.
416 Ibid., Reuters, 26 April 2009.
417 DPP spokesman Wen-tsang Cheng; “Pacts Deepen Economic Ties, Add Flights”, Taipei Times, 27
April 2009, p. 1.
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prediction, about US$5 billion.418 Taiwan has also opened its door to welcome
China’s professional investors, QDI (the qualified domestic institutional investor) 
going to the Taiwan stock market419 Taiwan also hopes that mainland business will
invest more in the manufacture and service industries and “I-Taiwan 12“infrastructure 
projects.420
On the other hand, from China’s investment perspective, Chinese investors 
feel Taiwan’s wory might be too much and “selfish” and that the major investment 
from the mainland so far is actually policy driven, not market driven. The investment
could be considered as a “favour’ or “gift” from the CCP government in order to win 
Taiwanese public support. If the Cross-Strait trade follows the principle of a free
market, the capital flow from China to Taiwan would be much less than the current
volume. In other words, the main objective of Chinese businesses investing in Taiwan
would be more interested in gaining access to high-tech companies and acquiring key
technologies. For example, China has shown great interest to cooperate with Taiwan’s 
telecommunication industry, such as the Far Eastone Telecommunications cooperation,
one of the major telecom companies on the island. Taiwan’s companies are also very 
willing to cooperate with China since there is a foreseeable huge mobile phone market
in the mainland.421 However, the preference is obviously; this sort of cooperation is
considered as potentially dangerous to Taiwan’s economic security. The Taiwan 
government also strictly limits Chinese investment in the media and defence
418 Liberty Times, “The Government Exaggerate the Benefits of China’s Procurement”, 10 November 
2009, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2009/new/nov/10/today-fo3.htm.
419 cnYES, “Chen Shu: Chinese QDII is Expected to Bring 337 Trilion and 5 Bilion NT to Taiwan, 
MOU Next Step for Less Limitation”, 31 July 2008,
http://tw.stock.yahoo.com/news_content/url/d/a/080731/2/12mno.html.
420 Ibid., Taipei Times, 27 April 2009 , p. 1.
421 Bloomberg News, “Taiwan Expects China Pact to Improve Competitiveness”, 15 December 2009,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a.VFVAOjkID0&pos=7.
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industries for fear that it would be harmful to national security and public opinion.422
To sum up, the diversified expectation of both sides on the objectives of investment
indicates that normal cross strait capital flow still has a long way to go.
7.1.3 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement or ECFA
In the fourth Chen–Chiang Talk, President Ma pressed hard for the delegates to
sign a free trade-style agreement with China, known locally as Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement or ECFA. The decision of Ma‘s administration was built on 
two main ideas: Firstly, an ECFA would avoid the further marginalization of the
export-dependent Taiwan economy in the subsequent five years, once a FTA between
China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN+1) took force in
2010.423 The grouping of ASEAN 10+1 would include China; ASEAN 10+3 in 2011
will incorporate Japan and South Korea in an FTA; and ASEAN 10+6 would then
include Australia, New Zealand and India. Without an ECFA, Chinese customs
charges would be 5 per cent to 10 per cent greater than those applying to ASEAN
exporters.424 Taiwan is geographically and economically close to ASEAN although
Taiwan is not part of the grouping. In 2007, ASEAN 10+3 accounted for 54 per cent
of all Taiwanese exports and 75 per cent of all Taiwanese FDI. The addition of China
to ASEAN would thus be hazardous to Taiwan as 40 per cent of its exports already go
422 Ibid, Taipei Times, 27 April 2009, p. 1.
423 Jane Rickard, “Overprotest, Taiwan moves toward Free Trade with China ”,Washington Post, 23
December 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/22/AR2009122203416.html
424 Wun-long Lin, “Pros, cons of a Cross-Strait ECFA”, Taipei Times, 27 December 2009, p. 8.
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/12/27/2003461972.
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there.425
The second concern of Ma’s administration regarding the ECFA was the deeper 
wory that Taiwanese competition in China’s growing domestic market would 
decrease and be replaced by the other competitors if Taiwan did not sign the
agreement. In fact, according to statistics, products supporting mainland China’s 
domestic needs are mainly from ASEAN exports (at least 50 per cent) and only 30 per
cent are Taiwan export products.426 As the analysis above mentions, the centrepiece
of Taiwan's economic strategy could not be anything other than more open trade and
investment with mainland China, an immediate advantage for Taiwan to increase the
size of the island’s economy by deeper integration with China – the world’s 
third-largest economy with an estimated GDP in 2007 of US$7.973 trillion, China has
great potential in terms of consumer purchasing power. Meanwhile, after the global
financial crisis in 2008, the result of systemic failure in the global financial markets,
the post-World War II pattern of interdependent growth between Asian exporters and
Western consumers is under strain and the gradual transition in China from
export-focused growth strategies led by heavy investment in "hard" infrastructure
toward a more sustainable economic model demonstrates that China’s market has 
changed from a "growth" stock to a "value" stock, where growth is less dependent on
Western consumer pockets than those of Chinese consumers and small businesses. In
terms of raw growth, the days of 14 per cent GDP gains in the 1990s and 12 per cent
GDP gains earlier this decade are gone, to be replaced (after the post-crisis bounce) by
425 Taiwan was excluded by ASEAN owing to its status of a non sovereignty state. China Times, “If 
FTA replaced WTO, Taiwan wil have no Play in the Next Years”, 23 October 2006, 
http://blog.xuite.net/changchih228/changchih228/8651636?ref=rel.
426 Gui-fen He, “The Huge Treat of ASEAN + 3: The East Asia Economic Integration, the Key 5 Years 
for Taiwan”,Commonwealth Magazine, No. 434 (November, 2009).
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long-term growth of about 8 per cent annually.427 For Taiwan, if the ECFA were to be
successfully established, the Taiwanese businesses would make use of the cheap
labour and natural resources in the integrated ASEAN regional economy and then
export the products to the mainland market. In addition to this competitiveness, the
change would also be advantageous for reducing the island’s economic dependence
on China since Taishang will invest more in South East Asian countries and even go
back to the island when the environment in China is actually getting worse, especially
those provinces along the coast where gradually Taishang cannot find labourers even
though wages are higher than ever before.
The potential impacts of ECFA are listed by several ROC officials and research
institutes. The Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research (CIER), commissioned
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, predicts that the deal could increase Taiwan’s 
annual GDP growth by between 1.65 per cent and 1.72 per cent. The increase might
be even bigger if a multiplier effect is taken into consideration. Exports will increase
by between 4.87 per cent and 4.97 per cent. Otherwise, if Taiwan does not have any
response when the ASEAN +1 is in efect, Taiwan’s annual GDP growth wil decrease 
0.18 per cent and exports will decrease 0.41 per cent; if Taiwan does not have any
response to ASEAN +3, Taiwan’s annual GDP growth wil decrease 0.84 per cent and
exports will decrease 1.89 per cent.428 An ECFA would also benefit Taiwan’s plastics, 
petrochemicals, petroleum, machinery, textiles, coal and steel sectors which were
identified by the Ministry of Economic Affairs as "early harvest lists" of sectors for
which ECFA will end the high tariffs imposed by China, and the strong growth in
427 Derek Scissors, “Taiwan Economy needs more than Cooperation with China”, Heritage Foundation,
November2009,
www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/11/Taiwans%20Economy%20Needs%20
More%20Than%20Cooperation%20with%20China.
428 Zu-jia Lin, “Signing ECFA, should be Broader and Faster”, Yuan-jian Magazine, September 2009.
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Chinese demand for these products will stimulate production in these areas.429 A
report from the Council of Labour Affairs in mid-October 2009 showed a positive
impact of 0.75 per cent GDP growth and a net gain of 125,000 jobs under a
favourable ECFA scenario, and a dip of almost 0.2 per cent in GDP, accompanied by a
net loss of 47,000 jobs, in the event of the ECFA not being concluded.430
Opponents of ECFA consider the pact will also bring Taiwan several negative
impacts. First, ECFA is advantageous to the large industries mentioned above but will
be harmful to small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). Owing to a possible flood
of cheaper Chinese goods on the island’s market, the domestic manufacturers of 
products like towels, shoes, bedding and ceramics will lose competitiveness, on which
the ministry did not elaborate. Some private sector analysis also shows that the ECFA
will have minimal benefit for Taiwan's exports. This is because the major benefits of
Taiwan’s exports are from the IT industry which has already highly integrated into the 
global supply chain, and faces low commodity taxes of only 0.58 per cent when
exporting its components to China for assembly and reshipment to world markets.431
Moreover, the dificulties in Taiwan’s manufacturing industry not only include tarif 
barriers but various other factors, for example, the competition from newly
established factories in the mainland. By 2010, China had planned to establish at least
20 massive petroleum refineries in the mainland.432 To illustrate: in an interview with
429 For example, in the petrochemicals industry, the Chinese market absorbs 66 per cent of Taiwanese
exports. If an ECFA is signed before China signs an FTA with Japan and South Korea, Taiwan’s 
petrochemical suppliers will more than double their share of the Chinese market, from the current
15 per cent to 38 per cent.
430 Merrit T. Cooke, “Taiwan Economy: Recovery with Chinese Characteristic”,Brookings Institute,
November 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/11_taiwan_economy_cooke.aspx.
431 Taipei Times, “Editorial: ECFA Contingency Plan Imperative”, 2 August 2009,
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/08/02/2003450168
432 People Daily News, “Before the Final Decision of Petrol Price: The CPC (China Petrochemical 
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the general manager of Bao Der Marble Co., Ltd., one of the largest marble and
granite companies in Asia, Mr. Lin pointed out other reasons why the ECFA is not
generally welcomed by the Taiwanese small and medium-size enterprises.
Take our field and company and as an example, the ECFA will be a trouble, not
an opportunity. […] In the field of granite and marble manufacturing and
processing (marble slabs, tiles, cut-to-size and customer-designed size granite
products are important materials for housing building), the major Taiwan
companies will go bankrupt if the government allows China to export cheaper
granite and marble products to Taiwan. Although Taiwan companies are still
leading in technology which is important for producing better quality products,
the gradual dry resource and higher limit on mining in Taiwan has reduced
competitiveness and forced companies to import stones from overseas. […] 
When ECFA works, it seems like a good opportunity for Taiwan to export granite
and marble products to growing housing market due to low tax barriers; however,
the situation is temporary and superficial, ultimately Taiwan cannot reject
China’s exports. In fact, the current smuggling of stone from China to Taiwan
products is already serious. Moreover, Taiwan companies general believe they
stil need to pay high “tariff duties” (including bribes) since corruption is very 
common in Chinese custom.433
The experience of Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) Hong
Corporation ) took Great Leaps Forward”, 2 July 2007,
http://finance.people.com.cn/BIG5/1038/59942/59945/6203350.html.
433 Interview with Mr. Ching-ming Lin, who is president of the Stone and Resource Industry R&D
Centre and chairman of the Taiwan Marble Association, 12 March 2010.
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Kong signed by Hong Kong and China in June 2003 supports the idea that CEPA will
bring long-term negative impacts. Vincent Sung, the organizing secretary of the Hong
Kong Confederation of Trade Unions, said during a symposium in Taiwan that the
CEPA had only benefited multinational corporations and a minority of special interest
groups, and had neither revitalized the local manufacturing industry nor generated an
increase in wages. In Hong Kong, employment in manufacturing fell from 170,000 in
2003 to 140,000 in 2007, while exports fell by 1.1 per cent in 2006 and by 19.1 per
cent in 2007. He urged Taiwan’s government to consider this point before signing an 
ECFA with China.434 The final problem is still the political and security issue. The
ECFA wil increase the island’sdependence on the mainland and therefore fall into
China’s geopolitical quagmire (economic measures to unify with Taiwan under 
Beijing’s “One China” policy).435 For al this, Ma’s administration stil hopes that the 
initial establishment of ECFA will be a prelude to a Taiwan–China FTA, which would
imply China’s implicit acceptance of Taiwan signing similar trade pacts with other 
countries in the region, or even in the US and in Europe.436
7.1.4 Summary of Ma’s Open-door policies and Cross- Strait negotiations after 2008
To Taiwan’s democratic development, the Cross-Strait issues on the negotiation
table during 2008–2009 are new stories between KMT’s open door policy and DPP’s 
protectionism. If we use the theoretical framework created in Chapter 4 to explain all
changes and debates on the issue in the two years discussed in this section, Table 4.3
provides a clear picture of the different logics of these two groups, the ideas raised by
434 Ibid., Taipei Times, 27 December 2009.
435 Chen-yuan Tung, “Optimizing Taiwan’s Development”, Taipei Times, 5 May 2010, p. 8.
436 Ibid., Taipei Times, 2 August 2009.
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both camps were in some aspect reasonable and persuasive to the public and offered
support to the negotiation teams to reflect the island’s real and plural voice. While the 
KMT strongly promoted the open door policy and persuaded people that China was a
good co-operator who actually provided Taiwan with huge market opportunities (i.e.
benefits from mainland tourists visiting, expansion of Taiwanese Banks, early harvest
list of signing ECFA) needed for Taiwan to prevent marginalization of regional
economic cooperation, especially ASEAN+3 after 2010, the DPP reminded people
that China was an economic competitor (i.e. flood of RMB, state-owned capital,
cheaper Chinese products, and intentionally limiting the fifth freedom of the air) and
any risky or urgent economic agreement with China would be harmful to the island’s 
major industries, SMES and also raise unemployment. In politics, since the KMT
returned to power in 2008, the Ma’s administration prefered to promote its policy by 
direct negotiations with China as the KMT enjoyed minimal legislative checks which
allowed the president to authorize administration and technical measurements such
that the topics on the negotiation tables were simple economic issues. This style of
decision making was criticized as antidemocratic since every agreement with China
was influential to the island’s future development and yet decided in a verylimited
administrative inner circle under table. This kind of situation also influenced Ma’s 
public support such that some people even considered that President Ma and the KMT
administration had better communication with the CCP than the DPP had. In contrast,
after the loss of central power in 2008, the DPP was forced to return “on the street” 
with its poor support, very limited control of legislative seats, and a handful of south
county and city majors. To appeal to a more direct democracy, referendum for ECFA
or large demonstration on the street are actually the traditional strategies for the DPP
to maintain its basic support and momentum when they lack central power and
majority in the Legislative Yuan. However, while the KMT focused on cross strait
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issues to emphasize its ability to lead the island’s growth (the traditional image of the 
KMT is that it is more capable to deal with economic and mainland affairs), whether
the cross-strait issues were useful for the DPP to play a good role as the opposition, to
supervise the KMT’s negotiations, and even get public support to return to power, the 
outcome is still questionable and requires further investigation. There will be more
detailed discussion Chapter 8, focusing on the DPP’s role of opposition on cross strait
negotiations and their future possible development.
7.2 The issues off the table
Obviously, the reopened cross strait dialogues and negotiations were very limited
in terms of economic issues. Other important issues, such as the role of Taiwan in
international organizations and how to maintain the peace in the Taiwan Strait, could
not be officially discussed on the table owing to constant sovereignty disputes
between both sides. As mentioned above, Ma’s administration had set up three steps 
designed to resume the dialogue and talks. When the negotiations reopened quickly
and smoothly, Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and the changed 
situation regarding US arms sales had become important evidence to test the PRC’s 
concessions and the possibility of further establishing mutual military trust, even a
cross-strait peace accord. Nevertheless, after Ma went to ofice, Taiwan’s participation 
in international organizations was very limited and the cross-strait peace accord
seemed to be far beyond the expectations of either side.
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7.2.1 Asia Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) and World Health Assembly (WHA)
The twenty-first APEC, held 22–23 November 2008 in Peru’s capital city of Lima, 
provided Taiwan the first opportunity to examine the efects of Ma’s “modus vivendi" 
diplomacy. Lien Chan, the former vice president and KMT presidential candidate in
2004 was selected by President Ma Ying-jeou as special envoy to represent Taiwan
(participating as Chinese Taipei). Lien Chan met with PRC leader Hu Jintao for about
40 minutes at a hotel in Lima, Peru. Officials in Taiwan's summit delegation called it
the highest-level meeting in an international setting since 1949.437 This came just
weeks after PRC envoy Chen Yunlin visited Taipei, Taiwan. In another breakthrough,
the official list of participating economies and leaders released by the organizer
included a portrait of President Ma under the "Chinese Taipei" section. It was
accompanied by a brief description stating that "President Ma Ying-jeou" was the
leader of the member economy and that "the leader has nominated former Vice
President of Chinese Taipei, Lien Chan, to replace him".438 As discussed in Chapter
4.1, APEC is an annual event and the representatives must be a national leader,
president or prime minister. The semi-official international forum had become an
important occasion for Asian Pacific countries to interact with the United States.
According to the past experience, Beijing would no doubt oppose Taiwanese
representatives from high levels of government, and also any initiatives proposed in
the name of financial contribution to the development of the regional economy. Under
Beijing’s blockade, in the final year of the DPP’s power from 2000–2008, Taiwan did
437 The China Post,“China, Taiwan hold High-Level Meeting”, 22 November 2008, 
www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2008/11/22/184283/China-Taiwan.htm.
438 Taiwan Headlines, “President Touts APEC Breakthrough as Success of 'Diplomatic Truce' ”, 15 
November 2008, www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=141031&CtNode=39.
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not send government officials but authorized world-famous Taiwan businessmen as
delegates, for example, TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company)
Chairman Morris Chang in 2006 and Acer Computer president Stan Shih in 2007.439
The positive interaction between Lien Chen and Hu Jin-tao can be considered a good
response to Ma’s foreign policy from Beijing, but might be seen as another kind of 
prejudice and privilege to the KMT. Lien is typically considered as a pro-unification
politician in Taiwan and is famous for his “groundbreaking visits” to mainland China 
in 2005.440 However, even though Taiwan might have felt more space in the APEC,
China had become a heavyweight player in the forum and influenced agenda setting.
In addition to occupying the VIP seat beside the host in the banquet, Hu Jin-tao’s 
strong promise on China’s contribution to global economic stability and climate
change was very impressive to the other countries. For example, Hu promised China’s 
energy consumption in 2010 would be only 80 per cent of that in 2005. This objective
was considered very chalenging to China’s high speed economic growth.441 The
situation demonstrates that the expansion of Taiwan’s international space was stil 
very limited and much dependent on China’s atitude, even though Taiwan was trying 
to breakout from China’s blockade.  
The process of Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization (WHO)
during 2008–2009 shows that the PRC’s concession in international organizations was 
439 “AcerGroup Founder Stan Shih to Be President Chen’s Representative at APEC Economic Leaders
Meeting”, Ofice of President (ROC), 17 August 2007, 
www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=1314&ctNode=251&mp=4.
440 On 26 April 2005, Lien Chan travelled to mainland China to meet with the leaders of the
Communist Party of China. His meeting with CPC leader Hu Jintao was the highest level exchange
since Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong met in Chongqing on 28 August 1945 to celebrate the
victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War and discuss a possible truce in the impending Chinese
Civil War.
441 Yi-zheng Lu, “ What is the Achievement of 2009 APEC? ”, China Times, 1 December 2009, A19
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very limited and the major intention of China’s blockade was obviously to constrain 
Taiwan’s international activities and interpret the activities as China’s domestic afairs. 
Like the outbreak of a lethal strain of bird flu and the SARS epidemic, the Chinese
melamine-contaminated products scandal, a food safety incident in the mainland
became another event which angered the Taiwanese people and stimulated pressure on
Ma’s administration to participate in a global diseases prevention network, especialy 
cooperation and information sharing in the WHO.442 This low political appeal was still
suspicious and therefore was overthrown by Beijing under a reason of
non-qualification since Taiwan was not a sovereign state. Chinese opposition is not
very persuasive to the international community since Taiwan is famous for its
successful national health care insurance system443 and China itself is actually
notorious for big loopholes and a lack of transparency in the diseases reporting system.
The exclusion of Taiwan from WTO mechanisms such as the International Health
Regulations (IHR) and World Health Assembly (WHA) not only obviously violated
the rights of Taiwan’s people for beter international health security, it also become 
another source of cross strait confrontation in the international organization. However,
these potential conflicts were temporally eased since the SEF and ARATS had signed
agreements on establishing food safety control mechanisms between the two sides in
the second Chen–Chiang Talk and Chen Yun-lin, head of ARATS, had surprisingly
442 Sheng-mou Hou, “Taiwan must be in Global Disease Prevention Network”, News of Taipei
Representatives Office in the EU and Belgium;
www.taiwanembassy.org/ct.asp?xItem=57535&ctNode=5914&mp=102.
443 For example, Taiwan’s public health insurance care system had a very good reputation in several 
international evaluation indexes. Taiwan got the top ranking in life expectancy and infant mortality
rate in 2007 and WHO fairness of financial contribution in 2003. For more details, please reference
the folowing articles: “Hong Kong Magazine: Taiwan Public Health Insurance Enjoy International
Reputation, ”Xinghua News, 27 March 2009;
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2009-03/27/content_11083511.htm.
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made an official apology to the Taiwanese people for this issue prior to visiting
Taiwan in November.444 On 28 April 2009, Taiwan’s Department of Health (DOH) 
Minister Yeh Ching-chuan received a letter from the WHO inviting him to attend as
an observer in the WHA's annual meeting scheduled for 18–27 May in Geneva. The
next day, President Ma Ying-jeou declared that the invitation was a major step
forward in Taiwan's campaign for meaningful participation in international
organizations. Taiwan's presence at the annual meeting of the decision-making arm of
the World Health Organization (WHO) would mark the first time that Taiwan had
been allowed to participate in a meeting or activity of a United Nations specialized
agency since losing its UN membership to China in 1971. This would also be the first
time that Taiwan would be allowed to take part in the WHA after 12 failed attempts at
WHA participation since 1997.445 Yeh explained that obtaining observer status in the
WHA would enable Taiwan to maintain direct contact with the WHO to exchange
information on disease control and prevention, better protecting the health and safety
of the people in Taiwan. The situation was really a good news for Taiwan, since
Taiwan enjoys higher compliance with international principles, norms and rules,
(Taiwan’s complete and advanced health care system is undoubtedly a good example) 
Taiwan can obtain greater support from advanced countries; enhancing the ability of
Taipei to work with other governments, and somewhat eroding Beijing’s atempts to 
isolate or marginalize Taiwan internationaly. Nevertheless, Taiwan’s membership 
name “Chinese Taipei”, a consensus accepted by both the KMT and the CCP 
444 Taiwan Public Television,“The Incident of Tainted Milk Powder Scandal, Chen Yun-lin Apologized
to TaiwanesePeople”, 30 October 2008,
http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!ga9p9iuTQE7N63sfElEW3C5ywg--/article?mid=25960.
445 The China Post,“Taiwan Invited to Atend World Health Assembly ”,29 April 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2009/04/29/206179/Taiwan-invited.h
tm
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governments in joining international organizations not only reflects Taiwan’s public 
unwilingness and lack of choice, but also explains China’s concession was stil very 
limited and did not change too much even though the Ma’s administration think its 
foreign policy to be more pragmatic and flexible than previous.
7.2.2 Arms Sales
After the direct links, the shortened travel time due to the opening up of air and
sea routes was very beneficial to cross strait commercial interaction, but in terms of
island defence in the event of a sudden outbreak of war Taiwan would have a shorter
time to respond to China’s atack –especially missile and air force and aid from the
American 7th Fleet; the 7th Fleet is the US Navy Force in the Pacific Ocean. Even
though President Ma proclaimed he was very willing to sign a cross-strait peace
accord or any mutual military trust agreement for the long term cross strait peace,
expectations were low since both sides still kept a certain military force as leverage
for confrontations and negotiations. Taiwan frequently appealed to China to withdraw
at least 1,000 PLA missiles targeting Taiwan,446 however, the issue was obviously
political, it did not make sense from a technical perspective that the PLA was able to
redeploy the missiles very quickly, even overnight. For China, Beijing had long been
sick of US arm sales to Taiwan. For example, when the United States sold F-16s to
Taiwan in 1992 under President George H.W. Bush China threatened to withdraw
from international arms control talks and retaliated, many China experts contend, by
selling medium-range missiles to Pakistan. A $6.5 billion arms sales package,
including 114 Patriot missiles worth $2.82 billion, 60 Black Hawk helicopters worth
446 United Daily News, “Never ask Americans to Fight for Taiwan? Ma shows High Confidence on 
Self-Defense”,3 May 2010, http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/5574008.shtml.
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$3.1 bilion, communications equipment for Taiwan’s F-16 fleet, and Harpoon
missiles and mine-hunting ships, approved by the Obama administration in 2010, also
aroused a swift and negative Chinese reaction. China’s vice foreign minister, He Yafei, 
issued a diplomatic message to the State Department expressing his “indignation” 
over the pending sale, revealed Wang Baoding, the spokesman at the Chinese
Embassy in Washington.447 However, in order to maintain a certain degree of
self-defence capability, Taiwan also suffered and needed to pay higher prices to
purchase US expansive weapons. Most weapons were costly and some did not make a
significant contribution to Taiwan’s actual defence requirements. 
After Ma wentto ofice, the island’s defence strategy clearly changed, reflecting 
the KMT’s difering thoughts on how to protect the island. Before 2008, KMT 
legislature blocked Taiwan’s military procurements during the Chen Shui-bian years,
and thus ensured Taiwan’s long-term defencelessness against China.448 However, the
KMT politicians believed their objection to be reasonable as Taiwan was not able to
aford an arms race with China, and the “Active Defence” strategy which planned to 
develop those counter-measure weapons such as HF-2E were unpractical or even
dangerous.449 Then-Legislator Su Chi (now Ma Ying-jeou’s Secretary General of the 
National Security Council) was the major leader who rejected the “Active Defence” 
strategy and stated openly that the KMT would never consider developing any
447 The New York Times,Helene Cooper, “US Approval of Taiwan Arm Sales Angers China”, 29
January 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30arms.html?ref=world
448 Taipei Times, “Analysis: US Arm Package could be an Expensive Ilusion,”16 December 2009,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/12/16/2003461063
449 Rather, they were opposed to having them under Chen Shui-bian’s command on grounds because  
Chen might abuse them; David Lague, “Taiwan Develops Missiles Designed to Reach Targets in 
China”,The New York Times, 28 September 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/28/world/asia/28iht-taiwan.1.7670540.html?_r=1
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weapon that could strike mainland China.450 Su believed that Chen’s “Decisive 
Campaign outside the Teritory” was irelevant to defending Taiwan and a dangerous 
idea that might provoke military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. As a result,
then-Legislator Su Chi boycotted the MND budget for HF-2E production. As an
alternative, Su proposed the idea of the “Hard ROC” during Ma's 2008 presidential 
campaign, which became the mantra of Ma’s military strategy. Under the “Hard 
ROC,” Su argued that the imperatives of defending Taiwan were
The capabilities to sustain China’s surprise atack and maintain air superiority in 
order to deprive China from landing and occupying Taiwan. If China cannot
ensure its swift victory and create a fait accompli before the U.S. intervention,
then China’s incentive of invasion is naturaly decreased.451
Under the concept of a “Hard ROC,” rather than big ships and fast planes, the 
Taiwan military preferred runway repair kits (for maintaining local air superiority),
sea mines (to deny the enemy’s command of the sea), and troop transport helicopters 
(for rapid force redeployment within Taiwan).452 However, the new arms sales, a
$6.5 billion deal, approved by the Obama administration in 2010 mentioned above
could be an active but not a very encouraging response to Taiwan’s requirements 
because the items were those originally approved by former US president George W.
Bush in 2001 .It is believed that US may release PAC-3 interceptor missiles, UH-60
Black Hawk helicopters, as wel as an operations deal for the “Po Sheng,” or Broad 
Victory, command and control programme and design work on diesel-electric
450 York W. Chen (2009), “The Evolution of Taiwan Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance”, 
China Brief, Vol. 9, Issue 23, 19 November 2009.
451 United Daily News,“The Imperatives of Defending Taiwan were the Capabilities to Sustain China’s 
Surprise Atack and Maintain Air Superiority”, 24 January 2006, A3.
452 The Liberty Times, “Su Argued that Taiwan’s Arms Procurement should be Redirected”, 20 October
2007. A5.
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submarines.453 Except for UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters–the only items which can
satisfy ROC’s military requirements –the deal is nothing new in that the 66 F-16C/D
fighter aircraft that Taiwan has sought for years was still missing from the list, there
are reservations regarding the capability of the Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles to
defend against PLA missiles barrage, and also problematic is the fact that the design
work on the submarines would be costly and may not even result in actual
submarines.454
The controversy regarding whether Taiwan should reopen markets to US bone-in
beef and certain other beef products not only handed President Ma one of his biggest
crises since he took office in 2008, but also became an unanticipated factor to the US
arms sales. On 22 October 2009, the Taiwan Legislative Yuan changed a food safety
law (the Act Governing Food Sanitation) to ban some US beef imports and urged the
executive to renegotiate with the US –a response to pacify mad cow disease fears
from the island’s public –this angered Washington, which said the movement had
undermined Taiwan's credibility as a trading partner.455 The action also promoted
speculation that the American government would take retaliation measures including
suspending weapons sales to the island, Wu stressed. Coincidentally, the dispute
resulted from Su Chi‘s protocol signed with the US. Su explained that
miscommunication had led to public panic and sought to avoid future
misunderstandings, but he also warned the public that if Taiwan violated a
recently-inked protocol on the import of US beef this would undermine its
453 James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), “Arms Sales to Taiwan - Statements and
Development”, 21 February 2003, http://www.nti.org/db/china/twnchr.htm.
454 Ibid., Taipei Times, 16 December 2009, p.3.
455 Reuters, “Taiwan seeks new talks with U.S. after banning beef“, 6 January 2010,
http://mobile.reuters.com/mobile/m/FullArticle/CPOL/npoliticsNews_uUSTRE6051F720100106?s
rc=RSS-POL.
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international credibility and US support. The US and its lawmakers were likely to
hold back their support for the island because 70 per cent of the US congressional
leaders were from agricultural states.456 The US Congress had long been a major
force backing Taiwan. Su also reminded that trade friction would also postpone
several items of long-stalled talks between the two sides on the Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFF), double taxation, intellectual property rights and
energy and environmental cooperation.457 Under these challenges, Taiwan planned to
send a delegation to the United States, likely to be comprised of legislators and
officials who would mainly inspect slaughterhouses, meat processing factories and
packing procedures to better control the safety of the US beef to be exported to
Taiwan. The delegates also sought to explain to the US that Taiwan's legislature would
not always accept all of the decisions made by the executive branch without
expressing any opinions.458 Nevertheless, the action was considered not to be useful
as people in Taiwan gradually discovered, leading to lost confidence on the less
democratic values in the process of US foreign policy making.
7.3 The impact of global economic recession
The global economic recession caused by the US financial crisis at the end of
2008 caused an unexpected, rapid and direct impact on the island’s economy. Since 
President Ma’s inauguration, an unprecedented high “misery” economic index –not
seen in the previous 28 years –had not only been a big surprise to experts, but was
456 The China Post,“Reneging on beef might erode U.S. support: Su Chi”, 25 December 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2009/12/25/237932/Reneging-on.htm
457 The China Post,“Taiwan has Hard Role in TPP Process: Scholars ”, 24 December 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/t-business/2009/12/24/237790/Taiwan-has.htm
458 Taipei Times, “Ma Sending Delegation to Washington”, 31 December 2009, p. 1.
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also a strike to Ma’s prestige. According to oficial statistics from the ROC Ministry 
of Economic afairs, Taiwan's GDP growth was −1.9 per cent in 2009, down from 6.0 
per cent in 2007;459 Meanwhile, in the first quarter of 2009, (January–March) the
island’s exports decreased by 20.3 per cent, and even reached −34.3 per cent in 
April –the most worst condition in history.460 The unemployment rate was 6.13 per
cent in August, which was the highest ever recorded and higher than any other
country in Asia. 461 About 2,000 companies had gone bankrupt since Ma's
inauguration.462 The Taipei Stock Exchange had slumped from 9,200 on 20 May
2008 to 4,500 points on 8 October 2008, losing about 4,000 points, down almost 49
per cent of market values.463 In early September, in an interview with a Mexican
newspaper, President Ma admitted that he would not be able to achieve his "633 Plan"
promises before the end of his first term. 464
How to deal with the rising cost of international oil and raw materials in May
became the first challenge to the Ma’s administration (not part of the global economic 
recession). Before the presidential election, in order to get the popular support, the
459 Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs (ROC), “A-1: Global Major Countries
GDP”, in Economy Statistic Index, ROC,
http://2k3dmz2.moea.gov.tw/gnweb/Indicator/wFrmIndicator.aspx#B, accessed 1 May 2009.
460 Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs (ROC), “C-1: ROC Export ”in Economy 
Statistic Index, http://2k3dmz2.moea.gov.tw/gnweb/Indicator/wFrmIndicator.aspx#B ,accessed 1
May 2009.
461 SinaNews, “Taiwan’s Unemployment Rate: 6.13%, the highest in Asia”, 22 September 2009,
http://financenews.sina.com/bcc/000-000-107-104/403/2009-09-22/0356474193.shtml.
462 The Liberty Times, “People’s Misery Index Rise”, 30August 2008,
www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/aug/30/today-taipei4-2.htm.
463 Taiwan Headlines, “Taiwan Stocks Close Lower Despite New Measures to Shore Up Market”, 13
October 2008, http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=137135&CtNode=39 ; Economic
Daily News, 11 January 2009, http://udn.com/NEWS/STOCK/STO2/4681566.shtml.
464 United Daily News, “President Ma: “633” Cannot be Achieved until 2016”, 4 September 2008,
http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN2/4502786.shtml.
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government intentionally controlled oil and electricity prices. On 28 May 2008, the
Executive Yuan proclaimed the price would be raised and modified later according to
market mechanisms. 465 Although the measurements were helpful for those
governments capable of paying the higher oil prices, the policy obviously hindered
President Ma’s economic plans –his government could not expand public expenditure
to infrastructure building which was the core idea of “I-Taiwan 12 Projects”. 
Meanwhile, the goal of the “633” economic plan would be also delayed because the 
government was forced to change its priority from economic growth to suppressing
inflation. In general, the government always used financial (reduction of public
demand; regulating the salary standard and market price) and monetary policy
instruments (devaluation of the currency) to resolve problems of inflation. The price
of these conservative economic policies was the resulting economic recession and
higher unemployment rate.
Maintaining the island’s international competition in the export sector and the 
work of the stock market become other dificult chalenges for Ma’s administration
when large numbers of purchasing orders were cancelled and huge amounts of foreign
capital escaped the Asian market during the serious global economic recession at the
end of 2008. The island’s economic weakness was revealed: too highly dependent on
the US market along with slow innovation in industry structure. The island still relies
heavily on the benefits from sales of IT products and electric machinery which are
deeply associated with US economic cycle. When the US economy goes into a
recession like the one caused by the subprime mortgage crisis at the end of 2008, the
reduction of IT exports quickly influence investor confidence and force business
owners to reduce staff and lay off employees. Meanwhile, when investors lose
465 The Commercial Times, “Foreign Investment Views on Raised Oil Price: A Burst of Inflation”, 28
May 2008, p. 12.
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confidence in the stock market, another impact is that the domestic housing market
and the car market fall down at the same time. According to the Hsinchu Science Park
Administration investigation, in January 2009 –the most serious period of economic
depression –about 96,900 employees including high tech engineers were forced to
have “unpaid leave”.466 As Shi Zhen-rong, the founding father of Acer (one of the
most worlds famous and leading IT companies) said, the development of high-tech
manufacturing industry in Taiwan had gone into the stage of capital centralization
which meant the industry would gradually reduce jobs offers. If Taiwan is not able to
expand the percentage of service industry inside the island, Taiwan will keep on
suffering the impact from the gradual decline of the Western market.467
Nevertheless, the innovation of industry is after all a long term work. For the
gradually matured democratic society of Taiwan, during economic crises the
government should act to satisfy public expectation and prove its capability to lead
the country out of such crises. Similar to the previous measurement to cope with the
inflation problems in the early half of 2008, the Ma’s administration was now tasked 
with using various financial and monetary instruments to solve the problems of the
depression in late 2008. From September 2008 to March 2009, the Taiwan Central
Bank successively reduced the interest rate seven times in an effort to stimulate the
economy.468 On October 7 2008, the Executive Yuan proclaimed that the government
would provide 100 per cent financial insurance for the small and medium size banks
since those banks had lost NT$188.5 billion in savings when the global financial crisis
stuck the island in early September 2009. In fact, the crisis caused many to bank their
466 Economic Daily News, “The Amount of Unpaid Leave: only 225”, 16 October 2009,
http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN3/5197004.shtml.
467 China Times, “No More Rely on Single Engine of Export!”, 6 February 2009, A.19. 
468 BCC News, “Swalows Come? Central Bank Stop Decreasing Interest Rates”,March 26,2009,
http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!ge5yHEqYAwJclp5zYbw-/article?mid=14877
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money with state-owned banks, for example, the Taiwan Bank increased its funds by
NT$232.1 billion during this time.469 In Asian countries, like the tradition of a high
proportion of people’s saving, the situation reflected people’s low confidence in 
private banks and their concerns regarding potential loss of money during the period
of economic recession. However, tradition and psychology made a poor economy
worse and forced the government to act to save private banks and stimulate
consumers. On 5 December, the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) proclaimed
another risky measurement: the NT$4.2 trillion of public savings in the mail system,
mostly consisting of pension funds for retired people, the public saving would be also
transferred to the commercial bank.470 In addition to the financial aid to the banks,
the government also spent huge amounts on a series of tax incentives and relief
programmes in order to stimulate the market; however, the price of this was further
deterioration of government finances. Up until the end of 2008, Ma’s administration 
had introduced NT$150 billion tax cut programmes, in four major fields: 50 per cent
reduction of stock exchange tax (NT$32 billion), 5 per cent reduction of business tax
(NT$76.5 billion), lower inheritance tax (NT$26 million) and income tax (NT$15.3
million).471 The government also removed NT$30,000 in commodity taxes for car
sales and provided five-year tax-free business incentives for investment in traditional
industry.472 Meanwhile, saving industries –especially those companies who owned
469 “Premier Liu: 100 Percent Governmental Insurance for all Savings in the Bank, the best Patronage
in the World”, CD News, 8 October 2008.
470 China Times, “Chen Chong: NT $4.2 Trilion of Public Saving in the Mail System Wil Be 
Transferred toCommercial Banks”, 5 December 2008,
http://n.yam.com/chinatimes/fn/200812/20081205247070.html.
471 China Times, “The Opium War of Ma’s Administration”,15 November 2008, A17.
472 Industrial Development Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs (ROC), “Five Years Business Tax 
Free–After Getting MOEA Certificate, the Applicants still need to be Permitted by Ministry of
Finance”, http://type.0800000601.com/5tax/new10.html, accessed 1 April 2009.
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core technology and enjoyed high global market shares, but had suffered the deepest
impact in the wave of the global economic recession became another hard lesson for
Ma’s administration. On 10 March 2009, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA)
proclaimed NT$3 billion financial aids for the ProMos Technologies Company, one of
the world's leading DRAM memory solution providers and a major manufacture in
the Taiwan DRAM industry.473 During the wave of serious global economic recession
in 2008, Taiwan’s DRAM companies lost most of their purchasing orders to their 
major competitors, the South Korea Samsung Group, and the global market share
dropped from 40 per cent to 15 per cent.474 The MOEA also considered utilizing a
bigger DRAM company (Taiwan Memory Company, TMC) who enjoyed full
financial support from the government in order to change this poor situation.475 As
usual, the price was even greater losses in government finances, estimated at around
NT$30 billion initial investment and NT$100 billion of National Development
Fund.476 One other huge public expense for stimulating the economy was the policy
of the “Consumer Voucher” before the Chinese New Year 2009. The government 
distributed vouchers worth NT$3,600 to every Taiwanese citizen. The vouchers could
be exchanged for goods and services in shops throughout the country but would
expire at the end of 2009. The budget for this policy is estimated at NT$82.9 billion
and was expected to raise the island’s GDP by 0.66 per cent or even 1 per cent.477
473 China Times, “Xuan Ming-zhi: Rebuild D-RAM, The Government Stimulus Package only Cost 3
Bilion NT$”, 11 March 2009, http://n.yam.com/chinatimes/fn/200903/20090311765220.html.
474 Jenn-hwa Tu, ” Unadoptable Decision Making of Stimulus Package for D-RAM”, Taiwan Times, 18
February 2009, http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!3WucA0uGBR2iZ_41ENM-/article?mid=1562.
475 United Daily News,“The Mission of Integrating D-Ram Industry: Xuan Ming-zhi Jumped into a
Fiery Pit”, 6 March 2009, http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FINS1/4773051.shtml.
476 Ibid., Jenn-hwa Tu, 18 February 2009.
477 United Daily News, “The Efects of Consumer Vouchers: The Government Estimates a Growth of 
0.66% to 1% in GDP”, 20 January 2009,
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The policy was later to be proved successful ; in order to get more vouchers, local
business tried to design diferent “product portfolios” and marketing strategies to 
atract consumer’s atention. This behaviour at the same time stimulated economic
activity and public consumption as people often spent more money along with their
vouchers, not just the NT$3,600. The policy was also more efective than the “Tax 
Refund” policy suggested by the opposition party where in those countries with a 
tradition of a high saving rate, people would keep the refund and save it in the bank. A
high rate of saving is obviously not helpful to improve economic depression, people
will hold onto their money and do not consume, invest etc, economic activity is
therefore passive and the depression will become serious. 478 According to
government statistics, the tax revenue in the first five months of 2009 (January–May
2009) was estimated at NT$520 billion, which was 120 billion less than the earnings
in the same period of the previous year, a reduction of 19.2 per cent from 2008. It was
also the biggest tax reduction in the previous 36 years.
7.4 Ma’s chalenges and its Significance for Taiwan Democratic Development   
Ma’s leadership and the style of his administration were viewed as problematic
and weak when coping with the challenges mentioned in the above sections. This
perspective was demonstrated by the series of major domestic elections after the KMT
went to office in 2008. On 5 December 2009, local-level elections for county
magistrates and city mayors were held. The elections were widely seen as a
touchstone of public opinion on Ma’s performance in the first half of his term as wel 
http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/jw!iMioti2ZFQE3ifW7eoKtr3Io.g--/article?mid=358.
478 China Times, “The DPP Advocates Tax Refund: Premier Liu Refused”, 25 June 2008,
http://n.yam.com/chinatimes/politics/200806/20080625174190.html
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as on the island's new relations with China. Although the KMT maintained its hold on
a majority of the 17 counties and cities in winning magistrate and mayoral positions,
the DPP gained one county, more importantly, it won 45.32 per cent of the overall
votes cast, up significantly from the 41.95 per cent in the local-level elections held
four years previously (2005), and the votes cast for the DPP were only 2.55 per cent
lower than those cast for the KMT (the KMT got 47.87 per cent). The ruling KMT
party, in other words, lost in percentage terms–in 2005 the KMT had a much higher
percentage, 50.96 per cent of the votes.479 In a word, the KMT and President Ma
Ying-jeou were widely considered the losers.
As discussed in the above sections, the rapprochement of cross-strait relations,
global economic downturn, and controversies regarding beef issues were not only new
chalenges to the island, but were also important lessons to Ma’s administration in its 
first two years’ tenure. Although the island’s economy was obviously bouncing back 
at the end of 2009 and Cross-Strait relations appeared at their most stable following
almost 12 years of confrontation following the 1996 missile crisis in the Lee Teng-hui
presidency; Ma’s personal approval rating had plummeted since the election and 
popular dissatisfaction was at a very high level. The people showed very low
confidence in his administration and the ruling KMT party. According to a recent
investigation by Global Views Survey Research Centre, one of the authoritative
survey organizations in Taiwan, only 28.2 per cent of Taiwanese were satisfied with
Ma’s performance and 59.6 per cent were not, 44.8 per cent said they trusted Ma, 
while 41.7 per cent say they did not. In fact, Ma’s approval ratings dropped to their 
lowest level (22.9 per cent) after Typhoon Morakot devastated the island from 6–10
479 Cindy Shui, “Taiwan Elections, A Warning to Ma”, Asia Times, 8 December 2009,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KL08Ad01.html
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August 2009.480 Ma’s administration was criticized for its sluggish response to the 
worst typhoon in half a century, where more than 600 people were killed. 481 Several
government mistakes–including the Central Weather Bureau wrongly predicting low
rainfalls, troops not dispatched in time (until the third day of the typhoon), too few
soldiers to rescue typhoon victims, not evacuating people living in dangerous areas
before the typhoon hit, and initially rejecting international aid–also disappointed the
public whose expectation had been for more efficient and stronger leadership from the
top to coordinate the rescue. The reactions from top officials at the height of the
rescue efort also angered the public and reminded people of the KMT’s old negative 
images: senior public officials were arrogant and easily ignored public needs. For
example, Premier Liu Chao-shiuan had the nerve to get his hair cut and dyed on 11
August 2009; the Executive Yuan's secretary general Hsueh Hsiang-chuan, who was
responsible for coordination between ministries, had a Taiwanese Father's Day dinner
with his father-in-law on 8 August 2009 when the typhoon brought flooding to the
south.482
Before the presidency, compared with the DPP’s coruption and rough 
manipulation on democratic institutions, Ma’s image of a polite, honest, clean and 
dispassionate technocrat who always showed high respect to the regulations helped
him to win the high support from public and freed him from the political struggles
inside the KMT. However, after he went to presidency in 2008–2009, the Ma
480 Global Views Survey Research Centre (GVSRC), “Survey on Cross-strait Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA) and Exchanges Taiwanese’s views on Ultimate Unification with
China and Independence and President Ma Ying-jeou Approval Rating”,Tien Xia Magazine, 22
December 2009.
481 Andrew Jacobs, “Taiwan’s Leader Faces Anger Over Storm Response”, New York Times, 24 August
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/world/asia/24taiwan.html?_r=1&ref=world
482 Asia Times, “Typhoon Turns into a Political Storm ”, 21 August 2009,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KH21Ad01.html
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administration's "closed-door" style of negotiations with China and the inappropriate
response to the public when incidents happened revealed his weaknesses and
problems concerning his personality and leadership. Even the core supporters of the
Blue camp started to consider him as aloof, incapable, indecisive and bureaucratic.
Some members of Ma’s inner circle atributed Ma’s problems to his family 
background: Ma had too much of an easy life, didn’t realy feel other people’s pain, 
and did not have enough training in dealing with adversity.483 Moreover, it is
interesting that lots of KMT politicians considered the major challenges to Ma were
mainly from the KMT itself. For example, as senior KMT legislators Chen
Shui-sheng and Dr. Ting Shou-chung said, how to organize a strong leadership and
work well with the partners inside the KMT were key factors to decide whether the
KMT would be still in power after the next presidential election. However, so far,
along with the failure in the 2009 county magistrates and city mayoral elections, the
KMT have surprisingly failed in the subsequent two legislative by-elections in
January and March 2010,484 revealing that the ruling KMT party is still losing its
basic support, which shows that Ma’s leadership and the style of his administration 
were both very problematic after he went to the office. As two famous KMT
politicians (Chen Shui-shen and Ting Shou-chung) described when interviewed by the
researcher, the major problem of Ma’s leadershipand his team is a blunt and
inefficient style which cannot properly respond to, or satisfy, popular demand in time.
It is even suggested that a parliamentary executive team with a group of capable
politicians would be better for Taiwan to form an efficient government, rather than a
483 Huo-wang Lin,“The Problem is not from KMT Heavy Weights, it is Ma Himself!“, United Daily
News, 29 December 2009, A15.
484 DPP recaptured six of seven seats; the KMT only kept Hualian; the DPP won all three seats from
Taoyuan, Taichung, and Taitung ; two of three from Taoyuan, Hsinchu and Chiayi in March.
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presidential cabinet in which the so called professionals are good at academic theories
but very weak in terms of producing practical public policy, catching the public’s 
attention, and gaining popular support and trust.
Chen Shui-sheng:
Obviously, Ma’s chalenge is majorly from domestic afairs, not the external 
international environment. No matter the impact of the global economic
recession or any changes in the cross strait relationship, the general people’s 
feeling about Ma’s administration performance is always the key elements which 
decide whether the KMT could stay in power after the presidential election in
2012. […] For President Ma and the members of his team, how to modify a
suitable role between professional technocrats and genial politicians; how to
develop a balance between professionalism and populism will be the major
lesson for them in the remaining two years during this presidency.[…] However,
it is obvious that the general public in Taiwan do not show high confidence in the
style of Ma’s administration, despite they consider themselves beter than the 
previous authoritarian bureaucrats or opportunistic brokers during the DPP ruling
period.485
Ting Shou-chung:
The incapable and unsuitable performance of new cabinet members, including
President Ma himself [Ting considers Ma should act as prime minister as in the
British parliamentary system] always angers the public and legislators. The
485 Interview with Shui-sheng Chen, who is chairman of KMT Taoyuan Branch, the former director of
Cultural Affairs Bureau, Taoyuan County Government; KMT legislator (2001–2004), 27 April
2010.
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problems result from Ma’s personal preference of personnel recruitment
(sometimes, maybe prejudice) that he always prefers scholars for important
government positions. […] Unlike legislators, these scholars do not have enough
experience of local elections, away from real public voice, and most important of
all, it always takes a long time for them to get used to the work of legislative, “the 
real politics” which is completely diferent with “theories baking” inside campus. 
The price is not only low public approval for central government, it also influences
the whole party image which creates unnecessary difficulties for the other KMT
elites, especially senior legislators and local mayors. […] For the long-term
Taiwan democratic development, it is better to change the form of central
government from a presidential to a parliamentary system. The spirit of collective
responsibly and the way of complementary principles, the typical characteristics of
parliamentary system are better for creating an efficient government and
developing a capable national leader, which is lacking in the current Taiwan
democracy. 486
The other analyses regarding Ma’s leadership and weak performance of his 
administration point out that Ma seems to make similar mistakes to those Chen
Shui-bian made during his first tenure. In order to be a “President of al people”, Ma 
tended to implement reforms to win more support from the general public, but when
he faced challenges from the pan-Blue core supporters, he reversed his decision and
therefore provided people with an image of inconsistent, indecisive and inefficient
policy making. For example, the KMT government tried to cancel the policy of free
tax incentives for the military, teachers and civil servants (these people are generally
486 Interview with Dr. Shou-chung Ting, who is current senior KMT legislator and has been working in
the Legislative Yuan for 18 years since 1989, 31 March 2010.
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considered as the KMT core supporters) after 2011, however, before the follow-up
legislators’ election in January of 2010, the Executive Yuan suddenly proclaimed the 
policy was only in the process of discussion, not definitely to be executed in the
future.487 Meanwhile, as the KMT party chairman, Ma is even considered hostile and
as having prejudice to the KMT local factions. No mater if Ma’s perspectives of 
“clean politics” and “fair play” are right or wrong, the split between Ma’s inner circle 
and local factions caused problems in the KMT’s cooperation. 
The problems of KMT are not only troublesome to Ma’s leadership; they are also 
a potential obstacle to the institutionalization of Cross-Strait relations. In addition to
the power struggle inside the KMT, the party has long been notorious for its style of
“political business”, in Gordon Cheung’s interpretation, a typical “Plutocracy” which 
refers to an inappropriate patron–client relationship between government and business,
where the elite of the ruling class whose power derives from the wealth and collective
force in driving at public policy and political initiatives which favours private
economic interests (i.e. the KMT enjoys a huge amount of party assets and
enterprise).488 The KMT is criticised for working with the CCP in the same way that
the under-table “intermingling of KMT incumbent power with the interest of top
Chinese leaders” had taken regular Cross-Strait talks and interaction out of legislative
control and lost popular confidence in the transparency of the negotiation
process–both of which are important values and principles in any democratic system.
487 FTV News,“Premier Wu Changed the Saying: Military, Civil Servants and Teachers stil Enjoy Free 
Tax, ”23 February 2010,
http://times.hinet.net/times/article.do?newsid=2669624&isMediaArticle=true&cate=polity
488 Gordon C.K. Cheung (2010),“NewApproaches to Cross-Strait Integration and its Impacts on
Taiwan’s Domestic Economy: An Emerging“Chaiwan”?”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs
1/2010:1-2, pp. 20–21.
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Conclusion
Two empirical findings are found and concluded in this chapter; these findings are
related to the three major hypotheses of this research, but also reveal a new tendency
in Taiwan’s democratic development.   
First, the weakness of Ma’s leadership and his KMT administration is more 
influential to the island’s political economic development than the efects of deeper 
cross strait economic interaction. The condition is also coherent with the theoretical
argument that in a country with lower international economic integration and
openness, the efficiency of new policy and political accountability of a government
will be more directly examined by the general public and reflected in the result of
domestic election. The logic of Ma’s administration conforms with the KMT’s 
traditional concept: economic prosperity is the most important element to consolidate
its power and legitimate any promotion of political reforms. In addition, Ma is the
“third mainlander president” who enjoys an unprecedented level of electoral support
and public trust among most “native Taiwanese”. Along with the decline of Taiwanese 
consciousness on the island, the situation also facilitates both him and his KMT to
have more rational and pragmatic policy making, to seek greater political reforms and
economic cooperation with mainland China. However, as discussed in this chapter, it
is unfortunate that Ma did not make good use of this opportunity to improve the
difficulties of a nascent democratic institution and the problems of poverty inequality,
which was actually threatening to the stability of the democratic system. Moreover,
the KMT administration was also bothered by the unpredicted impact of the global
economic financial crisis at the end of 2008, and their expectation that the
reconciliation of Cross-Strait and economic cooperation would bring the island
benefits was also over-optimistic both to themselves and the general public –the
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effects of closer Cross-Strait economic interaction were very limited and not able to
be seen in the short run. In a word, the closer cross strait interaction after 2008 did not
produce a direct, manifest and complete influence on the island’s social economic 
development. The effects of the series of KMT open door policies to China were
indirect and marginal; most people on the island did not have strong feelings about
these major changes in their daily lives except for those Taiwanese Businessman
(Taishang) who had frequently moved between the mainland and Taiwan.
The other findings concern the legitimacy of the series of Cross Strait Talks
from 2008–2010. The process of political dialogues and negotiations with China was
thought to be anti-democratic (under the table and non-transparent) in that Ma did not
reach a good consensus inside the island before he sent the delegates to the
negotiation tables. It is obvious that the KMT government tended to ignore the
legislative supervision and neglected the need for scrutiny for the chance of cross
strait agreement. The strategy of Ma’s administration was in defining the agreement 
of cross strait talks in the “executive and domestic” levels, rather than “beyond the 
border”; thus decision making could easily be done via the intra party mechanism. 
The method of negotiation obviously violated the basic democratic norms and
principles in terms of transparency and efficient consensus building. Meanwhile, the
work of the Cross-Strait negotiations might not be so smooth and efficient in the
future if there is another minority president and divided government–as was the case
during the Chen Shui-bian tenure, 2000–2008. If a divided government happens again,
similar to the situation in the DPP’s tenure (2000–2008), it can be seen that an
inefficient and inconsistent mainland policy will influence the normal and regular
work of Cross-Strait political dialogue and economic cooperation –undoubtedly the
most important external factor to the stability of the island’s further democratic 
development.
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Chapter 8 The development of the DPP after it lost power in 2008
Introduction
In this chapter, the researcher will focus on the development of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) after it lost power in 2008. As the other major political party
in Taiwan, the DPP’s further transition and whether –since the two party alternation
system had been confirmed after the KMT returned to office in 2008 –it has an
opportunity to return to power are two significant issues to the island’s democratic 
development. Meanwhile, as discussed in the previous chapter, a series of cross strait
interactions had begun under the guidance of the KMT’s open door policy in late 2008. 
As the major opposition party with completely different perspectives on the nature of
cross-strait relations, what kind of strategy the party will adopt and what kind of role
the DPP should play to win public support are not only important considerations for
the party itself, but also a characteristic of the island’s democratic development after 
the coming of this new era. In the first section of this chapter, the discussion will be
focused on the reasons behind the DPP’s failure after eight years in ofice. In addition 
to the general view that the DPP’s fatal electoral failure in 2008 was the resulted of 
the former President Chen Shui-bain’s corruption scandal, the party’s decline was also 
attributed to the long-existing problems of factionalism, a loss of traditional social
support, and unnecessary arousal of social confrontation in the name of consolidating
Taiwan’s identity. In the second section, the discussion will point out that after Tsai
Inn-wen was elected as the first female party chairman in 2009, the DPP gradually
stepped out of the shadows. As former MAC chairman, Tsai’s wealth of experience in 
mainland affairs helped her to make use of the cross strait issue to skilfully integrate
the party’s core supporters while consolidating her leadership with a series of radical 
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protests on the street when CCP high ranking delegates visited Taiwan. Following this,
in the third section, the researcher will argue that the DPP ignored other social
economic issues, mostly related with the island’s gradualy worsening economic 
inequality; this was important in terms of winning the power back given that the KMT
did not work to resolve these issues after its return to office in 2008. In the final
section, the researcher will demonstrate that the best opportunity for the DPP to return
to the power is rising from South Taiwan: rapid cross strait economic interaction is
valuable to reducing the southern people’s hostility to mainland china, but is very 
limited in terms of changing their basic party orientation (anti-KMT) and national
identity (against the idea of reunification with the mainland). When the KMT made
mistakes in domestic and local affairs which disappointed the populace, the DPP
became optimistic that they would win back central power through victory in local
elections, especialy the five large municipalities’ elections which would be held in 
November 2010.
8.1 The reasons behind theDPP’s failure in 2008  
After the loss of the 2008 presidential election, there were many of meaningful
discussions inside the party about the reasons for the DPP’s failure. For example, the 
DPP presidential candidate, former Kaohsiung mayor and ROC Premier Frank Hsieh,
published an article in the China Times.489 In addition to his surprising announcement
that he would no longer join any nation-wide presidential or party chairman election,
Frank Hsieh also apologized to the public for the poor performance of the DPP
government in the previous eight years since he had acted in some of the most
489 Frank Chang-ting Hsieh,“My Introspection and futureperspective”, China Times, 12 April 2008,
A22.
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important positions in the administration.490 Hsieh atributed the DPP’s failure to four 
major reasons. First, the DPP created more social conflicts than harmony–especially
when fighting with the KMT. Second, a series of political scandals –the main one
being former President Chen Shui-bian’s corruption and abuse of government funds –
not only led to the significant defeat in three nationwide elections from 2005–2008
which caused the DPP’s ultimate loss of power, the incident also revealed that the 
DPP had lost its core values–moral courage and justice to prevent party corruption–
which had been the major difference between the DPP and the KMT prior to the
DPP’s rise to ofice in 2000. Third, the DPP did not meet the expectations of civil 
society and was too weak to reduce the worsening poverty gap. Fourth, the DPP was
notorious for its political struggles inside the party factions and was seen by the public
image as incompetent and belligerent. If we use the theoretical framework of the four
stages of democratic development created in Chapter 3 to compare Frank Hsieh’s 
analysis on the DPP’s problems during their eight years in power, it is easy to see that 
the DPP had made various mistakes in different levels of democratic development
(Figure 8.1): Instead of promoting democratic values (level 1), establishing fair and
efficient institutions (level 2), creating the strong social capital (social trust), civil
society (level 3), and healthy culture (level 4) that any democracy should have, the
ideological Taiwanese nationalism and tradition of faction politics (mistakes 3) had
made the DPP, especially Chen Shui-bian’s power circle, unable to make use of the 
490 Hsieh was one of the founding members of the Democratic Progressive Party (the current name of
the DPP was believed to have been proposed by Hsieh) and he served as its chairman from June
2000 to 2002. A two-time Taipei City councilor from 1981 to 1988, and a member of the
Legislative Yuan from 1989 to 1995, Hsieh ran in the 1996 presidential as a vice-presidential
candidate with Peng Ming-min on the DPP ticket. He was the mayor of Kaohsiung City until his
appointment as Premier of the Executive Yuan on February 1, 2005. He announced his resignation
from the post of premier on January 17, 2006. Hsieh was the DPP nominee in the 2008 presidential
election but was defeated by Ma Ying-jeou.
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state machine for personal benefits and consolidation of power by feeding its
corrupted patronage clients (mistakes 4: corruption). The price was that the DPP
gradually moved away from civil society (mistake 2), its major social support, and
increasingly faced social confrontations (mistakes 1). Finally, they were forced out of
power by the public vote.
Figures 8.1: Four mistakes which caused DPP’s failure in 2008 (in democratic development 
analysis)
Definition of Democracy
Pre-democracy Values M2: Corruptions
Electoral democracy Elections
Liberal Democracy Civil society M3: Away from Civil Society
M1: Social Confrontation
Culture
M4: Faction Politics
M: Mistakes
Source: Author’s compilation 
8.1.1 Social confrontation
In addition to the disputed policies that were out of favour with the general public,
the misuse of policy instruments (i.e. referendums, provocative diplomacy) in the
name of democratic consolidation and combining democracy with Taiwanese
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nationalism generated different social conflicts in the eight years when DPP was in
power. One critic pointed out that DPP members had considered themselves superior
in promoting Taiwan’s democracy to their counterpart in the KMT; the DPP 
represented the fundamental psychology of Taiwanese people, and only the DPP
understood what democracy was and where Taiwanese democracy should go.491
However, in fact, compared with the KMT’s previous long standing Taiwanization 
policy–tolerance to opposition and the successful creation of a social economic base
for democratic development – the DPP’s psychology and mentality appeared 
relatively narrow prejudiced and only focused on criticizing the KMT. As the other
DPP political heavyweight Su Tseng-chang pointed out (Su was former Taipei County
Mayor (2001–2005), ROC Premier (2006–2007), and the existing DPP candidate for
Taipei City Mayor in the five forthcoming large municipality elections. Su was also
very hopeful of representing the DPP when running for the next presidential election
in 2012), it is impossible for DPP to return to the power if they only rely on criticizing
the KMT.492 After eight years in office, the DPP did not enjoy any legitimacy of
reform because the KMT was no longer an authoritarian party. The other perspective
coming from the former famous DPP legislator Li Wen-chung is also very persuasive
in explaining why the KMT was more popular and accepted by the Taiwan public than
the DPP: Li pointed out that the KMT’s image of being wel- experienced in foreign
and economic afairs and was stil deeply rooted in people’s mind even after an 
eight-year leave from office.493 As the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 indicated,
Taiwanese people were tired of the chaos caused by democratic struggling during
491 Ze-xun Niu,“517Mobilization: Still Old Strategy?“United Daily News, 13 May 2009, A13.
492 China Times, “Su Tseng-chang: Only by Criticism on KMT, DPP will Never Return toPower”, 22
June 2009.
493 Wen-chung Lee ,”Onlyopposition, it is hard to return to power”, China Times, 11 April 2008.
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Chen’sadministration and preferred the political stability which was considered more
possible when KMT was in office.
Another famous former DPP legislator, Kuo Zheng-liang, pointed out it was
difficult for the DPP to appease people be seen as reliable due to its historical
background and limitations. Most DPP politicians or professionals in government
affairs have experienced suppression by the KMT and many were even forced to
escape overseas from Taiwan during the KMT’s authoritarian ruling period. When 
they were recruited and invited to be members of government when the DPP went to
power in 2000, they found precise policy making and implementation difficult owing
to insufficient and incorrect information, especially in the fields of national security,
defence and mainland afairs. Most civil servants showed high loyalty to the KMT’s 
regime and were unwilling to cooperate with the DPP if they lacked the neutrality
which was an important democratic value. To make matters worse, if these DPP
“elites” could not adapt to their partners and put their sentiment aside then conflicts
were inevitable, and irrational policy making took place. This uneasy situation was a
widespread phenomenon during the DPP’s term in ofice from 2000 to 2008. 
8.1.2 Erosion of social base
While there was very limited expansion of widespread public support, the DPP
lost some of its traditional social base during its eight years in office. Compared with
the KMT’s strong cross-class coalition constructed over 40 years of single party
authoritarianism (including mainlanders, government employees, the military, farmers,
workers, and big business),494 the DPP’s traditional support mainly consisted of 
494 Hai-tao Ju (2006), The DPP’s Social Basis, Taipei: Buffaloes Publishers, p.15.
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native intellectuals, some entrepreneurs in small and medium sized business, urban
middle class, and younger generations. In the rural area, the combination of local
gentry and a grass-root democratic movement was also a characteristic of the early
stages of the DPP’s development.495 After 1990, the public in the central and southern
villages gradually joined the DPP and consolidated its basic regional support in the
southern area.496 The DPP benefited from a resentment in southern Taiwan caused by
the wide discrepancy in government spending between North and South. In addition,
the good performance of DPP county mayors in the south helped to establish a good
reputation, and, where Taiwanese consciousness was strong, was advantageous in
emphasizing the Taiwan’s identity, including language and culture as wel as Taiwan’s 
independence. 497 Meanwhile, the DPP was also considered as having better
interaction with disadvantaged social groups, including the elderly, woman, farmers,
labourers and environmentalists, due to three waves of rising social movement in
1980. As Michael Hisao’s analysis showed in Chapter 3.5,the rising social
movements resulted in a good combination of anti-KMT mercantilism (economical)
and opposition to authoritarian dominance (political).
After eight years of DPP administration, the DPP’s social basis was expanded 
but had noticeably eroded in urban areas and some social groups. The DPP also lost
huge numbers of women and young voters to the KMT; the DPP had generally been
considered as more attractive to these groups due to its fashionable image and fancy
and campaign style. The island’s poor economic performance, worsened poverty gap,
slow growth of income and high unemployment rate were undoubtedly the major
reasons that disappointed the urban middle class and young generations who
495 Ibid., p.41.
496 Ibid., p.56.
497 Hong Liu (2006), The condition of DPP in power, Taipei: Buffaloes Publishers, p.27.
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possessed a strong sense of social justice and were greatly concerned about how to
improve quality of life rather than with politics and ideological debate. 498 On
campuses, the fervour of students seen in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections for
the DPP's Chen Shui-bian was not as apparent in 2008, less than 20 per cent of
students professed their support for the DPP, who in 2004 had received 60 per cent of
the younger groups’ support and 30,000 more voters than the KMT.499
In fact, the DPP’s failure to improve its fundamentaly weak organizational 
development was the major reason for its gradual alienation from the social groups.
Unlike its counterpart KMT who owned considerable party assets which gave stable
support to the development of party organizations and relations with social groups
both in the authoritarian period and after democratization, the DPP gradually moved
to a more “eficient” way of seeking popular (and electoral) support through personal 
performance in parliament (Legislative Yuan) and the media rather than costly and
time consuming consolidated organizational development at the grass-roots level.500
Moreover, the DPP even considered the “traditional” radical, violent and anti-system
street demonstration which they had previously adopted was disadvantageous for
them to gain the widespread popular support necessary to win central power.501
498 Interview with Mrs. Cha-ching Shu, who is the current DPP member of Taipei City Council, 3 May
2010.
499 International Herald Leader, “The investigation of political situation after Taiwan 80’s generation”, 
12 December 2007.
500 The DPP weak support in local level constituency can be easily found in their less share of county
mayors and representatives. For example, in 2005 ROC County and Township Mayors and
Representatives election, the 5th year of Chen administration in power, the DPP only won 192/901
seats (22.25%) of county representatives and 35/319 township majors (23.69%).
501 The strategy is confirmed after “1992 party transformation” when Hsin-liang Hsu acted as party
chairman. The basic idea of 1992 DPP party transformation was that the DPP’s policy should focus 
more on the economic and social issues rather than the radical appeal for Taiwan independence.
This change was proved successful when the DPP won a unprecedented victory (31 per cent of
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Meanwhile, the successful experience of Chen Shui-bian’s unanticipated victory in 
the 2000 ROC presidential election undoubtedly enhanced the belief that sensitive
campaign issues and even a charismatic candidate were more useful to gain the media
attention essential to a positive outcome in a nation-wide election.
When Chen Sui-bian became the incumbent in 2000, the DPP started to realise
that the media did not “favour” them anymore and it was vital that itenhanced its
weak social basis. However, as argued in Chapter 4.4, Chen Shui-bian wavered in
several controversial policies (i.e. the reconstruction of a fourth nuclear power plant)
and his feebleness with regard to Pan-Blue Coalition obstructionism actually hindered
his intention and ability to do anything new. In some aspects, Chen found out it is
very difficult to erode the Pan-Blue’s social basis since the KMT enjoyed 
consolidated support from mainlanders, government employees, the military, farmers,
workers, and big business. By the same token, most of the DPP administration’s 
proposals failed in the legislative check, obviously limiting their administrative
resources–essential to maintaining the relationship with their fundamental supporters,
especially environmental protection and pro-Taiwan Independence Groups; in fact,
before the DPP went to office, the Environmental Protection Coalition and Labour
Frontline had stepped out of New Tide, the largest faction inside the DPP in the early
1990s. The former even organized a Taiwan Green Party in 1996.502In 1997 there was
a demonstration against the creation of a fourth nuclear power plant, at midnight at
the end of the movement it was somewhat embarrassing that even the Anti-Nuclear
Group had quarrels with the DPP.503 The DPP were already distanced from these
votes, 50 seats) in the legislative election.
http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/mjdzx/778128.htm. Cheng Wen-sheng and Wang Ru
(2006), DPP Electoral Strategy, Taipei: Buffalo Publishers.
502 Yi-zhou Yang (2006), DPP’s Organizations and Factions, Taipei: Buffaloes Publishers, p. 32.
503 Ibid., p. 37.
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social groups before they went to the office in 2000.
8.1.3 Factionalism
The DPP’s factionalism was obviously more public and institutionalized than that 
of its counterpart, the KMT. Compared to the KMT’s top-down authoritarian control
which produced mainlander and local Taiwanese factions, the DPP’s factions are 
rooted in different generations who began as a group or coalition of anti-KMT
elements working together to bring about political reform.504 Table 8.1 shows the five
major factions inside the DPP. Each faction was built around a various relationship
and composed of different generations. The members of each faction all later became
DPP major political celebrities, occupied important political positions, and dominated
various directions of the DPP’s policy and strategies. From Dangwai to geting the 
power in 2000, the functions of the factions were always controversial–positively, the
factions performed certain party functions that were helpful to provide a channel for
the party to unify diverse elements into compromises, develop a balance of power
inside the party, recruit political newcomers, and an institutionalized procedure for
efficient nominations for different elections including party and public careers; the
culture appeared pluralistic 505 and showed high respect to democratic values.
However, negatively, the factionalism created the impression that the party was not
unified, drew attention to conflict and dissension, and therefore undermined the
party’s credibility and electoral appeal.506 For example, the factionalism undoubtedly
504 Shelly Rigger (2001), From Opposition to power: Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 72.
505 Julian. J. Kuo (1998), The DPP’s Ordeal of Transformation, Taipei: Common Wealth Magazine, p.
25.
506 Ibid., Shelly Rigger (2001), p. 83.
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created difficulties for comprehensive policy making as the faction leaders and
members tended to focus their attention on superficial and short-term concerns over
electoral victory rather than a long-term and comprehensive policy direction for the
whole party. The growing low mutual trust between factions also confused rational
debate inside the party and faction members tended to attribute disagreements to
faction-based conspiracies.507 Moreover, the factionalism even produced the problem
of “nominal party members”, leading to persistent rumours of vote buying and a 
tendency for bad candidates to eliminate good ones.508 A general case of faction
conflicts during the DPP’sadministration happened at the end of 2007, causing fatal
damage to the party’s unity, and was widely believed to be the major reason for the 
chaotic nomination which led to the DPP’s serious defeat in the 2008 legislators’ 
election. In the process of nomination, a controversial mechanism was proposed to
exclude Pan-Blue respondents from participating in the opinion polls that the party
was to use to choose candidates in its primaries. The “blue exclusion clause" 
stipulated anyone who did not vote for a DPP or Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)
candidate in the previous presidential, local or legislative election would be
disqualified from taking part in the opinion poll. The entire debate is also a striking
example of the anxiety being caused by the new single-seat district system that would
come into effect with the coming legislative elections in December. The proponents
believed that the simple questions in the traditional poll system could not filter out
Pan-Blue voters who would distort the DPP's primaries and thus the DPP's
nominations. The DPP’s primary values were only advantageous for those people who 
enjoyed high support inside the party. Outside the DPP, their support was very low.509
507 Ibid., Julian J. Kuo (1998), pp. 25–55.
508 Yi-zhou Yang (2006), DPP’s Organizations and Factions, Taipei: Buffaloes Publishers, p. 65.
509 The first question could be: "Have you paid up your party dues?" The second question could ask:
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The phenomena is similar to the problem of “nominal party members” mentioned
above in that this kind of candidate may have led in opinion polls but could ultimately
lose the election–especially in the new single seat district system which required the
elected candidate to win majority support. Unfortunately, the new poll system was
finally adopted, with detrimental results for the party. The 11 party heavyweights,
who enjoyed good reputation among the public, were dubbed as the "11 Bandits"
inside the party and failed in the nomination for the 2008 legislators’ election.510 The
"most united" and "patriotic" members of the DPP called DPP Legislator Hsiao
Bi-khim "China Khim" and Straits Exchange Foundation Chairman Hung Chi-chang
"China-bound Chang". The party's nomination policy and exclusiveness had not only
stunned Taiwanese society but demonstrated the huge negative impact of a new rift
between non-localization and pro-localization factions, leading to the further decline
of the DPP. For the DPP, qualification for public posts became based on political
ideology rather than ability. As Chen Fang-ming criticised: “A ‘democratic’, 
‘progressive’ party cleansed itself of dissidents; it became a mockery to Taiwan's 
democratic movement.”511
"Do you hold onto your own party membership card?" And the third could be: "Are you voting in
the primary on your own accord?" Naturally, anybody with any sense will question the efficacy of
asking these three questions, since every party member is going to answer "Yes, yes and yes." If
this method won't work to get rid of nominal DPP members, then how is the Blue exclusion clause
going to filter out Pan-Blue voters?
510 The Liberty Times,“The Failure of 11 Bandits: Su Tseng-chang urged DPP Insistence on Founding
Values”, 21 May 2007, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2007/new/may/21/today-p1.htm.
511 Chen Fang-ming,“DPP needs Way ofDefining Localization”, Taipei Times, 16 January 2008, p. 8.
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Table 8.1: DPP’s Factionalism
Source: Author’s compilation
Name of
Factions
The origin of the faction
(Political generation )
Famous politicians
(highest political position )
Policy and strategy
The Formosa
Faction
Staff from Formosan
Magazine in 1979
1. Huang Hsin-chieh
(DPP Party Chairman)
2. Hsu Hsin-liang
(DPP Party Chairman)
Demonstrations to
achieve political
reform
The New Tide
Faction
Students who became active
in politics in the mid-1970s
1. Chiou I-Jen
(Vice Premier of ROC )
2. Lin Cho-Sui
(Legislator)
3. Wu Nai-Jen
(DPP Party’s Secretary 
General )
Ideological purity
and direct action
over pragmatism
and electoral
politics
The Justice
Alliance
Chen Shui Bian
(President of ROC 2000-2008)
The Welfare
State Alliance
Attorneys who defended the
Formosa Magazine Staff
arrested in 1979 Hsieh Chang Ting
(Premier of ROC)
The Taiwan
Independence
Alliance
Members of the World
United Formosans for
Independence–returned
from overseas between 1990
and 1995
Chen Tang -Shen
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8.1.4 Corruption
Nothing harmed the DPP more than the damage caused by allegations and court
cases involving former president Chen Shui-bian, who left office in May 2008 after
eight years as president and was then charged with embezzlement, taking bribes,
money laundering, influence peddling and blackmail. The short-term political
consequence was reflected in the DPP’s overwhelming failure in the two major 
elections in 2008 (legislative elections in January and the presidential election in
March), which caused their power loss and transferral to their counterpart, the KMT.
From a long-term perspective, the corruption scandal had a devastating impact on the
DPP in terms of the party’s considerable loss of political legitimacy and public trust. 
First, the corruption scandals destroyed the long-established party image and core
values of the DPP. The DPP had always portrayed itself as representatives for justice
and honesty in Taiwan politics, compared to its overbearing and often-corrupt rival,
the KMT. The DPP was definitely cleaner, more honest, upright and free-handed than
the KMT’s frequent vote buying and slandering. Moreover, the DPP was also proud of
its traditional asymmetric confrontations with the KMT who enjoyed disproportionate
administrative resources and party assets. But this time, Chen’s coruption stunned the 
public who saw the illegal behaviour of the Chen family and the inner circle as more
ridiculous and greedy than any other case; people started to believe there was no
difference between the DPP and the KMT. Meanwhile, Taiwan was working hard to
appeal to the international community for its de facto existence and even sought to
return to the UN; the political scandal and its subsequent public investigation into and
sentencing of a national leader512 helped Taiwan to achieve this goal although they
512 The Wall Street Journal,“Trying Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian Jailing in a Pivotal Moment for Taiwan“,
15 September 2009,
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also received shame rather than winning a good name. Chen’s justification that the 
money saved overseas was the public funding for Taiwan’s independence also angered 
the core supporters of the Green Group. In a word, after 20 years of democratization
(1986–2006), the Taiwanese general public was already tired of the reciprocal
collusion between elites and entrepreneurs, misuse of public power for private gain,
and election as a kind of “money game” for very personalistic and candidate-centered
play.513 Instead, they cherished the established democratic institutions and hoped the
institutions could work autonomously, creditably and fairly so that under these
institutions anyone could be outstanding through personal effort no matter how poor
and difficult their personal background, like Chen Shui-bian’s in his youth. Chen’s 
ilegal behaviour demonstrated by his corruption was the worst story of Taiwan’s 
democratic development and the manipulation of the fair institutions which had
actually helped him to rise up in politics .
8.2 The development of DPP after Tsai Ing-wen elected as party chairman
8.2.1 First female DPP chairman
On 18 May 2009, Tsai Ing-wen, the former vice premier and chairman of the
Mainland Affairs Council during Chen Shui-bian‘s administration (also famous for 
her role of convener of the drafting team on the special State-to-State theory for KMT
President Lee Teng Hui in 1999) was successfully elected as the twelfth DPP
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203917304574412742093565248.
html?mod=googlenews_wsj
513 Lynn T. White (2009), Political Booms, Local Money and Power in Taiwan, East China,
Thailand ,and Philippines, World Scientific Pub Co. Inc, pp. 600–650.
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chairman with 57.14 per cent support and defeated her major competitor (Koo
Kwang-ming, a typical hardliner of Taiwan’s Independence, only got 37.81 per cent 
support in the election) by almost 20 percent.514 On the road to rebuilding the DPP,
Tsai faced challenges both inside and outside the party. Externally, a series of
snowballing corruption scandals surrounding Chen’s administration were stil deep 
rooted in people’s mind which caused great dificulties for the DPP in respect of 
regaining trust among the public. Although the DPP defined itself as the best balance
to check the absolute power that the Pan-Blue camp enjoyed, the appeal was quite
weak at this moment as the KMT had returned to the power for a short time and the
general public had high expectations on Ma’s administration. Inside the party, the 
DPP’s heavy defeat in the legislative elections in January and the presidential election
in March 2008 caused by the corruption scandals mentioned above explained the
DPP’s weak survival power base, only 27 (of 113) representatives in the Legislative 
Yuan and 6 (of 25) cities and counties in South Taiwan indicated that Chairman Tsai
was facing the most difficult period since the DPP was formed 22 years ago. Unlike
the situation when the KMT stepped down in 2000, the DPP did not have strong
financial ability and struggled to build a think tank –was composed of government
professionals who had performed well when the DPP was in power –to maintain the
comprehensive political ideas and policies the party had long stood for.515 On the
other hand, Tsai’s lack of experience in elections and her brief DPP membership made
her the target of challenges from influential politicians, especially those who had
acted in the highest government positions and represented the DPP in the runnings for
ROC president –including former vice president Annette Lu, former premier Frank
514 The Liberty Times, “Elected as Party Chairman, Tsia Ing-Wen: DPP will stand up again !”, 18
May 2008, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/may/19/today-t1.htm.
515 China Review News,“Green Camp Think Tank leads DPP to stand up“, Vol.147 (March 2010).
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Hsieh, Su Tseng-chang and Yu Shyi-Kun.516 For example, former vice president
Annette Lu criticized Tsai as being unqualified as party chairman in that she had only
four years of party membership (Tsai joined the DPP in 2004) and did not have any
experience in elections.(Tsai was elected as legislator-at-large in the 2004 legislative
election).517 Compared to other party chairmen in the DPP’s history, such as Hsu 
Hsin-liang (5th,1991–1994;7th 1996–1998), Shih Ming-teh, (6th ,1994–1996), Lin
Yi-hsiung (8th, 1998–2000) who enjoyed the reputation of suffering court martial and
imprisonment; or Chen Shui-bian (10th, 2002–2004; 11th, 2007–2008), Hsieh
Chang –ting (9th, 2000–2002) who enjoyed the reputation of good performance as
legislator and city mayor, Tsai Ing-wen lacked the traditional charisma to consolidate
the DPP’s basic support.518 Meanwhile, Tsai was trying to prevent the DPP from
falling into problems of a split owing to diversified interaction with former
Presidential Chen Shui-bian. After former President Chen Shui-bian's
acknowledgement of transferring past campaign funds overseas, Tsai apologized to
the public and also said that the DPP would not try to cover up for Chen's alleged
illegal behaviour. Tsai also vowed to sweep up any and all corrupt members in the
party and set up a special internal investigative committee for the task. Nevertheless,
to save the DPP from Chen‘s negative influence was not as easy as Tsai expected.519
516 These four people werenicknamed “the Four Heavenly Kings” of the DPP because these four DPP  
heavy weights all rose in politics from county mayor and later acted in the most important positions
(vice president and premiers) in the Chen Shui-bian administration when the DPP was in power
during 2000–2008.
517 SinaNews, “It is Unclear whether Tsai Join the Election; Annete Lu Criticized Tsai is Not Strong 
Enough”, 16 May 2010, 
http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/tw/twpolitics/phoenixtv/20100516/07411446488.html
518 Ibid., Hong Liu (2006), p. 17.
519 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Taiwan ex-President Quits Party over Aleged Money Laundering”, 
15 August 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gv6SiwXWiozgYPCgv00g6f_s2eQA.
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The process of nomination for the next Tainan county election was the first difficult
lesson for Tsai to deal with. In the name of improving the public image and returning
to the DPP’s core values, the DPP preferred to nominate a new candidate and finally
Legislator Lai Ching-te emerged as the candidate for the Tainan municipality mayoral
election in late November 2010.520 However, the nomination process was constantly
under the shadow of Chen’s interference. Initially, former Presidential Office
secretary-general Mark Chen said he would enter the race, no matter whether the
party nominated him or not. Later, there were even rumours that Chen Shui–bian
would run in the 2010 Tainan magistrate election, or the seat to be vacated (legislator);
even though Chen himself had been on trial for his corruption he would be allowed to
run for public office until he was finally convicted by the Supreme Court.521 DPP
leaders believed that Chen could easily win the magistracy if he decided to go for it,
and at least, it would undoubtedly cause a big impact to the DPP’s campaign work 
even though it enjoyed stable and superior support in this area.
8.2.2 Cross-Strait negotiations and DPP’s reaction   
A series of cross-strait negotiations after the KMT returned to power in 2008
provided Tsai a good platform to stage a comeback DPP and consolidate her
leadership inside the party; especially Chen Yun-lin’s five-day visit to Taiwan during
3–7 November 2008. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the second Chang–Chen
520 CAN News,“Talk of the Day–Lai Emerges as DPP Candidate in Tainan, 5 May 2010,
http://daily.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1250267&lang=eng_news&cate_rss=news_
Politics_TAIWAN.
521 The China Post,“Chen Shui-bian May Run for Legislative Yuan”, 13 March 2009,
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2009/03/13/199897/Chen-Shui-bian.htm
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Talk was the first time cross-strait negotiation had been held in Taiwan, and Chen
Yun-Lin, who headed the mainland's semi-official ARATS, was considered the
highest-ranking Chinese official to visit since the sides divided amid civil war in 1949.
The DPP found it was an unprecedented chance to express its basic ideas on Taiwan’s 
status (Taiwan is not part of China) in front of a PRC high ranking officer. A more
radical protest method was preferred as with only 27 legislators in Congress the DPP
had few chances to represent other segments of the population who felt a strong
suspicion toward China and unease with the fast pace that Ma Ying -Jeou was moving
to build closer ties with China. However, too many concessions were made and the
effect was not so efficient after being in office for only five months. To make matters
worse, the attack on Chinese envoy Zhang Ming- qing and Ma administration's weak
and passive handling of the scandal over melamine-tainted food imported from China
had further fuelled unrest –it was unlikely that a large scale conflict would be
avoided during Chen’s visit to Taiwan. Mr. Zhang, the ARATS vice chairman, was 
surrounded by protesters who became violent and pushed him to the ground while
visiting Tainan City's Confucius Temple in the morning of 20 October 2008, just two
weeks before the second Chen–Chiang Talk. These Pro-independence protesters in
southern Taiwan yelled to Zhang and shouted that their island did not belong to
Beijing. 522 On 25 October, about one week before Chen’s visit, an estimated  
600,000 people were reported to have participated in a peaceful protest, named “1025 
March” (police gave a figure of about 180,000), planned by the DPP as a response to 
the mainland Chinese tainted milk powder scandal and as an action to safeguard
Taiwan's sovereignty.523 On 5 November, the third day of the second Chen–Chiang
522 BBC NEWS Channel,“Chinese Envoy Atacked in Taiwan”, 21 October 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7681556.stm.
523 The Liberty Times,“60 Thousand People Shouted Angrily and Denounced Ma’sIncompetence”, 26
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Talk in Taipei, the DPP were unable to prevent the use of violence when Chen Yun-lin
was stranded at the Grand Formosa Regent Taipei hotel for nine hours as
pro-independence activists surrounded the building, where a dinner was being hosted
by KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung in Chen's honour. The event forced the meeting
between President Ma and Chen Yun-lin held at the Taipei Guest House near the
Presidential Office, to move from its scheduled time of the afternoon of the next day
(November 6) to the morning. The high-profile meeting between President Ma
Ying-jeou and China's top negotiator with Taiwan ended after only seven minutes,
with the two parties exchanging gifts at this historic moment.524
The incident brought each group different lessons and the following political
consequences. For the DPP, in addition to the protest march having been the largest
successful mobilization after the DPP lost power in 2008, the movement of riot police
to disperse protestors –generally believed ordered by administration –was criticized
as an over-reaction, and the final domination at midnight helped the DPP to refresh
the public distrust of the ruling KMT–some remembered the days the KMT ruled the
island under martial law and the clashes between pro-democracy demonstrators and
police. Many people accepted rumours that Ma had ordered ROC national flags to be
taken down to avoid offending Chen. Ma met with reporters to deny the rumour,
saying he gave no such orders and repeated that facilities and locations should
maintain their normal look. He added that anyone could protest as long as they did it
legally.525 For the KMT, even president Ma had reassured the public he would not
jeopardize Taiwan’s sovereignty and vowed to ensure transparency in the talks. The 
October 2008, www.libertytimes.com.tw/2008/new/oct/26/today-t1.htm.
524 Cindy Shui,“China’s Envoys takes Taiwan in hisStride”, Asia Times, 8 November 2008,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JK08Ad01.html.
525 United Daily News,“Ma Ordered ROC Flags not to be taken down where ChenVisit”, 14
November 2008, A3.
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Ma administration’s weakness in communicationwas revealed in his inexperienced
negotiations, with neither consensus from the public nor legislative support inside the
party. Ma’s administration started the negotiations through two periods of “unoficial” 
talks: KMT–CCP discussed the principle first and then SEF–ARATS checked the
details. The opposition criticized that the KMT–CCP dialogue was a kind of “black 
box” secrecy and the exchange between the quasi-oficial “SEF–ARATS” lacked a 
legal foundation: the interaction between these two “white gloves” had violated the 
most fundamental democratic principle, at the very least it should have been approved
by the Legislative Yuan and the complete exclusion of legislative monitoring had
intensified other anxieties.526 For President Ma, the issue was about his leadership in
the KMT. Even though he had been ROC president with unprecedented majority
support from central (Legislative Yuan) and local levels, it was still difficult for him to
coordinate efficiently between the executive, legislative and party machines. Ma only
controlled the executive division because the president cannot do anything on
mainland affairs after nominating the premier and the MAC chairman; the KMT
legislators mostly followed Wang Jin-pyng and the major negotiator, Chiang Pin-kung
had better interaction with KMT heavyweight Lien Chan, who was the former party
chairman and KMT presidential candidate in 2000 and 2004. It was generally
believed that the difficulties mentioned above were the major reasons why President
Ma decided to hold a concurrent job of a party chairman at the end of 2009.527
For Tsai Ing-wen, although she had laid down the guidelines to prevent violence
occurring during the demonstration, the overnight protest after the high-profile
526 Shiow-duang Huwang (2010),“Beyond the Border Agreement and Congressional Supervision,”
Current Affairs Review, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2010), pp. 45–55.
527 Nian Huwang (2008),“The Hard Lessons before Ma: Five Tracks and Eight Heavyweight inside
the KMT”in Such a Chen Shui-bian, The Records of DPP in Power, 2000–2008, p. 458, Taipei:
Lian-jing Publishers.
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meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou and Chen Yun-lin on 5 November finally
went out of control and turned into serious violence in front of the Grand Formosa
Regent Taipei Hotel. Tsai later apologized to the public about the violent protest and
attributed the riot to the subversion of gangster, however, the radical movement was
remembered by the public –an image that DPP tends to use violence when they lose
power – Tsai was even nicknamed “Violent Shiao Ing ” which mocked her as being 
the violence organizer while feigning innocence and non-involvement with the riot.528
Nevertheless, the demonstrations were positive to the negotiations in some aspects.
The island’s raucous democracy had left China’s delegate a stronger impression and 
more realistic understanding that it might be difficult for the CCP to win the hearts of
Taiwanese people.529 After all, after 20 years of democratization, people in Taiwan
had got used to conflict inside the democratic system. Even though the work of CCP
negotiation teams seemed to be more autonomous and efficient, in the Taiwanese
public’s eyes it was seen merely as an administrative agency to implement the wil of 
the CCP; that the PRC’s authoritarian system put the party above the state was out of 
fashion and definitely not accepted in Taiwanese society. However, whether a small
and democratic Taiwan would be capable of keeping negotiations equal and talk with
a large but authoritarian China in the future were undoubtedly the most important
lessons for the Taiwanese government no matter the pro-unification KMT or the
pro-independence DPP were in power.
528 Tsai“Ing”Wen has the same second character in her name as Ma“Ing”jeou, after she became DPP
chairman, people started to call her Shiao Ing when comparing her performance with KMT Ma Ing-
jeou.
529 Ibid., Cindy Shui (2008), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JK08Ad01.html.
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8.3 New social issues for the opposition
For the DPP, the island’s long term economic dificulties provided them a clear 
and more easily grasped issue to criticize the Ma administration, and another
opportunity to return to power in the future. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
island’s general public did not feel strongly about the benefits of closer cross strait 
economic interaction. The public reaction showed that even though Ma’s 
administration was expected to reconstruct the island’s economy by cooperation with 
China and focusing on how to maintain economic growth, the policy was considered a
short-sightedness of equal distribution and only advantageous for certain social
classes –especially those Taishang capable of benefiting from the mainland market.
Without a fair or sophisticated policy to lessen inequality, and as more and more
people became the poor class, issues about how to solve the problem of the worsening
poverty gap became the major focus of the public policy debate. Growing resentment
at government performance reflected in electoral support was hugely disadvantageous
to the incumbent KMT and become a potential factor to change the island’s politics in 
the near future. Nevertheless, the discussion of this section will reveal that the DPP
did not seize this opportunity, seeming to folow in the KMT’s footsteps and did not 
provide any new ideas to make use of new social issues gaining public support –
essential to their future possible return to central power.
8.3.1 The poverty gap in Taiwan
The poverty gap in Taiwan’s is a normal case of global economic liberalization.  
With the growth of marketization and privatization, few people can work in the
financial or high-tech manufacturing industries. These people enjoy most benefits;
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control the greater part of social wealth, but require higher professional and working
skills. Moreover, the higher level of professional skills require more training and
education which is costly and concentrated in the urban areas that not everyone can
afford, especially those people in the rural area.
The inequality of job, accommodation and education opportunities had been the
major reason for the island’s expanding poverty gap. According to the statistics of 
ROC Directorate General of Budget and Accounting, in 2007, Taiwan’s Lorenz curve 
showed the island’s top 20 per cent of al annual household income is 6.05 times that 
of the bottom 20 per cent; the average annual household income of the top 20 per cent
is NT$1,835,000, but the bottom 20 per cent only have NT$304,000 (1/62 of top 5 per
cent). The island’s Gini Coeficient had also reached 0.341 in 2008 which is close to 
0.4, the international standard of serious unequal distribution.530 During the global
economic recession in 2008, the bottom 20 per cent suffered the most impact as their
annual household income reduced by 2.76 per cent, but the top 20 per cent and 40 per
cent only reduced by 1.7 per cent and 0.1 per cent respectively.531 In the capital city
Taipei, a very normal 1,080 square foot house costs an average citizen 115 months’ 
salary (9.59 years).532 Meanwhile, in a 2008 admission test, among 1,200 brilliant
high school students who entered the National Taiwan University (NTU), the best
leading university in Taiwan, only one student came from a low income family.533 In
Taiwan, most leading universities are public schools, but ironically, the students from
530 Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan National Statistics
(ROC), 20 August 2009, http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Data/9111910134271.doc.
531 United Daily News,“2008 Global Financial Crisis: Poor Get More Hurt than Rich”, 21 August
2009, A4.
532 Interview with Mrs Jade Wang, who is the agent of Taiwan House, 22 May 2009.
533 Yun-dong Wang, “NTU Entrance is Tough for Poor Students ”,NPF Commentary, 4 June 2007,
http://www.npf.org.tw/tag?query=%E8%B2%A7%E5%AF%8C%E5%B7%AE%E8%B7%9D.
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rich families have more opportunities to go to public schools, and enjoy more job
opportunities after they graduate. The unfair “rules of game” worsen the poverty gap 
since these rich families have opportunities to “reproduce” their superior social 
economic positions for their next generations. Education had thus lost its important
social function, an important vertical access of social wealth redistribution.534 On 1
December 2009, the ROC Research, Development and Evaluation Commission
declared the results of interesting survey, a live vote on "Ten Major Public
Grievances”.535 The so caled “Ten Major Public Grievances” refers to those curent 
social problems which were considered by general public as most relevant to their
daily life and people had high expectations that government should be capable and
efficient to tackle these problems. In fact, one can find that among these Public
Grievances, the worsened inequality of income and property distributions prevailed.
For example, an excessively high housing price in metropolitan areas ranked in top
place and high unemployment rate ranked third.
The controversial tax policies of the imputation system (personal tax can be
offset by corporation tax) and free stock income tax 536 were also “Public 
Grievances” which actualy expanded the island’s social poverty gap and provided a 
good issue for the opposition party to criticise the government in power. The two
taxes referred to are both kinds of capital gains tax (CGT) incentives, favourable to
rich people–especially those capitalists who are owners or shareholders of high-tech
companies. In Taiwan, the government only taxes the deals of the stock market, not
534 Ibid.
535 United Daily News,“NoHit Parade for Public Grievances, No Fast Track for Political
Accomplishments”, 27 November 2009,
http://datelinetaipei.blogspot.com/2009/11/no-hit-parade-for-public-grievances-no.html.
536 Ching–huang Chang (2001), The Analysis of Imputation System of Corporation Tax & Personal
Tax, Taipei: Taiwan Commercial & Tax Publishers.
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the owners or shareholders. Moreover, the shareholders enjoy partial exemption from
personal tax after payment of corporation tax (the imputation system). According to
the regulations of Taiwan’s progressive tax system,those people whose annual
income is above NT$3.72 million must pay the highest rate (40 per cent) personal tax;
however, for those rich people who are owners or shareholders, in general, if their
annual income is above NT$3.72 million, 80 per cent of their benefits are from
corporation earnings. For these 80 per cent benefits, they only need to pay 25 per cent
corporation tax rather than 40 per cent personal tax.537 The policy is unfair to those
people who are not owners or shareholders and is obviously a privilege for rich
people.
As argued in Chapter 5.3, in order to attract more capital flow into the island
and stimulate the weak economy during the global economic recession in 2008, the
series of tax reductions superficially seemed to help the KMT government control the
island’s poor economic performance (temporarily), but essentialy caused a further 
deterioration of government finances, reduced the budgets for public support and
social welfare which are the most important measurements for the government to
redistribute social income and wealth. 538
8.3.2 The DPP still focuses on referendum
While the Ma’s administration had high expectations that the island’s economy 
would be reconstructed and become prosperous after direct links, the signing of the
537 Interview with Mrs. Yi-wen Hu, who is the Section Chief of R&D department, Revenue Service
Office, Taipei County Government, 29 April 2010.
538 Interview with Mrs. Cha-ching Shu, who is the current DPP member of Taipei City Council, 3 May
2010.
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MOUs and ECFA with China, and closer and more stable cross-strait relations, the
DPP seemed to folow in the KMT’s footsteps and did not provide any new ideas to 
make use of the new social issues mentioned above in order to increase public support,
all of which was essential to their future possible return to central power. Like the
proposal of “tax refunds” while the KMT government released “Consumer Vouchers” 
before the 2009 Chinese New Year (discussed in the previous chapter), the DPP still
followed ECFA issues and were unable to raise any constructive criticism or generate
new ideas to persuade the public they had better public policy proposals than the
KMT.539 The DPP still talked about referendums. Tung Chen-yuan, the former MAC
vice chairman of the DPP administration provided five reasons to explain why the ECFA
referendum was necessary:540 Firstly, signing ECFA was definitely political, and not
simple a economic issue because of special relations between Taiwan and China.
Secondly, the government had an obligation to let people articulate their worries about the
possible negative consequences–most public did not actually understand what was going
on and did not have confidence in the government while the Ma administration was eager
to sign ECFA with China (the third reason why an ECFA referendum was necessary).541
One authoritative public poll made by Global Views Survey Research Centre
(GVSRC) supports this idea: although 54.4 per cent of people considered signing of
the ECFA to be very important to Taiwan’seconomy and 55.3 per cent said it should
not be interpreted as being unified with China, there were still 49 per cent who did not
539 The government distributed vouchers worth NT$3,600 to every Taiwanese citizen ,and the
vouchers could be exchanged for goods and services in shops throughout the country but would be
out of date at the end of 2009. For the effects of this policy, please take reference to the discussion
in the previous chapter at page 225.
540 Chen-yuan Tung,“Why an ECFA Referendum is Key?”, Taipei Times, 11 June 2009, p. 8.
541 The TVBS and DPP polls found that 71 per cent and 44.7 per cent of respondents respectively were
unclear about the ECFA. The CICD poll showed that merely 10 per cent of respondents understood
the content of the ECFA, while 47.5 per cent did not know whether to support it or not.
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believe the government would be capable of alleviating the impact of the
agreement.542 Meanwhile, President Ma considered ECFA to be a kind of FTA and so
there was no need for a referendum to decide on such an economic agreement which
was still within the range of rights of executive authorization. However, the example
of 19 of the EU’s 27 members holding referendums on economic integration as part of
the EU indicates that Ma’s view was not completely accurate (the fourth reason).
Finally, the fifth reason is that most Taiwanese supported signing ECFA with China
and holding a referendum as well. Several public polls clarified this situation: There
were separately 55 per cent (TVBS), 63.8 per cent (DPP), and 59.7 per cent (Taiwan
Solidarity Union) of respondents who articulated they favoured a referendum.543
To sum up, the story of signing the ECFA in 2010 in Taiwan still reflected two
extreme logics and perspectives about how to define the island’s political economic 
relation with mainland China (open door or protectionism). Moreover, the debate
regarding signing the ECFA had become the name of the game for two major political
groups (Blue and Green) to win over public opinion and target their own audiences.544
As the major opposition party, the DPP stil atributed the problem of island’s 
worsening inequality of income and property distribution and massive unemployment
to the rapid economic integration with mainland China. The island’s economy did not 
have enough time to restructure and deal with the new environment. As DPP
Chairman Tsai-Ing wen said, “There is no urgency for that kind of agreement with 
542 Ibid, Global Views Survey Research Centre (GVSRC), 22 December 2009.
543 TVBS Polls Centre, “Surveyon ECFAReferendum”, 31 May 2010,
http://www.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/201006/doshouldo-20100601201132.pdf,
CNA News, “TSU Public Polls: near 60% Population Considers there should be an ECFA
Referendum”, 21 April 2009. http://tw.money.yahoo.com/news_article/adbf/d_a_090421_1_1gehg
544 Alan D. Romberg (2010),“All Economics is Political: ECFA Front andCenter “, China Leadership
Monitor, Hoover Institution, No. 32 (Spring 2010), p. 4.
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China. Our companies are doing OK.”545 In fact, when the KMT government aimed
its efforts primarily at residents of central and southern Taiwan, low and
medium-income households, and small-and medium-sized enterprises (including
those in agriculture), the DPP aimed its efforts primarily at young people–especially
professionals and those in white-collar service industries, college graduates,
housewives and, like the KMT, owners of small-and medium-sized enterprises.
Nevertheless, while it is still unclear whether singing ECFA was helpful or harmful to
resolving the emergence of social economic problems, the KMT government and the
DPP both agreed to hold a debate to discuss the effects of ECFA. It was another
milestone in Taiwan’s democratic development history –the first debate between the
incumbent president and the opposition leader for a single public issue, not for
presidential election. The debate was also advantageous for both leaders to
consolidate her or his own power inside the party. However, the debate seemed to lose
focus on the economic issue itself and post-debate polls showed president Ma had
proven more persuasive and scored points with the public by highlighting the fact that
the DPP caucus in the legislature had either not shown up for briefings, or had
attended only to disrupt the sessions rather than asking hard questions of the officials ,
despite the DPP complained they had not received sufficient and relevant information
for the debate.546
545 Taipei Times,“Interview: Tsai says no Urgency for theDeal”, 11 May 2010, p. 3.
546 Taiwan News, “Taiwan DPP Renews Call for True Debate aboutECFA with China”, 30 March
2010.
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8.4 Rises from South?
The North–South Split in Taiwan is generally believed to have risen from the
KMT’s long-term support of the north over the south. As the KMT regime took over
Taipei from the Japanese colonial governor for 50 years, the industrialization and
urbanization happened earlier in North Taiwan. In addition to being the political
centre, Taipei is also the major commercial and cultural centre, the urban area in
which most business headquarters, media and universities are highly concentrated in
and provides more opportunities for economic and commercial activities, employment
and information exchange. Several following economic indicators explain this
social–economic cleavage.
8.4.1 The situation of North-South Cleavage
In Taipei, 52 per cent of people over 15 years’ old are higher educated (colege or 
higher), but in Kaohsiung this figure is between 17–36 per cent.547 In 1987, the
disposable household income in Taipei was NT$400,000 and in Kaohsiung
NT$320,000, only NT$80,000 gap between these two major cities.548 However, the
gap expanded to NT$580,000 after 21 years: in 2008 Taipei’s disposable household 
income had risen to NT$1,260,000 but that of Kaoshiung had risen to only
NT$680,000 (figures provided by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics).549 Not only does the south have lower disposable income levels, but its
547 The Commercial Times,“How big is the North South Gap? “, 24 September 2006, A7.
548 Mei-xia Chen, “The North South Cleavage is geting serious”, China Times, 22 December 2006.
549 Xue-hui Lu,“Investing countryside, balancing South -North”, The Commercial Times, 26 March
2008, A6.
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income growth is also far beyond the northern standard. Along Taiwan's west coast,
the highest rate of growth in income is in Hsinchu City, with a NT$7,200 rise between
1988 and 2006. After Hsinchu, the highest areas of growth are in Taipei City,
Kaohsiung City, Taipei County, and Taoyuan County, only one of these cities being
located in the south.550 In 2005, the employment in Taipei was 1.75 times that of
Kaohsiung; the total working population was about 2.8 million, almost 28 per cent of
the total labour force of the island. Moreover, the statistic was on the basis of family
units, not including a floating population. If the statistic included the floating force,
the working population is believed to have been above 3 million, since most of the
floating force is actually from the south.551 Even though people in Taipei are tired of
the frequent political struggles in the capital, the residents still show higher
confidence in the growing housing market than any other city in Taiwan. According to
the investigation of housing needs in the second quarter of 2005 made by ROC
Economic and Planning and Development Council, the confidence in the housing
market in Taipei city scored 122 marks and Kaohsiung only scored 85.9.552
Meanwhile, in the six years from 2002–2008, the population in Taipei city and
county increased by 200 thousand but Kaohsiung’s population only increased by 50 
thousand.553 Although the regular service of Taiwan High Speed Railroad and
Kaohsiung MRT had already started in 2007 and 2008, the expected benefits that the
two massive and expansive transportation constructions would stimulate the
prosperity of housing market in Kaohsiung seemed to be differ from the local
residents’ expectation that the two systems were actualy more convenient for the rich
550 Cho-shui Lin,“the north–south split is losing its relevance,”Taipei Times, 23 November 2007, p.8.
551 Ibid., The Commercial Times, 24 September 2006, A7.
552 Ibid., Mei-xia Chen, 22 December 2006.
553 United Daily News,“South Taiwan does not only need aRetired President”, 17 December 2006,
A2.
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from northern cities to purchase houses in Kaohsiung city ,which increased house
prices making them more difficult for local people to purchase.554 The other situation
which proved the existence of the north–south social economic gap was the difference
in health conditions between the two areas. The various death rates in the south area
were also higher than the north area. For example, liver cancer patients in the northern
urban area were more quickly diagnosed than those in the southern rural countryside
and therefore survived beyond 3–5 years.555 Meanwhile, underground economic
activity was more serious in the south. Usurious loans and violence were popular
demonstrating that a lot of people in south did not have the ability to pay the loan.556
However, ironically, the training and discipline of police in south region was generally
considered loose and less professional.557 The conditions are believed to be related to
the mass psychology in southern regions, as people in these areas are generally
considered as “more friendly” and prefer “warmer interpersonal relationships” to 
following regulations, including the government officials and civil servants. Moreover,
people in the south had been found to speak Taiwanese Hokkien more than Standard
Mandarin.558 The lingual cleavage also enhanced the differences in political identity.
8.4.2 Diversified political identity
The social economic cleavage and mass psychology had therefore created a
554 Interview with Mrs Jade Wang, who is the agent of Taiwan House, 23 May 2009.
555 China Times,“The North–South Split Death Rate is alsoDiferent”, 31 March 2008, T1.
556 United Daily News,“NorthernPeople: More Space for Negotiation; Southern People, Borrow and
Run Away”, 6 May 2007, A2.
557 United Daily News,“North Nervous, South Relaxing: There is also North- South Difference in
Police Training”, 21 March 2007, A2.
558 Standard Mandarin is officially recognized by the ROC as the National Language; Taiwanese is
commonly known as "Taiwanese"; a variant of Min Nan spoken in Fujian province.
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deeply different political identity in southern region of Taiwan. As discussed
previously, the historical Mei-li-tao (Formosa) Incident happened in Kaohsiung in
1979 and the subsequent series of clamping down on democratic movements
enhanced hostility towards the KMT and gradually consolidated the widespread
perception of discrepancies in government spending between the north and the south.
After DPP President Chen Shui-bian came to power in 2000, his subsequent policy for
equal development in the north and the south received a strong response in the south,
resulting in a major change in voting patterns. For example, the election results in the
major cities and counties of the south were on the whole dramatic, surprising and
difficult to predict for the experts, since most voters in southern areas were considered
as “latent supporters” of the DPP who had not easily been distinguished by public 
polls before elections due to their tendency to silence during the KMT authoritarian
ruling period. These people were generally the lowest social economic classes and
did not have time to care deeply about politics owing to their struggle in their difficult
daily life.559 However, these voters were influential to election results and became
“free” and “enthusiastic” on the electoral date; a situation that was believed to be the 
outcome of a successful mobilization by the DPP with radical issues and a negative
campaign before the election. After the elections, the central and local governments in
southern counties for some years disputed the distribution of government budget,
important public infrastructure projects, and even the relocation of part of central
government offices to the south. For example, in June 2008, the new KMT cabinet
made a financial proposal, a NT$114.4 billion special budget for expanding domestic
needs by enhancing the central and local infrastructure which was predicted to
559 United Daily News, “TheOpinion Poll does Work Anymore? The Green Group Latent Supporters
Increase more in Kaohsiung“, 10 December 2006, A8.
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stimulate economic growth by 0.45 per cent.560 The proposal was criticized by the
major seven DPP county mayors who declared the budget to be unfair and less helpful
to the south of Taiwan and that it should be distributed according to regional
development, not by proportion of population.561 The Ma administration responded to
the opposition that the “I-Taiwan 12” infrastructure project had been designed to 
balance north–south development, not this special proposal.562 In fact, in order to
prevent the DPP from using of southern identity issues in further challenges,
following the 2008 presidential campaign, the KMT made a series of strategies in
name of “listen to south people” but these were criticized as symbolic activities rather 
than useful regional balance policies.563 After Ma went to office, the inauguration
banquet was held in Kaohsiung and the firework show celebrating the National Day
was staged in the Love River, one of the famous landmarks in Kaohsiung city.564 On
8 April 2008, Terry Gou, the president of Hon Hai Precision Industry Company Ltd
and famously “richest Taiwanese businessman” announced an investment project in
Kaohsiung Software Science Park and promised to relocate the transit export from
Vietnam to Kaohsiung harbour.565 The decision was generally believed as intended to
560 United Daily News,“Expanding Domestic Infrastructure, both Blue and Green Group are
Unsatisfied with the Project ofExpanding Domestic Need”, 23 May 2008 ; United Daily News,
“An Half-Year Project of Expanding Domestic Infrastructure, 114.4 Billion Special Budget are
Distributed to Local ,”7 June 2008, A19.
561 United Daily News,“Seven Green Group County Mayors Criticized Unfair Budget Distribution
Proposed by Executive Yuan,”26 May 2008, A4.
562 United Evening News,“EconomicPlanning and Council: The I-Taiwan 12 Infrastructure Projects
will Balance North SouthRegional Development”, 23 May 2008, A4.
563 During the presidential campaign, Ma Ying -jeou went to the villages to know what was actually
going on in South Taiwan during his "long stay" programme which lasted close to 100 days.
564 The Commercial Times,“The National Banquet and North–SouthCleavage”, 2 April 2008.
565 Economic Daily News, “PresidentMa Required: Hon Hai Group Invest Kaohsiung ,”8 April 2008,
A3.
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support Ma’s balance policy of north-south development before his inauguration.
However, the series of measurements was later proved very limited to the KMT in
terms of winning public support in the southern area. The 2009 local-level elections
for county magistrates and city mayors, the first nation-wide election after Ma went to
ofice, were widely seen as a touchstone of public opinion on Ma’s performance in his 
first half-term. The DPP still enjoyed majority support in the main southern counties
and cities.566
The resolution of the island’s North–South split is always debated between
having been policy driven or market driven. In views of a policy driven approach,
except for the re-distribution of government budget and important public
infrastructure projects mentioned above, the relocation of central government offices
to the south was considered as the most useful aspect of the measure as when the
government offices were moved, the new offices would attract more investment and
stimulate the local peripheral economic activities. The critics pointed out that except
for Southern Taiwan Joint Service Center of Executive Yuan and Taiwan Fisheries
Bureau, the major 38 central offices were all located in Taipei which showed the
service to be unfair to southern regional development –seven southern cities with an
area of 27.7 per cent and population of 28.36 per cent of the total island.567 In views
of a market driven approach, the arguments attribute the late and incomplete
development of the southern region to the slow process of industrial upgrading and
transformation. There was no reason why the newer industries, such as IT, Biotech,
(especially oceanic fishing and marine resources), alternative resource (especially
566 Yung-ming Hsu (2000),“TheFormation of Southern Politics in Taiwan? The Regional Disparities
of Party Voting”, Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 167–196.
567 Zhen-ming Sun,“Balancing North–South Shortage, Part of the Central Government Office should
be Relocated to South”, Economic Daily News, 21 May 2008, A5.
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solar), environmental production (especially food), medical, culture, creativity and
tourism, could not have been established and well developed while the southern
region enjoyed better natural resources and transportation infrastructures. The
Kaohsiung Harbour and Airport are the biggest international harbour and airport of
the island, and government had actually put more spending into higher education so
that there is at least one national university in each major city.568 Meanwhile, some
traditional manufacturing industries would still be competitive providing they could
keep up with global market changes. For example, Taiwan is famous for its leading
technology in the leisure boat manufacturing industry. The main 30 companies of this
field contribute NT$200 million annually in export and regional development of the
relative machinery and metal manufacturing.569
8.4.3 The significance of North–South Split for DPP to return to the power
The existence of the north–south cleavage was advantageous for the DPP to
consolidate its power base in these local areas. However, whether the DPP could make
use of this issue to get central power back was questionable; the DPP could not
depend on the KMT making mistakes on this issue, and DPP had not done a good job
of balancing north–south either when they were in power during 2000–2008. Two
good examples are the work of FTV and the failed proposal of capital relocation from
Taipei to Kaohsiung. The FTV station was established by Chai,Trong-rong, the
political heavyweight and famous legislator of the DPP. The TV station was generally
568 For example, National Cheng Kung University (Tainan), National Sun Yat-Sen University
(Kaohsiung) and National Pintung University of Science and Technology are all leading university
which play important roles (R&D, human resource ) in the regional development.
569 Economic Daily News,“Developing leisure boat, machinery and metal manufacturing industry: the
first episode of south regionaldevelopment”, 10 April 2008, A18.
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considered as a means of official public propaganda of the DPP since it emphasized
and defined the mission and direction of the company as promoting and consolidating
public Taiwan consciousness. Moreover, the news or programmes on this TV channel
often reported DPP politicians’ performances and provided them aplatform to explain
and debate for the individual’s or party’s policy standard. However, in addition to the 
headquarters being set up in Kaohsiung city, the major business of FTV was also
finished and centralized in Taipei, indicating that the work of this pro-south TV
station was also market driven rather than policy driven.570
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 2009 local-level election for country
magistrates and city mayors was considered as an electoral defeat of Ma’s 
administration after the KMT returned to power for 16 months. The DPP gained 45.32
per cent of all overall votes, 3.77 per cent more than the presidential election in 2008
(41.55 per cent), and 3.37 per cent (41.95 per cent) more than the local elections held
four years previously. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, in the
subsequent two legislative by-elections in January and March, 2010, the DPP
recaptured six out of seven seats (the KMT only kept Hualian; the DPP won all three
seats from Taoyuan, Taichung, and Taitung; two of three from Taoyuan, Hsinchu and
Chiayi) which showed the recovery of DPP support from the shadow of the corruption
trial of former president and DPP chairman Chen Shui-bian. Although the series of
elections was considered as partial, or not nationwide, it was simply “non-urban” in 
that the major five populous cities and counties of Taipei, Taichung, Tainan and
Kaohsiung were not included in the 2009 local elections and almost half of the
island’s population did not vote on that occasion; the KMT could have a “domino 
efect” and sufer yet another setback in the five large municipalities elections which 
570 Interview with J. Ben Wei, who is director of legislator office of Dr. Chai Trong-rong; Legislator
Tsai is inaugurator and current president of the FTV station, May 23 2010.
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would be held at the end of 2010 after Ma’s administration modified the local 
institutions laws in January 2009.571 Meanwhile, it is interesting that in the named list
of DPP candidates for the November mayoral elections in the five large municipalities,
four of five candidates were political stars rising from southern counties and cities,
except for Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen, who decided to run for Xinbei (New Taipei)
City mayor after shortly winning re-election as DPP chairwoman on 23 March
2010.572 According to the recent United Daily News Public Poll, one of the major
authoritative investigations in Taiwan, for the 2012 presidential election, if Ma
Ying-jeou (KMT) runs against Su Tseng-chang (DPP), a DPP political heavyweight
who will run for Taipei City Mayor (his background was introduced in Section 8.1.1
of this chapter) and rises from the southern region of Taiwan (Pingtong County
Mayor), the KMT might lose power since Ma only has 29 per cent support, almost 10
percent less than the 38 per cent support of Su even though there are still 32 percent
who have not yet decided.573
For Taiwan’s democratic development, the DPP’s return to power is obviously 
not the most important issue and it is good to see that the island’s people are already 
confident to cast their ballots according to administrative performance, regardless of
any internal ideological or passionate appeal or external interference, especially the
military treat and economic leverage from China. For Taiwanese people, the KMT and
DPP are already simply two companies competing for the same market in which the
products are practical policies and governing ability, instead of previous historical
sentiment or choice of national identity. As Mr You Si-kun said, the most important
571 Chi-chang Hong,“TheDPP still has a Long Road toRecovery”, Taipei Times, 14 December 2009,
p. 8.
572 The China Post,“Tsai to Run for Xinbei Mayor”, 24 May 2010.
573 United Daily News ,“Public Opinion Poll: Survey on 2012 Presidential Election”, 19 March 2010,
http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=114&anum=7790
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way the DPP can rebuild the trust of the people is to prove itself as having better
ability to solve the country's fundamental problems than its counterpart, the KMT.
The major weakness of KMT politicians, including President Ma and future possible inheritors
(such as current Vice Premier Eric Chu and Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu) are their common
characteristics and similar personal backgrounds. These people all have an outstanding educational
background (especially PhD degrees from the US or UK) and held important government positions in
their early careers which was very advantageous for them to gain public support and media attention
during the elections. However, after they went to power, their actual performance was far away from
the public expectation, which demonstrates that governing ability is more important than any degree
you have or any position you have held for any politics, no matter you are Blue or Green in Taiwan.574
Conclusion
After the discussions in this chapter, three obvious changes of the DPP’s situation 
after they lost central power are found, and predicted to be influential to the
Cross-Strait economic interaction and political talks. The changes reveal that the DPP
had modified some of their policy orientation and learned a lesson from the mistakes
during President Chen Shui-bien’s tenure. However, some of the DPP’s innate 
weakness and limitations are still the major difficulties for them to make a clear stand
and win the popular support while the island’s economy begins to integrate with 
China.
First, in perspectives of core political values, as a pro-Taiwan faction who makes
eforts to achieve the island’s de-jure independence, compared with its counterpart the
574 Interview with Mr. You Si-kun, former ROC Premier (2002–2005) and Secretary of President
(2000–2002); Mr You rose in politics from his outstanding and creative performance during two
terms as Yilan County Mayor (1989–1987); 8 May 2010.
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KMT, the DPP cannot but define itself as a “Sovereignty Safeguard” and focus its 
criticism on the issue that the KMT is “seling out Taiwan”.575 This political appeal is
helpful for the DPP to consolidate its fundamentalists, but not persuasive or
advantageous for attracting more supporters, including the floating voters and a quite
comprehensive growing number of the Taiwanese working population in mainland
China whose voting priority is stil the island’s economic stability –in which the
island's economy cannot compete without a stable economic linkage, including
China's huge market and manufacturing base for Taiwan companies.576 In addition
to being perceived as a trouble maker in stable Cross-Strait economic interaction, the
political stance that the DPP has long denied of the “One China policy” and rejection 
of the “1992 Consensus” actualy created more dificulties and narowed the space 
and flexibility of Cross-Strait negotiations with the CCP should the DPP have the
chance to return to office and dominate the Cross-Strait negotiations in the near future.
Under these circumstances, it has been found that the DPP’s mainland policy is 
believed to have become more moderate and pragmatic. They learned a lesson from
Chen’s tenure that a provocative mainland policy will not help them to achieve their
goal of independence but may escalate an unnecessary tension with China and social
confrontation inside the island.577 One piece of evidence to support this tendency is
the obvious reduction in the number of opposition demonstrators while the sixth CC
575 Jens Kastner, “Taiwanese Politics take Strange Turn”, Asian Times, 8 January 2011,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA08Ad01.html.
576 Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan Elections Put Pro-China Party in Lead for Presidency”, Voice of
America, November 29 2010,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Taiwan-Elections-Put-Pro-China-Party-in-Lead-for-Preside
ncy-110968749.html.
577 David G. Brown, “Thinking about a Future DPP Government”, Pacific Forum CSIS, 23 March 
2010, http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1013.pdf.
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Talk was held in Taipei on 20 December 2010.578 Compared with the estimated
100,000 protestors who marched while the fourth CC Talk was held in Taichung, the
scale of the demonstration was relatively smaller andwithout DPP’s sponsorship.
Second, in perspective of party transformation, it is good to see there was a
manifest increasing support for the DPP in the 2009 and 2010 local mayoral elections,
indicating that chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen had consolidated her leadership in the
process of power transition inside the DPP.579 The DPP’s victory also shows Tsai’s 
strategy to steer the party towards a more centrist platform has been effective, and the
changed policy orientation towards the avoidance of political ideological debate, such
as the provocative and radical anti-China rhetoric during President Chen Shui-bien’s 
tenure, which had caused unnecessary controversies and confrontation, and even
suspicion from the US. The other efficient strategy which contributed to the
increasing support was that the DPP recaptured its traditional talent in the local
election campaign during the KMT authoritarian control. They have a better and
corect understanding and interpretation of ordinary people’s psychology and 
perception on the minimal change of the political situation.580 When the Cross-Strait
economic relation became stable after 2008, the main two public opinions inside the
island were that people pay more atention to the candidates’ characters and abilities 
and expected a bigger counterbalance to the KMT who enjoyed a huge political
578 Shu-lin Ko and Vincent Y. Chao, “ARATS Delegation arrives in Taipei”, Taipei Times, 21
December 2010. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/12/21/2003491489 ; New
York Times, “Taiwan Protests Flare Over Visit of China Envoy to Sign Accords”, 20 December 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/world/asia/21iht-taiwan.html?_r=1&ref=world
579 David Yang, “Mayoral Elections show Increase in Support for DPP”, The China Post, 28 November
2010, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/11/28/281629/
Mayoral-elections.htm
580 Chi-chang Hong, “Economy Key to Looming Elections”,Taipei Times, 20 September 2010, p. 8.
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dominance after 2008 but showed a very poor government performance.581
Third, in terms of social economic perspectives, as the analysis in Chapter 8.3
demonstrated, the DPP did not make use of the good opportunity of the inefficiency of
the series of KMT open door polices – including attracting Chinese tourists,
increasing Chinese investment in Taiwan, and starting regular direct flights to the
mainland–to produce direct and clear effects on the island’s economy in the short run. 
The DPP did not propose a more constructive or practical plan to solve the main
social economic problems of the island’s emerging “M -Shaped society”,582 the
widening gap between rich and poor, but criticised the new Cross-Strait deals –
especially the signing of ECFA. The DPP considered the pact beneficial only to big
businesses and China, but harmful to those losers including small and medium
enterprises, the unemployed, farmers, and workers in Taiwan’s new economic 
environment.583 Nevertheless, it is reasonable that the DPP’s traditional “leftist” and 
“isolationist” approach584 to Cross-Strait economic and trade relations definitely led
their policy orientation to pay more attention to fair social wealth distribution and
relatively more conservative support to economic development in the mainland China
market. However, the major difficulty for the DPP to demonstrate that their social
581 Dafydd Fel, “Election Season Returns to Taiwan: Prospects for Taiwan's National Elections in
2012”, Brooking Northeast Asia Commentary, No. 47.
www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0307_taiwan_election_fell.aspx
582 The M-shaped society refers to a polarized society with the extreme rich and poor. The middle class
in the M-shaped society gradually shrink, even disappear. This change explains opportunities and
fair competition become fewer and fewer. In a well-developed modern society, the middle class is
the bulk of the society and the ladder for the lower-income group to become part of the upper class.
About more details, please see: Ohmae Kenichi (2006), The Impact of Rising Lower-Middle Class
Population in Japan, Tokyo: Kodan-sha Publishing Company.
583 Ibid.
584 Ibid., Chi-chang Hong (2010), p. 8.
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economic policies were beter than those of the KMT was that the DPP’s traditional 
advocacy of developing high-tech industry inside the island, renewing the island’s 
moribund agricultural sector, and seeking more environmental protection was easily
replaced by its counterpart, especially when the KMT was in power. For example, in
recent times, Ma’s KMT administration has raised many of the same ideas including 
a series of measurements such as taxing expensive property and luxury cars,
developing six new pillar industries, and stopping an offshore oil refinery project in
July 2011 following environmental protests.585 The situation shows that the DPP’s 
attempts to make use of the social economic issues mentioned above to challenge
the KMT’s administration or stop deeper Cross-Strait economic interaction has been
relatively limited and ineffective.
585 Ralph Jennings, “Taiwan Opposition Candidate Would Seek DealsWith China”, Voice of
America, August 5, 2011,
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/east-pacific/Opposition-Candidate-in-Taiwan-Would-Seek-
Deals-With-China-122654379.html.
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Chapter 9 Conclusion
Introduction
The general conclusion of this dissertation is that democratization in Taiwan over
the past 60 years (1949–2008) can be considered as successful, but has produced
internal and external problems of Blue–Green conflicts, north-south regional
development and “distinctness from China” that the direction of democratic
development is abandoning the One China principle and moving toward Taiwan’s 
independence (empirical findings) when the China’s economic power was growing
fast and more influential to the global economy after 1990 . The island’s external 
political economic development and the internal social economic structure were also
actually being reshaped and influenced by the change of global economic
environment.(historical findings). Moreover, these fundamental cleavage and
sovereignty controversies with China (the characteristics are also defined as the
weakness of Taiwan democratic system) are also examined and proved as real and
problematic by the major theories of democratic development (including
modernization, transition , and structural approaches) and constitutional choice .The
weakness of democratic system have negatively impacted upon the island’s external 
political and economic development, including the difficult mutual trust and
consensus building on Cross-Strait negotiations, and a diversified trade policy which
caused ineficient support of the Taishang’s development in mainland China 
especially with the closer Cross-Strait interaction after 2008. The analysis of the
relationship between the weakness of a democratic system and its interplay with the
system’s external political economic development are also established by the major
theories of International political economy (IPE). The more details about the three
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theoretical, two historical and three empirical findings mentioned above will be listed
in the first section of this chapter (9.1) and taken as the evidence to support the central
argument and three major hypotheses of this dissertation (9.2). Two limitations (9.3)
and two applications (9.4) of this research are also found in this concluding chapter.
9.1 Research findings
9.1.1 Theoretical findings
The theoretical discussion of this research has focussed on two major fields: the
democratic transition and the international political economy (IPE). The former
discussion has clarified the reasons, patterns, and types of democratic transition
processes. The various institutional designs and their political consequences were
examined in Chapter 2. The discussion of IPE field looks at: the work of international
economic organizations, the logic of a diversified trade policy (protectionism or
open-door), the currency policy, and the advantages of multi-national corporations
(MNCs).
After applying these theories into the case of Taiwan’s democratic development 
and Cross-Strait economic interaction, three theoretical findings can be arranged and
concluded as follows.
First, regarding the democratic transition in Taiwan, as discussed in Chapter 3.1
Critics and Taiwan Uniqueness (Page 43), three approaches of thinking
(modernization, transformation, and structural) on the reasons for the regime change
are al applicable to the process of Taiwan’s democratization. The successful 
economic development in 1980 not only helped the island to become more
modernized and successfully integrated into the global economic order, it also
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provided the development of this democratic system with greater stability and less
risk so that the authoritarian KMT was not the limiter of democratization but the
biggest beneficiary of successful political liberalization and economic privatization.
Meanwhile, the democratic transition in Taiwan’s case can be categorized as of a  
“transformation” type; the elites in power took the lead in bringing about democracy
(or incumbent- led caretaker government) when the opposition power was weaker
than the authoritarian incumbent (transition approach). The existing ethnic tension
between mainlanders and native Taiwanese was not intense or a threat to the
democratic development since a comprehensive accumulation of social wealth helped
to create a middle class and reduced the ethnic tension, making the process of
democratic development smoother and more peaceful. Nevertheless, democratization
in Taiwan had obviously caused a Blue–Green conflict: a structural cleavage in
national identity, social economic class, and regional development. The unbalanced
regional development was also considered as a north–south cleavage which enhanced
the Blue–Green conflict. Compared with the supporters of KMT, the traditional
supporters of DPP were “the minor urban and rural working classes” mostly located in 
southern Taiwan. Those people were at same time the most “deeply atached to a 
natives Taiwanese identity” and “responsive to ethnic mobilization”.
Second, the democratic development in Taiwan had revealed a uniqueness of
constitutional choices and a series of institutional problems caused by its individual
historical background and political power struggle during the democratization.
Comparing the theoretical classification in Chapter 3.2 (constitutional choice and its
political consequence), it is interesting that Taiwan should adapt inherited
parliamentarism from the Japanese colonizers whose form of government was a
typical monarchy with a parliament, yet Taiwan did not experience any revolution
prior to World War II. However when the KMT took over Taiwan after World War II,
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the form of government of the island was a presidential system with a limited local
election. Add to this that democratizing dictatorships tend to retain presidentialism,
and countries in which the monarchy has been abolished (France in 1848 and again in
1875, Germany in 1919) and colonies that have rebelled against monarchical powers
(the United States and Latin America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries) have replaced monarchs with presidents (see Chapter 3.2). The difference
here is that the Japanese monarchical powers were withdrawn by the United States,
and not by a successful rebellion from the island; therefore, the form of the ROC
government undoubtedly experienced the typical problems of a presidential system –
especially the divided government and minority president–after democratization and
maturation of the multiparty system. Even though the later electoral reform had
produced a majority formula which led to a two-party alternation system with more
stability, professionalism and clear accountability (Table 3.1: Democratic
Performance of Presidential, Westminster and Consensus Models), there was an
unclear division between president and premier and hence the problem of a divided
government with a minority president mentioned above. Historical evidence will
support these theoretical findings in the discussion that follows in Chapter 9.2.2
(historical findings).
The third theoretical finding concerns the analysis of the island’s democratic 
development in international political economic perspectives. As discussed in Chapter
4 (IPE Theories and Cross-Strait Relations), China’s growing economic power and 
rapid Cross-Strait economic interaction created three major difficulties for Taiwan to
face, as follows. First, the difficulty concerning the increasingly limited international
space for economic activities and subsequent marginalization from the global
economic order due to China’s intentional obstruction (One-China policy driven).
China had played the role of a regional hegemonic power which was advantageous for
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its bilateral economic interaction in East Asia. Even though China could not compete
with the US superpower who led the multilateral-cooperation in worldwide
international organizations, the growing regional economic influence was strong
enough to block the island’s space for international economic activities. The second
difficulty for Taiwan was the negative effect of the rapid movement of Taishang. As
discussed in Chapter 4.3 (the role of Taishang), Taishang are defined as another kind
of multi-national corporation (MNC) and enjoy five typical advantages (monopoly,
location, ownership, international and technology) by entering the Chinese market.
Even though the relocation of Taishang was considered a “reluctant” movement it was 
necessary in order for them to keep their international competiveness, the rapid
exodus of Taishang caused a “holowing out” of the island’s industries, the destruction 
of the internal vertical division of labour, and higher unemployment in which labour
intensive plants fled and low-paid mainland workers “took jobs away”. The third 
dificulty for Taiwan concerned the efects on the island’s further political 
development. As per the three conclusions of Chapter 4, the rapid cross-strait
economic exchange (open door or protectionism) would enhance the existing
Blue–Green conflicts as each group diversified, there were even contradictory
perspectives on the priority of development, the role of China, Cross-Strait trade
relations, the island’s economic security, and domestic interests. While the KMT Blue 
camp still believed that peaceful and smooth cross-strait interaction and economic
prosperity were the best guarantee for the island’s further democratic development, 
the DPP Green group criticized that closer Cross-Strait economic interaction was only
advantageous for the capitalists and not for the general public on the island as a whole.
(The DPP constantly criticized that the KMT only paid attention to the northern
interests as most capitalists lived in the north of Taiwan.) Under the threat of the small
island’s asymmetric dependence on the huge Chinese domestic market, Taiwan would
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lose its political sovereignty and economic security (i.e. the loss of core technology) if
the development of island relied only on the benefits from cross-strait economic
interaction.
9.1.2 Historical findings
The empirical studies of this research are divided into two parts for discussion.
The former and this (historical finding) part of the discussion concerns the almost 60
years of Taiwan’s political economic development history, 1949–2008. Several
characteristics and paterns of Taiwan’s democratic development have been 
indentified in addition to useful evidence to support the theoretical findings
mentioned above. The historical findings can be concluded in the following two
dimensions.
First, while reviewing the highest political values and their influence on decision
making and relative measurements, the most significant change in characteristics is
that the successful economic growth in the 1980s and the democratization in the
1990s had given the island’s leaders increased confidence and greater motivation to 
seek more autonomy. This psychology gradually led the leaders to abandon the
One-China principle and go down the road of independence. In the discussion of
Chapter 5 (Pre- democracy of Taiwan: under two Chiang’s authoritarian control), the 
researcher found that despite the local elections since 1951, Chiang Ching-kuo’s 
Taiwanization policy and tolerance on the growth of the opposition were efficient
democratic measurements that provided the island’s populace with a certain degree of 
political participation and were also very helpful for the KMT mainlanders to reduce
tension with local Taiwanese. The fundamental logic and values of the two Chiang’s 
authoritarian control period were the recovery of mainland China, and the function of
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democratic ROC in Taiwan as the role model for further political development in the
mainland. After two Taiwanese presidents, Lee tung-hui and Chen Sui-bian, went to
office during 1990–2008, the fundamental logic of political reforms had changed from
a “role model” for China to a “distinction from China” demonstrating that Taiwan was 
a modern democratic country. Even though the series of political reforms, including
Lee’s three stages of constitutional revisions and Chen’s promotion of public 
referendum, were perceived as the means of a political struggle, and not a result of
rational calculation, the abolition of the National Assembly, the Provincial
Government and reduction by half of legislators were considered efficient political
reforms that contributed to the normal work of Taiwan’s democratic system.  
The second historical finding relates to an external change of Taiwan’s 
international political economic development. As the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6
showed, the island’s economic development was dominated by the two super powers, 
the United States and China. China’s growing economic power after 1990 was 
undoubtedly the milestone of the island’s direction in its external political economic
development, which also reshaped the island’s internal social economic structure. 
Before 1980, along with two-Chiang authoritarian control and US military protection
and economic aid, the external peace and internal stability had helped the island
achieve a rapid economic recovery after World War II, and successful industrial
upgrading and integration into the global market during the 1970–1980s. After 1980,
huge number of Chinese workers started to enter the international division of labour,
accompanied by a rapid exodus of Taishang (Taiwanese businessman), Taiwan started
to lose its share of global economic advantages at the bottom end of the economical
product life cycle. This also worsened the condition of the island’s social economic
inequality and Blue-Green confrontations in politics. As discussed in Chapter 3.5
(Critics and Taiwan Uniqueness), the Blue-Green conflict was a structural cleavage in
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national identity (reunification or independence), social class (capitalists or labour
interests), and regional development (north–south). When Taiwan moved her focus to
the growing Chinese market, regardless of the island’s wilingness or reluctance, 
sovereignty controversies between Taiwan and China had made Cross-Strait
economic issues unavoidable and increasingly complex for any prominent leader to
take domestic political factors into consideration.
9.1.3 Empirical findings
The other empirical studies of this research are the discussions about the
democratic development, the Cross-Strait economic interaction, and the role of the
two main political parties (DPP and KMT) after the second party alternation in 2008.
Two empirical findings are clarified and concluded in Chapter 7 (The Democratic
Development and Cross-Strait Relations after KMT’s Return to Power) and Chapter 8 
(The Development of DPP after it Lost Power in 2008).
First, the weakness (Blue-Green cleavage) and problems (risk of minority
president and divided government) of the nascent democratic system had caused
dificulties for the island’s external political economic development, especialy on the 
further work of Cross-Strait economic interaction and political negotiations. As
concluded in Chapter 7, the strategy of the Ma’s administration was concentrated on 
defining the agreement of Cross-Strait talks at the “executive and domestic” level, 
rather than “beyond the border”, and thus the intra party mechanism could easily 
perform decision making functions. The methods of negotiation obviously violated
basic democratic norms and principles in terms of transparency and efficient
consensus building with the opposition. Meanwhile, the smoothness and efficiency of
future cross-strait negotiations with another minority president and divided
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government would likely be affected. If a divided government were to happen again,
similar with the situation in the DPP’s tenure (2000–2008), it can be seen that an
inefficient and inconsistent mainland policy will likely influence the normal and
regular work of cross-strait political dialogues and economic cooperation.
Second, the closer Cross-Strait interaction after 2008 did not produce a direct,
manifest and complete influence on the islands internal social economic development.
The efects of the series of KMT’s open door policiesto China was indirect and
marginal and most people on the island did not have strong feeling about these major
changes in their daily lives–except for those Taiwanese Businessman (Taishang) who
had frequently moved between the mainland and Taiwan. The discussion in Chapter 8
revealed that the DPP also made use of these opportunities to criticize the KMT’s 
open door policies, especially the signing of MOU and ECFA. However, the major
finding of Chapter 8 was the island’s long-term economic difficulties (expanding
social economic inequality) and existing uneven north–south regional development. If
the incumbent KMT cannot deal with these problems in the future well, it is really a
possible opportunity for the DPP to return to central power.
9.2 Test of hypothesis
First, after the historical discussion and empirical research, Hypothesis 1 is proved
as correct, the function of democracy for Taiwan is providing a distinction from CCP
China and rejecting a further political integration with mainland. However, the basic
logic and direction of the function has gradually transformed from consolidating the
KMT’s minority control and reducing internal ethnic conflicts (tension between 
mainlanders and native Taiwanese) to rejecting the possibility of future reunification
with China. In the two Chiang authoritarian control period, the promotion of limited
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democracy (the holding of local elections since 1956) had helped the KMT to
consolidate its power and legitimacy of regime while the KMT was made up of
minority mainlanders who immigrated to Taiwan in 1949 and started to face a series
of foreign setbacks when Communist China established official foreign relations with
the US and gradualy replaced Taiwan’s seats in the international organizations. Later, 
when the two Taiwanese presidents, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, came to power
(1988–2008), the idea of democracy was still a useful tool for the island to
consolidate its legitimacy and power to distinguish itself from mainland China while
gradually transforming its logic and direction. The successful birth of democracy was
no longer just a demonstration for further political development in mainland China; it
had become another mechanism for the island to reject further political integration
with China, and perhaps the best reason to build an independent country. In a word,
democratization can be considered as the process of abandoning the One-China
principle.
The second theoretical hypothesis concerns the work and problems of the
island’s established democratic institutions (Hypothesis 2). The historical discussion
in Chapters 5 and 6 provided evidence that eagerness to highlight the achievement of
the island’s democratic development was actualy the cause of several shortcomings 
and weaknesses (these problem can be also considered as an inappropriate
institutional transplant from other leading countries) in the established institutions –
including the confusing form of central government, high possibility of
executive–legislative deadlock (when there is a minority president) and
disproportionate outcome of electoral vote and seats for legislator elections. Moreover,
on the contrary, the institutional problems also produced difficulties when a political
party enjoyed a majority in the executive and legislative bodies. As discussed in
Chapter 7 (The democratic development and Cross-Strait Relations after KMT back to
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power in 2008), by making use of the confusing forms of central government and
unclear responsibility and division between President and Premier, it is obvious that
the KMT government tended to ignore the legislative supervision and neglect the need
of scrutiny for the risk of cross strait agreement after they went to central office after
2008. The strategy of the Ma’s administration was to define the agreement of cross
strait talks in the “executive and domestic” level, rather than “beyond the border”, and 
thus decision making can be easily performed via the intra party mechanism. The
method of negotiation has obviously violated the basic democratic norms and
principles in terms of transparency and efficient consensus building.
The third hypothesis of this research argued that deeper integration with the
mainland China market might have caused deterioration in the existing problems of
the island’s social economic inequality, and was perhaps even advantageous for the
development of extremist politics. However, this researcher found the situation was
not as serious as predicted; the closer cross-strait interaction after 2008 did not
produce a direct, manifest and complete influence on the island’s social economic 
development. The island’s economic integration with mainland China in some aspects 
could be considered as a part of the economic globalization. There is simply a certain
small part of the Taiwanese populace who are involved in the waves of immigration
and investment in China. In other words, even though the Ma’s administration’s series 
of open door policies, including expanding direct links, mainland tourists visiting ,and
signing of MOUs and ECFA, were actually a big step towards closer cross-strait
economic cooperation, as argued in Chapter 7 (The Democratic Development and
Cross-Strait Relations after KMT Returned to Power in 2008), the effects of these
measurement were still very limited and marginal and most people on the island
(except for those Taiwanese Businessman (Taishang) who frequently moved between
the mainland and Taiwan) did not have strong feelings about these major changes in
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their daily lives.
9.3 The limitations and further implications of this research
9.3.1 Limitations
The first limitation of this research is that the discussion about democratic values
only focuses on the ideas of the core political elite (highest leaders). This approach is
useful while studying the democratic values in the two-Chiang’s authoritarian control 
period since the populace did not have influence on policymaking. However,
afterwards, when martial law was lifted in 1986, the island’s society became more 
diversified and liberal for greater political participation. Therefore, the more
comprehensive understanding about public perspectives and expectations on the
development of democratic institutions and systems that is necessary relies on a
quantitative research, not just the qualitative method adopted in this research.
The second limitation concerns the research of Taishang. The effect of the rapid
movement of Taishang is not just an economic issue. Their special working and life
experience in mainland China are undoubtedly influential to the development of their
political thinking and perspectives on democratic development, especially the
mentality of their younger generation who stay even longer in China than their parents.
While more and more people emigrate from Taiwan to mainland China, it cannot be
ignored that the immigrants still have basic, but very powerful, democratic rights:
voting for the highest political position. Therefore, further investigation about the
political thinking and effects of this group of people is of interest and worthy of
further investigation. So far, the result of this essay predict and assume that the
Taishang and their younger generation will have stronger democratic values, the
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Taiwan identity, support of a democratic system, and more political participation than
the people on the island since their initial contact with the CCP has enhanced their
views concerning the values of and confidence in the established democratic systems.
9.3.2 Applications
As the second empirical finding mentioned in the previous section, the work of
Cross-Strait negotiations might not be so smooth and efficient in the future if there is
another minority president and divided government like the situation during the Chen
Shui-bian tenure between 2000 and 2008. In long-term perspectives, the most difficult
lesson for the nascent democracy in the future is whether a small island with a
democratic system is capable and effective to cope with the challenge from a big
authoritarian communist country. The asymmetric institutional competition is also an
interesting topic which is worthy for further comprehensive research and investigation.
So far, the situation is not all bad news for Taiwan. After the research of this essay, it
can been seen that the CCP was antagonistic if Taiwan wanted to secede from China,
but did not show any disagreement on the island’s democratic development (i.e. 
neither the official Chinese delegates of Cross-Strait talks nor the general mainland
tourists show any great reaction to the protest and demonstrations on the street which
were organized by the DPP or any other anti-CCP opposition groups). The situation
demonstrates that the closer Cross-Strait interaction were not an entirely negative
component of the island’s democratic development. It also explains that to some
extent, , when China is happy to see themselves become another international
superpower in the eyes of international community, contrasting with its strong
military and economic performance , the CCP‘s authoritarian control appears out of
fashion and weak to deal with internal problems especially the corruptions inside
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party. However, whether CCP would consider the democracy as a mechanism to bring
the authoritarian regime a new legitimacy, help CCP itself to transform to a
democratic party, and even accept the existence of opposition and dissidents who are
currently considered by CCP as a“destructionforce”. The issue is worthy of a further
investigation, and it is also necessary to understand the possible pattern of political
forms and its relation with Taiwan democratic experience. The relations means that
China will imitate, learn the lessons from Taiwan, or create an individual style of
Chinese democracy which is totally different with Taiwan democratic system.
For Taiwan’s democratic development, the researcher of this essay defines the
distinct feeling and mentality between immigrated Taishang and the island’s general 
public as another kind of “east–west cleavage”. Along with the existing north–south
cleavage, the unequal regional development discussed in Chapter 8, the “east–west
cleavage” can be considered as a new social economic structure of Blue–Green
conflicts (more immigrated Taishang support the Blue camp; more island’s general 
public support the Green camp) and reflect different attitudes to the island’s further 
democratic development. For those Taishang in mainland China, in order to ensure
economic benefits from the mainland market, stable Cross-Strait relations are
preferred and require more efficient negotiations between the two governments.
Therefore, the evaluation and expectation of the democratic system of this group of
people might be lower than the island’s general public who are concerned more about 
the issues of fair social wealth distribution, including unemployment, income, and
social welfare. Moreover, the other significant difference also supports this idea.
Compared with their compatriots in mainland China, people in Taiwan have enjoyed
and exercised their political right to vote for years. These important political rights
definitely enhance their understanding and support of the democratic system. In recent
times, the ROC government has been evaluating the possibility of postal and proxy
294
voting for Taishang–even setting up special polling stations in mainland China. The
effects and political consequences of this measurement make an interesting topic and
a new dimension which is worthy of further research and investigation.
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